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ABSTRACT 
Operators called 'logical connectives' convey in a 
precise way the logical relationships between truth 
functional propositions and hence determine what can be 
inferred from them. Mathematical reasoning therefore 
relies heavily on their use. Whilst the operators are 
free of ambiguity, this is not so for the linguistic 
items (called 'linguistic connectives') by which they 
are codified. In English, at least, there is a widely 
reported mismatch between the logical concepts and the 
'meanings' of the linguistic connectives with which 
they are frequently identified. 
This study compares the provision for expressing 
logical concepts in Japanese, Arabic and English and 
seeks to ascertain to what extent the problems reported 
for English are generalisable to the other two 
languages. 	 It also aims to establish whether the 
concepts underlying certain logical connectives are 
'more readily available' or 'better established' in the 
speakers of one or other of these languages and, if so, 
whether this can be attributed to differing provision 
in the lexicon. 
Two experiments were carried out using as subjects 
adults who were native speakers of either English, 
Japanese or Arabic. One was designed to determine to 
what extent the appropriate linguistic connectives in 
each of the three languages convey the associated 
logical concepts. The second compared performance on 
five concept identification tasks where the concepts 
tested were conjunction, inclusive and exclusive 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional. 
The results indicated no significant differences 
between language groups in the understanding of the 
linguistic expressions of logical connectives. 
However, the Japanese language group consistently 
outperformed the other two groups in all five concept 
identification tasks and also offered descriptions of 
these concepts which were more succinct and less 
variable. 	 Possible explanations for the superior 
performance of the Japanese group are suggested and 
some implications for the teaching and learning of 
mathematics proposed. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The context for this research project is the very broad 
question of whether mathematics might be easier to do 
and to learn in some languages rather than others. 
Human languages exhibit an extraordinary diversity; 
they differ in their phonology, in the categories for 
which they provide labels and in the grammatical rules 
which legislate how lexical units are combined. Could 
it be that the native speakers of certain languages 
have an advantage when it comes to learning mathematics 
because their language possesses structural features 
which in some way facilitate the formation of 
mathematical concepts? 
Mathematical reasoning relies heavily on the use of 
'logical connectives'. 	 Essential to any process of 
mathematical inference is knowing what can be deduced 
from a set of statements whose truth is established or 
assumed. Logical connectives convey in a precise and 
unambiguous way the relationship between propositions 
and hence determine what can be inferred from them. 
However, whilst the operators themselves are free of 
ambiguity, this is not the case for the linguistic 
terms (often called 'linguistic connectives') which are 
used to codify the logical operations. For instance, 
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there is ample evidence that, in English at least, a 
conditional statement such as 'If you clean the car, 
I'll give you £5' is not understood as conditional in 
the logical sense, i.e. false only when the addressee 
cleans the car and doesn't receive £5. In chapter 3 
logical connectives are described together with the 
English language items which are commonly taken to 
express the logical relations which they define. Also 
described are the many ways in which these linguistic 
connectives fail to match up with the associated 
logical concepts. 
Research published in English has dealt almost 
exclusively with the problems of expressing logical 
operations in that language. However, languages vary a 
great deal in the richness of their linguistic 
connective vocabulary and also in the grammatical 
structures which are used to convey logical concepts. 
It is by no means obvious that the problems reported 
for English language connectives should be universal 
features of all languages and yet this often seems to 
be the implicit (but unsupported) assumption. 
The purpose of this project is to compare the provision 
for expressing logical concepts in Japanese and Arabic 
and to ascertain to what extent the problems reported 
for English speakers are generalisable to these two 
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language groups. More specifically, do these languages 
provide connectives which convey the associated logical 
concepts more precisely than English does? Or is there 
a mismatch between what are normally assumed to be 
linguistic expressions of logical forms similar to that 
reported for English? Also, are certain logical 
concepts 'more readily available' or 'better 
established' in the speakers of one or other of these 
languages and, if so, can this be attributed to 
differing provision in the lexicon? 
There are two reasons why these particular languages 
were chosen. The first is that Japanese, English and 
Arabic belong to different 'language families'. Each 
is believed to stem from a different linguistic origin 
and hence we might expect significant structural 
differences between them. The second reason is 
pragmatic - the availability of a local source of 
native speakers to use as experimental subjects. 
This empirical and exploratory study aims to contribute 
to two major areas of debate. The first is the 
validity of the so-called 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis', a 
theory which proposes that our thought processes are 
influenced by the language we speak. The second 
concerns issues surrounding the relationship between 
logic and deductive reasoning. It is all too apparent 
12 
that even intelligent, educated adults make errors of 
reasoning which any model of the underlying thinking 
processes must attempt to explain. Whilst the source 
of these errors is not entirely clear, the 
comprehension process is clearly a prime candidate when 
reasoning is from verbal or written material. 	 If a 
language conveys logical relationships unambiguously, 
then a potential source of fallacious reasoning is 
eliminated and one might expect the incidence of 
certain kinds of error to be minimised. Whilst this 
study does not attempt to compare deductive reasoning 
across language groups, it does seek to identify 
factors which might differentially influence reasoning 
performance. 
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Chapter 2 
LANGUAGE AND MATHEMATICS 
The nature and extent of the relationship between 
language and thought has been, and remains, the subject 
of considerable controversy. At one extreme we have 
the view expressed in the so-called 'Whorfian 
hypothesis' (alternatively known as the 'Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis'), formulated in the 1920s and 30s by the 
anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin 
Lee Whorf. This proposes that the language we speak 
imposes upon us a particular way of viewing the world 
and hence the way in which we think about the world. 
'We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and 
ascribe significances as we do, largely because we 
are parties to an agreement to organize it in this 
way - an agreement that holds throughout our 
speech community and is codified in the patterns 
of our language. ... We are thus introduced to a 
new principle of relativity, which holds that all 
observers are not led by the same physical 
evidence to the same picture of the universe, 
unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, 
or can be in some way calibrated.' (Whorf, 1956, 
pp 212 - 214) 
Although there is considerable difference of opinion as 
to the validity of Whorf's theory, it is not now 
generally accepted in its 'strong' form - that language 
determines behaviour and thought. The view that a 
language imposes such rigorous constraints on the 
cognitive functioning of its user has implications 
which are both depressing and untenable. True 
communication between different cultural groups would 
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be, at best, severely limited and the problems faced by 
the second language learner would be sufficiently 
daunting to discourage the attempt. Yet we are told 
that some ideas, easily expressible in one language, 
are difficult to translate into another and that 
bilinguals think differently depending upon the 
language they are using (see, for instance: Wierzbicka, 
1985; 	 Ervin-Tripp, 1964). 	 It is evident that 
languages differ greatly in the aspects of the physical 
world which they label and also in the rules which they 
provide for stringing together basic semantic units. 
The notion that dissimilar languages influence the 
thought processes of their respective users in 
different ways is therefore intuitively appealing. 
Words are used to label concepts - mental 
representations which group together items on the basis 
of shared similarities. In effect, the 'meaning' of a 
word amounts to the concept underlying it. One current 
view is that knowledge is represented in memory in 
units called 'schemata' (see, for instance: Rumelhart, 
1980; Cohen and Murphy, 1984). Corresponding to a 
concept is a schema which incorporates its essential 
features and their interrelations. 
	 Attached to 
schemata are variables, each associated with a feature 
of the concept which is not constant across exemplars. 
For example, associated with the concept 'dog' would be 
such variables as colour, size, length of hair, etc. 
Constraints on the variables define their normal range. 
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However, the constraints are not binding and they allow 
for encountering unusual values and also for 
correlating the value of a particular variable with 
those of others to which it is related. Schemata are 
not simply definitions. They are self-regulating and, 
when activated, are capable of assessing how well they 
fit the data currently being processed. It is proposed 
(Rumelhart, 1980) that schemata represent knowledge at 
every level of abstraction and that they play a central 
role in all reasoning and thinking processes. As such 
they are 'the building blocks of cognition'. 
With this model of the mental representation of 
concepts, language comprehension consists of a process 
whereby words evoke the appropriate schemata. Failure 
to comprehend a word may be because no appropriate 
schema has been formed or because an inappropriate one 
has been activated. The words used in day-to-day 
interchanges in a speech community determine the 
schemata which members must share if they are to 
understand each other. A language must therefore 
oblige its speakers to form certain schemata if they 
are to be able to communicate effectively. 	 To the 
extent that different languages label different 
concepts, it seems reasonable to infer that the 
schemata common to one linguistic group may not be 
identical to those shared by another, although we would 
expect there to be a considerable degree of overlap. 
16 
The foregoing account should not be taken to imply that 
schemata can be formed only for concepts which are 
labelled nor that language is necessary for concept 
formation. However, linguistic labels provide a means 
whereby concepts can be accessed from memory, 
manipulated at will and communicated to others. 
Although animals may be able to form certain low order 
concepts, they are unable to isolate them from the 
examples which gave rise to them in the first place 
(Skemp, 1987, p 15). Also, the possession of language 
greatly increases the range of concepts which can 
potentially be acquired because it provides for access 
to those which have been abstracted by other 
individuals. Without language, a concept must be 
formed by encountering exemplars and distinguishing 
them from non-exemplars. 	 However, certain abstract 
concepts with no perceptible exemplars, such as 
'infinity', could not be acquired other than through 
language. 
The existence of a word in a given language implies 
sensitivity on the part of its users to the defining 
attributes of its referent and the existence of an 
underlying schema. 	 Bloom (1984) proposes that a 
cognitive schema for which there is a label facilitates 
the external representation of that schema and hence 
communication of it. He suggests that thoughts which 
are represented by schemata with no labels must be 
translated into those that do, not only for the 
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purposes of communication, but also as a means of 
internal representation. 	 His conclusion is that 
labelled schemata play an influential role in both the 
external and internal domains and also in the 
development of thought, leading each generation of 
speakers towards the specific schemata for which their 
culture has developed labels. 
A 'weak' form of Whorf's hypothesis (usually referred 
to as 'the theory of linguistic relativity') is 
generally taken to propose that it is easier to think 
and to talk about certain things in some languages 
rather than others. There is a 'cost of computation' 
associated with reasoning about a topic and this is 
partly determined by language. Hunt and Banaji (1988) 
explain this by proposing that thinking consists of 
manipulating mental representations, which presumably 
correspond to schemata in the model of knowledge 
representation described above. As such, thinking is a 
problem of symbolic computation which is carried out in 
short-term memory drawing upon ready-established 
concepts held in long-term memory. These concepts can 
be viewed as the 'pre-fabricated thoughts' provided by 
language. 	 The mechanism is efficient because the 
labels for concepts can be utilised in the processing 
carried out by short-term memory whilst the large data 
structures which they represent can be stored in long-
term memory. Therefore an idea which can be expressed 
in a single word rather than a lengthy description 
18 
places fewer demands on expensive space in short-term 
memory. 	 Although there is a concomitant additional 
burden on long-term memory, space there is virtually 
limitless and the net result is that 'a language user 
thinks most efficiently about those topics for which 
his or her lexicon has provided an efficient code'. 
Historically, it seems that languages evolve in such a 
way as to remove the computational burden from short 
term memory to long term memory (Hunt and Agnoli, 
1990). This offers an explanation for Zipf's (1935) 
observation that, the more frequently a word is used by 
a language group, the shorter it tends to be. 	 In 
English there are any number of examples of 
technological innovations which, as they become 
integrated into the culture, are tagged with shorter 
labels than those they originally bore. 'Personal 
computer' becomes 'P.C.', 'motor carriage' contracts to 
'car' and 'telephone' to 'phone'. 
	 Since a language 
user chooses words on the basis of their meaning rather 
than their length, it seems unlikely that the length of 
a word is the cause of its frequency of usage. It must 
be, therefore, that words are truncated because of an 
increase in the need to access the concepts they 
represent. Zipf terms this the 'Law of Abbreviation'. 
Brown and Lenneberg (1954) suggest that, in addition to 
the inverse correlation between word length and 
frequency of usage, there is also a direct correlation 
between frequency of utterance and the frequency of 
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making the perceptual judgements necessary to select 
the word. They also propose a further correlation - 
that between the frequency of such perceptual 
discriminations and the 'accessibility' of the 
underlying concept. To summarise, shorter words tend 
to label more commonly encountered (and therefore more 
familiar) concepts so that '... more nameable concepts 
are nearer the top of the cognitive "deck"'. 
Whilst the linguistic relativity hypothesis is 
compelling, experimental evidence in support of it is 
little more than flimsy. This is not surprising since 
we do not have direct access to the thoughts of the 
members of the linguistic groups we might wish to 
compare. All we can do is to look for differences in 
non-linguistic behaviour which might be attributable, 
in whole or in part, to language variation. This is 
clearly problematic. Whilst languages differ markedly 
and in ways that are amenable to analysis, the non-
linguistic behaviour of their speakers can be 
attributed to the influence of a large number of 
inextricably inter-related variables. 
Rosch (1974) describes five factors which she considers 
should apply to any domain used to test the effect of 
language on thought. 
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1) The languages under investigation must exhibit 
differences in their lexicon with respect to the 
domain. 
2) There must be some objective way of measuring the 
features of the domain which are reflected in lexical 
differences. 
3) The cultures whose languages are being investigated 
must have much the same experience of the domain so 
that differences in non-linguistic behaviour cannot be 
attributable simply to dissimilar encounters with it. 
4) Measures of non-linguistic behaviour associated 
with the domain must be independent of language and not 
deduced from it. 
5) Differences in non-linguistic behaviour should be 
explainable in terms of an interaction between 
linguistic and cultural variables. 
Domains which satisfy all these criteria are difficult 
to identify. One which comes very close to doing so 
however, is the colour spectrum. Languages differ in 
the way they divide up this continuum; for instance, 
some have a single word for the colour range which, in 
English, is coded either 'green' or 'blue'. Brown and 
Lenneberg (1954) carried out a series of colour 
recognition tasks in which Ss were exposed to four 
colours and, after these had been removed, were asked 
to pick them out on a chart consisting of 120 different 
colours. Their results led them to propose that highly 
codable colours were more likely to be remembered and 
recognised. A measure of codability was arrived at by 
considering the length of the word used to describe the 
colour, the amount of hesitation with which Ss 
responded to the colour with its name and the degree of 
agreement amongst Ss as to what was the appropriate 
name for the colour. Thus a colour to which Ss 
responded quickly with a short name agreed upon by all 
was said to be highly codable. 
Brown and Lenneberg's conclusions have been criticised 
by, for instance, Rosch (1974). 	 She points to the 
results of Berlin and Kay (1969) which suggest that 
certain colours have more perceptual salience than 
others and, as a direct result, are more codable. Thus 
memory for colours may derive from perceptual 
characteristics which are universal rather than 
culturally specific linguistic factors. 	 This 
highlights the difficulty in separating the effects of 
linguistic categories from the effects of those factors 
which led to the formation of those categories in the 
first place. A phenomenon with perceptual salience 
will itself always be especially amenable to reference. 
A more recent attempt to identify Whorfian differences 
in colour perception was carried out by Kay and Kempton 
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(1984). Their Ss were English speakers and speakers of 
Tarahumara, a language which does not distinguish green 
and blue. Ss were asked to indicate which of three 
coloured chips in the blue/green range was most 
different from the remaining two. It was found that 
English speakers' perceptual judgements were distorted 
when chips were on the blue/green boundary. This, it 
was proposed, was due to the fact that, given a 
difficult discrimination task, Ss had resorted to 
judgements based on lexical rather than perceptual 
characteristics. 	 On identifying the central of the 
three chips, the one 'most different' was the one with 
a different name. There was no such trap available for 
the Tarahumara speakers who therefore had a greater 
tendency to make the correct perceptual judgements. 
Kay and Kempton concluded that '... there do appear to 
be incursions of linguistic categorisation into 
apparently nonlinguistic processes of thinking, even 
incursions that result in judgements that differ from 
those made on a purely perceptual basis'. 
Of the many attempts to confirm Whorf's hypothesis, 
most have been, at best, inconclusive. Bloom (1981) 
noted the absence of structures in the Chinese language 
which mark a counterfactual statement. 
	 In Indo- 
European languages, the counterfactual is signalled by 
using verb tenses which invite the listener to suspend 
reality and consider for a moment what might have been. 
In English, the subjunctive of the verb 'to be' is used 
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as in 'If I were rich, I would own a yacht'. Chinese 
speaking subjects showed a marked resistance to move 
into the counterfactual realm stating that it was an 
'un-Chinese' (or even a 'Western') way of thinking. 
Bloom proposed that, because of this limitation of the 
Chinese language, a counterfactual interpretation would 
require considerably more cognitive effort for Chinese 
speakers than it would for their English counterparts. 
His experimental evidence seemed to support this 
contention. 
Bloom's results provoked a flurry of criticism. 	 Au 
(1984) 	 found fault with his experimental procedure, 
claiming that the stories used to test counterfactual 
understanding were not idiomatic and were therefore 
difficult for the Chinese speakers to understand 
regardless of their counterfactual content. 	 She 
repeated Bloom's experiments with more idiomatic 
stories and concluded that Chinese speakers have no 
particular problem in interpreting counterfactuals. 
Liu (1985) carried out experiments which also seemed to 
support this claim. 
In his response to Au's criticisms, Bloom (1984) points 
out the short-comings of attempts to verify Whorf's 
hypothesis using such studies as colour-naming where 
the possibility of substituting perceptual images for 
linguistic labels might preclude the emergence of 
Whorfian effects. 
	 He proposes that it is in the 
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abstract realm that language is most likely to 
influence thought processes. 	 Bloom is not alone in 
subscribing to this view. Lemon's (1981) research led 
him to suggest that, where concepts derive their 
meaning in verbal contexts rather than through direct 
sensory experience, language may affect categorisation. 
Cole and Scribner (1974, p 59) hold a similar opinion 
which they summarise thus: 
'It may very well be that the "filtering effect" 
of language is greatest in respect to domains of 
phenomena that are definable, not in terms of 
physical properties, but in terms of attributes 
that are culturally specified. ... Or consider the 
area of ideology or theoretical work in general, 
where concepts largely acquire their meanings 
through their being embodied in explanatory verbal 
networks. It is here that language may play the 
greatest role in shaping the person's view of 
reality, in influencing his memory and thinking 
processes, and in contributing to his 
understanding or misunderstanding of other 
cultures.' 
If, as seems likely, the influence of language on 
cognition is greatest where there is the necessity to 
acquire and manipulate abstract concepts, then 
mathematical thinking must surely be susceptible to 
language effects. 	 Mathematical objects are 
abstractions. To deduce a result about triangles, we 
must work with neither an isosceles nor an equilateral 
triangle but with a prototypical triangle which is an 
abstract representation embodying the features shared 
by all triangles. Whilst visual images may help, they 
will not suffice. Any image of a triangle is the image 
of a particular triangle with properties which other 
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triangles do not share. 	 In any case, many (perhaps 
most) mathematical concepts do not lend themselves to 
any obvious form of imagery. 	 Whilst we may learn 
something about triangles by manipulating mental 
'pictures' it is difficult to accept that such a 
process would be productive in learning something about 
'groups', for instance. 
Classification, generalisation and abstraction are 
essential features of mathematical activity. Whilst 
mathematical facts may be discovered by experimenting 
with concrete materials, it is the generalisation of 
these facts which is the ultimate goal. 	 Such 
generalisation involves abstraction and the formation 
of concepts which are independent of any concrete 
situation. Also important to mathematical thinking is 
an appreciation of how mathematical objects are 
classified into categories whose members share common 
properties. Furthermore, these categories are inter-
related. A square has certain properties by virtue of 
the particular relationship of its sides and angles. 
However, a square is a rhombus and therefore has 
properties which are shared by all rhombuses. 
Rhombuses are parallelograms which also have their own 
characteristics, and so on. This view of the nature of 
mathematical abstraction is summarised by Dienes: 
'... it is a process of class formation. Abstract 
ideas are formed by classifying objects into 
classes through some common property which, it is 
discovered, is possessed by these objects. 
Generalisation is regarded as the extension of an 
already formed class and, therefore, it is more of 
a logical operation whereas abstraction is 
regarded as a constructive operation.' (quoted in 
Philp, 1973). 
The current view is that language and mathematical 
learning and thought processes are inter-related, 
albeit in a complex way. 	 This raises the obvious 
question - do different languages affect these 
processes in different ways? Before 1974, there was 
little interest in the implications of cross-linguistic 
factors for mathematics education. However, there was 
a growing awareness of the problems faced by children 
who were, for various reasons, forced to receive 
instruction in a language very dissimilar from their 
mother tongue. In 1974, researchers in linguistics and 
mathematics education gathered to discuss which 
difficulties faced by the learner of mathematics might 
be attributable to linguistic factors and to identify 
pedagogical approaches to overcome these difficulties. 
The introduction to the report of this symposium 
summarises the problem thus: 	 'Difficulties in the 
learning of mathematics thus depend on the language of 
learning, because different languages "support" 
mathematical concept formation, precision and 
systematisation in different ways.' (Nairobi, 1974.) 
The Nairobi symposium heralded a growth in research 
designed to discover where it is that a particular 
language may fail to support the processes which are 
essential to successful mathematical activity. 
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The most fundamental way in which a language may fail 
to make adequate provision for 'doing' mathematics is 
by not having a vocabulary which meets the subject's 
requirements, i.e. by having an insufficiently well-
developed register of mathematical terms. (Indeed this 
has been reported as one of the reasons why many 
African countries have favoured English or French as 
the medium of instruction rather than native languages 
which lack the vocabulary necessary for technological 
subjects (Macnamara, 1967).) This can be solved by 
adding words to label the necessary concepts although 
the introduction of vocabulary for certain abstract 
concepts could prove problematic. For instance, 
certain African languages lack connectives and 
quantifiers such as 'all', 'some', 'only' and 'if' 
(CASME, 1975). 	 The introduction of terms to convey 
these relational concepts is clearly more problematic 
than the introduction of nouns, even if the latter are 
abstract. However, languages are never static and the 
'modernisation' of those which have had to accommodate 
a proliferation of technical terms has been engineered 
in an interesting variety of ways (see, for instance, 
Gallagher, 1969). The introduction of new vocabulary 
is a constant feature of any language and so there is 
no reason to believe that mathematical registers cannot 
be expanded using appropriate strategies. 
One way in which it has been suggested that a language 
structure may create difficulties for thinking 
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mathematically is in its lack of provision for 
classification hierarchies. Philp (1973) argues that 
the way in which objects are classified depends, at 
least in part, on the language used. From the results 
of research by Kelly (unpublished) in New Guinea, Philp 
proposes that: 	 'These data ... support the earlier 
findings that it is as if the accessibility of 
inclusive words in a language in some way affects and 
restricts the inclusiveness of classifications which 
the child is able to make.' He draws attention to the 
number of languages which incorporate linguistic 
classifiers thereby encouraging their speakers to 
classify other than according to Western logical 
categories. 	 The suggestion is that the logic of 
mathematics is the logic of the Indo-European languages 
and it must not be assumed that this is necessarily the 
logic inherent in other languages. 
Watson (1988) also subscribes to this view: 
'The words and operations of mathematics, as a 
field, are in the history of mathematics, a 
discipline which developed in Indo-European 
cultures, using and developing the language games 
of Indo-European cultures in specific ways. 
Mathematics is not just a set of concepts that 
anyone can learn as easily as anyone else. It is 
a specific Indo-European product. Learning 
mathematics will be easier for children whose 
language is Indo-European.' 
Haugen (1977) opposes the view that mathematics as we 
know it reflects the characteristics of any specific 
language or language group. 
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'The development of mathematics may be seen as an 
attempt to overcome the weaknesses of natural 
languages for the purpose of exact and elegant 
statement. The terminology of science has been 
successful to the extent that it has been able to 
surmount the limitations imposed by natural 
language and produce an inter- and supralinguistic 
language.' (Haugen, 1977) 
He goes on to say that accounts of scientific theories 
are expressed in the language of mathematics and are 
therefore translatable into any language regardless of 
its grammar, syntax or phonology. However, accounts 
which utilise natural language are necessarily only 
approximations because the ideas involved cannot be 
expressed precisely in any language. 	 This seems to 
miss the point, however. Whilst the concepts which 
underlie mathematical symbols are, in the main, precise 
and unambiguous, those concepts may well be more alien 
to some cultural groups rather than others. 
In the day-to-day use of language, sentences derive 
their meanings, not only from the words of which they 
are constituted, but also from the context in which 
they are uttered. 	 Natural language can therefore 
afford to be somewhat imprecise and even occasionally 
ambiguous. When 'talking mathematics', however, we are 
required to be precise, clear and unambiguous. 
Although we have a number of tightly defined terms 
whose use is confined to mathematical parlance, by and 
large it is through natural language that mathematical 
concepts must be conveyed and manipulated. The problem 
is exacerbated by the fact that mathematics takes 
common words and endows them with meanings very 
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different from those attached to them in normal usage. 
For example, 'ring', 'function' and 'root' label 
concepts in mathematics which have little, if anything, 
in common with their more widely recognised referents. 
In so many cases, it is as though words used to label 
mathematical objects have been selected and assigned at 
random from the natural language lexicon. This cannot 
but create difficulties for the learner of mathematics 
who must assign a label, already laden with connotative 
and denotative meaning, to a new concept. 
Whilst current interest in the interaction between 
language factors and mathematics education covers a 
wide spectrum, it is cross-linguistic issues which 
concern us here. 
	 For those researchers who have 
interested themselves in this field, the primary reason 
has been a concern for the many who must learn 
mathematics in a language which is not their mother 
tongue. A potential problem is a lack of proficiency 
in the second language but in this case the remedy has 
nothing to do with mathematics education. What are 
more insidious and intractable are the difficulties 
which result from the distance between the student's 
native language and culture and the language and 
culture of the teacher and curriculum designer. 
Western curricula and teaching methods are imposed in 
many countries of the world where they take little or 
no account of cultural norms and cognitive schemata 
implicit in the indigenous language. The problem is 
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particularly acute for various African countries 
(Nairobi, 1974; Morris, 1978; Berry, 1985), but is by 
no means confined to Africa nor to developing 
countries. For instance, it has also been described 
for Aboriginal children in Australia (Crawford, 1988; 
Watson, 1988). Children learning mathematics in their 
native language may also suffer from the effects of a 
curriculum which is not in sympathy with their cultural 
and linguistic norms (see, for instance, Bernstein, 
1971). 
It is clear that mathematics curricula must be designed 
in such a way as to take maximum advantage of whatever 
cognitive schemata are established and should not 
assume that there is one universal way in which 
concepts are formed and manipulated. 	 If methods of 
cognitive functioning vary across cultures then the 
implication is that curricula must vary also. Language 
is just one aspect of the child's culture but it is 
nevertheless an important one and a better 
understanding of its influence on cognitive processes 
must contribute to our understanding of how mathematics 
can be learned and taught more effectively. 
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Chapter 3 
LOGICAL AND LINGUISTIC CONNECTIVES 
In symbolic logic, a set of operators called 'logical 
connectives' allow the formation of compound truth- 
functional propositions from simple ones. These 
operators are binary in the sense that each is used to 
conjoin two (simple or compound) propositions. 	 The 
truth value of the resulting proposition is completely 
determined by two factors - the truth values of the two 
component propositions and the particular connective 
used to conjoin them. 	 In addition to the binary 
connectives, negation acts as a unary operator 
reversing the truth value of a proposition to which it 
is applied. If the proposition p is true, then its 
negation T is false and vice versa. 
For two propositions p and q, there are four possible 
ways in which their truth values may be combined. Both 
may be true (the case denoted by TT), both may be false 
(FF) or one may be true and the other false (TF and 
FT). Any proposition formed by conjoining p and q will 
have a set of four truth values, one corresponding to 
each of the four combinations of truth values for p and 
q. This allows the possibility of 24 = 16 different 
truth value sets. Taking the set of truth values of 
the compound proposition p * q as the definition of the 
logical connective *, we can conclude that a maximum 
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of 16 different logical connectives (*1, s*1,  "'' *16) can 
be identified. These are defined in table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1: Definition of logical connective *i by 
truth value set of p *i q (i = 1, ..., 
16). 
P q *1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7 *8  
T T T T T T F T T F 
T F T T T F T T F T 
F T T T F T T F T T 
F F T F T T T F F F 
	
P q 	 *9 *10 *11 *12 *13 *14 *15 *16 
T T T F F T F F F F 
T F F T F F T F F F 
	
F T 	 F F T F F T F F 
F F T T T F F F T F 
For practical purposes, this set of 16 distinct logical 
connectives can be reduced (following Neisser and 
Weene, 1962). We can eliminate as trivial a connective 
which results in a proposition which is always true or 
always false no matter what the truth values of its 
components. Hence we may discount *1 and *16. Also 
p *3 q has exactly the same truth value set as q *4 p.  
Since either of the component propositions may be 
labelled p or q arbitrarily, one of these connectives 
is redundant. For the same reason, so is one 
connective in each of the pairs *6 and *7,*10  and 
*11,  *13 and  *14' 
The ten connectives which remain may be organised into 
five pairs where the truth values defining one member 
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of the pair are the reverse of those defining the 
other. This is equivalent to saying that the compound 
proposition formed by using one member of the pair is 
simply the negation of that formed by using the other. 
Table 3.2 below shows, for each of these ten logical 
connectives, the defining truth value set, the usual 
symbolic representation of the compound proposition p * 
q and the term used to refer to that connective. 
Table 3.2: Definitions of logical connectives. 
p T 	 T F F Symbolic 
representation 
q T 	 F T F of 	 p * q 
*2 T 	 T T F p v q Inclusive disjunction 
*15  F 	 F F T p v q Joint denial 
*4  T 	 F T T p 	 q Conditional 
*13 F 	 T F F p 	 q Exclusion 
*12  T 	 F F F p A q Conjunction 
*5 F 	 T T T p 	 q Alternative denial 
*8  F 	 T T F p 	 q Exclusive disjunction 
*9  T 	 F F T P +- q Biconditional 
*6 T 	 T F F Affirmation of p 
*11 F 	 F T T Denial of p 
From the table above it can be seen that only the unary 
operation of negation together with the connectives 
denoted symbolically by v, A, -4., u and 4-4- are 
necessary to define all the relevant compound 
propositions. 	 However, there is a great deal of 
redundancy even in this set of connectives. One which 
is clearly redundant is the biconditional since the 
truth value set defining this connective is the same as 
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that for pAeq. In fact, all of the propositions above 
could be expressed in terms of negation and, for 
instance, conjunction. For example, we could replace 
the proposition denoted by py q by (p i% q) A (PA 4) 
which has exactly the same truth value set. 	 In a 
similar way, a binary proposition containing any of the 
ten connectives defined above can be replaced by an 
equivalent one which uses only negation and 
conjunction. (By 'equivalent' we mean one having the 
identical set of truth values.) We can condense the 
set even further, dispense with negation and use only 
the single connective defined by the truth value set 
for alternative denial. This connective is sometimes 
known as the 'Scheffer stroke function' and is denoted 
by 1 . Conjunction, for example, would then be 
expressed as (pl q) 1 (p I q). 
The examples above demonstrate that any significant 
reduction in the connectives symbolised results in an 
increase in the symbolic complexity of compound 
propositions. So, despite the inherent redundancy in 
the set, negation together with the five connectives 
described above are conventionally used to symbolise 
compound propositions. 
In describing logical connectives, we have so far 
restricted ourselves to their symbolic representation. 
However, logic is used to establish the validity of 
certain types of argument. The rules which it provides 
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allow us to assess whether the conclusion drawn from 
stated premises is consistent with those premises or 
whether there is some faulty step in the deductive 
process which claims to support the validity of the 
conclusion. It is clearly necessary for such arguments 
to be expressible, not only in symbols, but also in 
natural language. 	 Furthermore, logical problems 
frequently involve an assessment of the truth or 
falsity of a compound proposition when the truth values 
of its components are known. In order to carry out 
such an evaluation, it is necessary to identify the 
particular connectives used. If the argument is 
expressed in language, this information must be deduced 
from the linguistic content of the proposition. 
The translation of a compound proposition from symbolic 
to linguistic form is not a particular problem. There 
are English language items which, it is generally 
agreed, convey the sense of each of the five logical 
connectives. A proposition can be negated by inserting 
'not' in the appropriate position or by using 'It is 
not the case that ...' as a prefix. 
	 Inclusive 
disjunction can be expressed using '... or • • • or 
both', conjunction by '... and ...', the conditional by 
'if ... then ...', exclusive disjunction by '... or ... 
but not both' and the biconditional by '... if and only 
if ...'. 	 Thus given the two propositions: p: Tom is 
37 
American and q: Max is a student, the following are 
the linguistic expressions for the propositions which 
can be formed by using negation or by combining p and 
q using each of the logical connectives V, A, , 
and H . 
p: Tom is not American. 
pvq: Tom is American or Max is a student or both. 
p Aq: Tom is American and Max is a student. 
p-0.q: If Tom is American then Max is a student. 
p3eq: Tom is American or Max is a student but not 
both. 
p-r*q: Tom is American if and only if Max is a 
student. 
In this way we may map logical connectives onto 
linguistic connectives. However, because this mapping 
is not one-to-one, a difficulty arises when we attempt 
to map linguistic connectives to their logical 
equivalents. Specific difficulties in identifying the 
logical connective in a compound proposition arise from 
the ambiguity of the linguistic connectives which are 
commonly taken to be equivalent to the logical forms. 
A fundamental problem is that logical connectives are 
only appropriate between statements to which truth 
values can be assigned and where the meaning of the 
resulting statement is not affected by context. 
Language connectives have a much wider use. A more 
detailed examination of the problems associated with 
the individual connectives will serve to highlight the 
mismatch between the linguistic forms and the formal 
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logical operators with which they are frequently 
identified. 
Conjunction 
Although 'and' can be used to link two statements to 
form a compound statement whose truth or falsity can be 
deduced according to the rules of truth functional 
logic, there are other statements containing 'and' 
which cannot be so interpreted. It can be argued that 
a sentence like 'John and Mary are students' is simply 
an abbreviation of the conjunction of the two 
propositions 'John is a student' and 'Mary is a 
student'. However, no such argument can be sustained 
for 'John and Mary are colleagues'. 	 Copi (1986) 
maintains that such propositions must be regarded as 
simple (i.e. making only a single statement) rather 
than as compound propositions with two components. 
Logical conjunction is symmetric in the sense that it 
is commutative; /DA g is equivalent to qn p. However 
'She fell down and broke her neck' conjures up a very 
different scenario from 'She broke her neck and fell 
down'. Here again the interpretation of 'and' is not 
identical to logical conjunction. 
	 Staal (1966) 
distinguishes two meanings for 'and'. 	 One is 
identified with logical conjunction and the other is 
asymmetric and means 'and then' or 'and consequently'. 
Dik (1968) defends the view that the second 
interpretation of 'and' is arrived at on the basis of 
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non-linguistic knowledge about the two events and is 
not part of the semantic content of 'and'. 	 Lakoff 
(1971) argues that, with the asymmetric 'and', the 
truth of the first member of the pair of propositions 
must be presupposed for the second to have any meaning. 
Denying the first assertion renders the compound 
proposition nonsensical and does not therefore invite 
an analysis based on logical rules. 
Despite the fact that 'and' does not always have an 
interpretation which can be identified with logical 
conjunction, the divergence between the logical and 
linguistic forms is less than is the case for other 
connectives. It is for this reason that Strawson 
(1952) proposes that all connectives be defined in 
terms of negation and conjunction. 
Disjunction 
The linguistic expression of disjunction is usually 
given by 'or' or 'either ... or'. As we have seen, in 
symbolic logic two types of disjunction are 
distinguished - the exclusive and inclusive forms. The 
only difference between these is in the truth value of 
the compound statement when both components are true. 
For inclusive disjunction the TT case is true whereas 
for exclusive disjunction it is false. The linguistic 
connective 'or' is ambiguous in indicating which of 
these alternative meanings is to be conveyed. Where it 
is important that the disjunction be interpreted 
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inclusively, this sense can be made explicit by adding 
'or both'. Where it is to be given the exclusive 
interpretation, the phrase 'but not both' can be 
affixed. 	 However, 'or' is frequently used without 
either of these qualifiers and, when this is the case, 
it is not clear which interpretation is intended, 
especially if no contextual cues are available. 
In logic, 'or' is conventionally interpreted 
inclusively whereas, when 'or' is used in natural 
language, it is claimed that it is usually taken to 
represent exclusive disjunction (Lakoff, 1971; 
Sternberg, 1979; Newstead and Griggs, 1983). 	 On the 
other hand, Pelletier (1977) is of the opinion that in 
English 'or' always represents inclusive disjunction 
and that the exclusive interpretation is the result of 
an individual's judgement that it is impossible or 
unlikely for both disjuncts to be true simultaneously. 
Gazdar (1979, p 78) is even more emphatic that the 
inclusive interpretation is basic and claims 'that 
there is no clear evidence to the effect that exclusive 
disjunction has ever been lexicalised in any language'. 
There are 'or' statements which are clearly to be given 
an inclusive reading, for instance 'Applicants for the 
job must have a degree or three years relevant 
experience'. There are others which strongly suggest 
that they are to be interpreted exclusively such as 
'Chelsea or Liverpool will win the FA cup'. However, 
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it is debatable which of the two interpretations is 
basic and therefore how an ambiguous 'or' statement 
will be interpreted. Damarin (1977) found that the 
inclusive interpretation of 'or' was favoured amongst 
pre-service elementary teachers when interpreting 
statements about mathematical items. 	 However, there 
was also a marked tendency for her Ss to interpret 'or' 
statements in this context as if they were 
conjunctions. 
An additional ambiguity of the word 'or' in natural 
language is that it is sometimes used where the logical 
sense of 'and' is intended as in 'I eat meat or fish'. 
Conditional and Biconditional 
A number of interpretations have been found to exist 
for a statement expressed in the form 'if p then q' 
of which one is equivalent to the logical 
interpretation. Taplin (1971), in an investigation of 
adults' interpretations of conditional sentences 
expressed in 'if ... then' form, found that fewer than 
50% evaluated the conditional in any truth functional 
manner. Of those who did, however, the most common 
truth functional interpretation was that which actually 
corresponds to the biconditional. 	 Fillenbaum (1976) 
found that conditional promises and threats were 
particularly prone to a biconditional interpretation. 
Indeed the force of a conditional threat or promise is 
dependent upon the addressee assuming that a false 
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antecedent guarantees a false consequent. Furthermore, 
the biconditional is clearly the intended 
interpretation in many 'if ... then' statements. 	 On 
hearing 'If you don't take an umbrella, then you'll get 
wet', the addressee will assume that if he does take an 
umbrella (and uses it appropriately) he won't get wet. 
On the other hand 'If we go in August, then the weather 
will be hot' does not seem to suggest that the weather 
is hot only in August and therefore invites an 
interpretation equivalent to the logical conditional. 
There is no difficulty in interpreting a statement of 
the form 'if p then q' when the antecedent, p, is true. 
The statement would normally be regarded as true when q 
is true and false when q is false. It is the case of a 
false antecedent which is problematic. 	 Wason and 
Johnson-Laird (1972) argue that the antecedent in an 
'if ... then' statement is regarded as an indication of 
presupposition. The listener must assume the truth of 
the antecedent in order to interpret the sentence and 
will regard it as null and void if the antecedent turns 
out to be false. They therefore propose a 'defective' 
truth table for a conditional expressed in natural 
language, that is, one with an entry of 'irrelevant' 
for the two cases where the antecedent is not true. 
Paris (1975, pp. 88 - 89) proposes that the defective 
truth table for conditional statements is the result of 
an interpretation which assumes a causal relationship 
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between antecedent and consequent and which therefore 
dictates a symmetry between the two components. 
Although the FT case is true logically, it is not 
considered true causally. The failure of the logical 
conditional to account for comprehension of 'if • • • 
then' statements is attributed to the fact that it does 
not take account of the semantic relationship between 
the two component propositions. As Comrie (1986) 
points out - there is a fundamental difference between 
conditionals in logic and in natural language. In 
logic there is no necessity for the antecedent and 
consequent to be related, causally or otherwise. 	 A 
conditional proposition such as 'If Rome wasn't built 
in a day then London is north of the equator' is 
perfectly acceptable in logic but would evoke some 
surprise were it stated in normal conversation. 
It has been shown (Johnson-Laird and Tagart, 1969) that 
understanding of a conditional depends, to some extent, 
on the way in which it is expressed. Their Ss were 
more likely to treat the equivalent disjunctive form 
'Either there isn't p or there is q (or both)° as a 
logical conditional. However this form was found to 
take longer to process and tended to produce other 
diverse and unstable interpretations. 
	 On the other 
hand 'if p then 	 though faster and more stable in 
its interpretation, was less frequently interpreted as 
the logical conditional. 
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The biconditional, expressed linguistically using 'if 
and only if', has attracted less attention from 
researchers than have conjunctive, disjunctive and 
conditional language connectives. Lemmon (1965, p. 28) 
suggests that it is 'of rare occurrence in ordinary 
speech'. Since, as we have already seen, there is a 
tendency for conditional statements to interpreted as 
the logical biconditional, we might expect this 
tendency to be even more pronounced in interpreting 
statements containing 'if and only if'. If this is the 
case, a reasonable match might be expected between the 
linguistic and logical forms of this particular 
connective even though the language form is rarely 
used. 
Gazdar (1979, chapter 4) claims that, of the 16 
possible logical connectives, only two, conjunction and 
inclusive disjunction, are lexically encoded and that 
this is probably a universal feature of all languages. 
He suggests that there is some feature of the human 
mind which demands a convenient expression for these 
logical forms and that conjunction in particular is an 
unlearned innate human concept. He precludes 'if ... 
then' from having truth functional status because 
context affects its truth conditions. 
There is a fundamental difference between reasoning 
carried out according to the rules of symbolic logic 
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and the sort of reasoning that takes place in day-to-
day natural language exchanges. In the former nothing 
may be assumed other than the information contained 
within the propositions stated. 	 In general 
conversation however, this is not the case. If A says 
to B 'If you don't take an umbrella, then you'll get 
wet', B will reason with a variety of inferences and 
assumptions not conveyed by the statement alone. For 
instance, he well almost certainly infer that it is 
raining (or that it is about to rain). Furthermore, A 
can reasonably assume that B will infer that it is 
raining (or about to rain) so that this information 
need not be stated explicitly. He will also assume 
that B knows that, in normal circumstances, he can 
avoid getting wet in the rain by using an umbrella 
appropriately. 	 It may be that A really meant his 
statement to be a true conditional (rather than a 
biconditional) because, say, A knew that B's route 
would take him past some children throwing buckets of 
water at passers-by. If B subsequently got drenched 
because he had failed to use the umbrella at the 
appropriate time, he could not strictly accuse A of 
uttering a falsehood. However he could justifiably 
claim that he had been misled and intentionally so. 
There are various conventions which are understood by 
language users to apply in language exchanges and it is 
because of these that speakers and sometimes writers 
can afford to be imprecise and potentially ambiguous. 
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The potential ambiguity in 'On Monday I shall be 
attending a conference in Paris or visiting a friend in 
Birmingham' is resolved by the shared knowledge that 
the two constituent propositions are unlikely to be 
true simultaneously and that 'or' should therefore be 
interpreted exclusively. 
Grice (1975) subsumes what he believes to be the 
conventions of normal language utterances under what he 
terms the 'cooperative principle'. 	 Speakers try, as 
far as they can, to be truthful, relevant and 
informative, and listeners assume that speakers will be 
so. This allows much to be inferred that is not made 
explicit. He proposes 'conversational implicatures' - 
information not stated but understood by a listener by 
virtue of his assumption that the speaker is being co- 
operative. 	 The discrepancy between linguistic and 
logical statements is viewed as a consequence of the 
fact that a natural language statement conveys more 
than its analytic meaning. 
Geis and Zwicky (1971) explain the mismatch between 
linguistic and logical connectives by suggesting that 
certain types of compound propositions expressed in 
natural language have 'invited inferences'. For 
instance, 'if p then q' invites the inference 'if not p 
then not q' and hence a tendency to 'perfect 
conditionals to biconditionals'. They suggest that 
invited inferences are not part of the meaning of 'if' 
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because they can be cancelled without apparent 
contradiction. 	 For instance, 'If I study hard then 
I'll pass my exams and if I don't study hard I may or 
may not pass my exams' is a perfectly acceptable 
statement. Another invited inference proposed is 'but 
not both' in the expression 'p or q'. This can also be 
countermanded by adding 'or both' without producing a 
contradiction. 
Braine and Rumain (1988) suggest that invited 
inferences are not part of the lexical entry for 
particles such as 'if ... then' and 'or' but are 
invoked whenever considered relevant. In a later paper 
also co-authored by Braine (Braine and O'Brien, 1991), 
the 'pernicious ambiguities' in such expressions as 
'the meaning of "if"' are pointed out. 	 Such 
expressions could refer to understanding of the 
particle in some particular context or to the meaning 
encoded in semantic memory (that is, the lexical 
entry). It is pointed out that construal in ordinary 
comprehension takes account of factors over and above 
the content of the lexical entry. These include the 
context, the plausibility of possible construals, 
knowledge of the speaker's motives and intentions and 
other general knowledge which may be relevant to the 
discourse. Reasoning proceeds from the integration of 
all such factors. 
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The above makes clear the necessity to distinguish 
logical and linguistic connectives and yet this 
distinction is frequently neglected. Dik (1968, p 259) 
makes the point: 
'Even in the context of the description of natural 
language, the co-ordinators are often classed as 
"logical connectives" and treated as if the 
"meanings" attached to such connectives in logic 
are directly relevant to the semantic description 
of natural language. ... It is no disparagement of 
logic (nor of natural language) when I stress the 
undeniable fundamental differences between the 
two. 	 Again and again, students of natural 
language and of logical systems have rightly noted 
that the two are objects of fundamentally 
different natures, both in their aims and in their 
internal properties.' 
In mathematics, the only acceptable form of reasoning 
is that which conforms to the laws of symbolic logic. 
Skemp (1987, pp 170 - 171) emphasises the importance of 
logical understanding for successful mathematical 
activity. 
	
This he considers is 'evidenced by the 
ability to demonstrate that what has been stated 
follows of logical necessity, by a chain of inferences, 
from (i) the given premises, together with (ii) 
suitably chosen items from what is accepted as 
established mathematical knowledge (axioms and 
theorems). This involves analysis, and the 
construction of chains of logical reasoning to produce 
what we call demonstrations or proofs.' 
Correct inferences depend upon knowing what can be 
deduced from the logical relationships between 
statements about mathematical objects. 
	 For instance, 
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it is important to be able to distinguish conditional 
and biconditional propositions; given a mathematical 
statement of the form 'if p then q', the invited 
inference 'if not p then not q' will lead to errors of 
deduction. Furthermore mathematical objects are 
abstractions and therefore the contextual cues 
available in everyday language exchanges are not 
necessarily available to aid interpretation. 	 Evans' 
(1982) assertion that '"If it is a dog then it is an 
animal" obviously does not entail the converse.' is 
true enough but it presupposes that the addressee is 
already familiar with the relationship between dogs and 
animals. In this case the statement is not informative 
and is therefore redundant. 	 In mathematics, the 
interpreter of the statement 'If it is a rhombus then 
it is a parallelogram' may well be in the position of 
knowing nothing about the relationship between the two 
quadrilaterals other than that which the statement 
conveys. 	 In particular, he may have no idea as to 
whether or not the statement may be taken to entail its 
converse, especially when his experience with natural 
language uses of 'if ... then' allows that it may or 
may not. 
Politzer (1986) suggests that the lack of congruence 
between logical and linguistic connectives may go some 
way towards explaining poor performance in mathematics. 
'... one of the sources of the low mathematical 
achievement of students who perform normally on 
nonscientific subject matters consists of an 
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interpretation of the scientific language based on 
the pragmatic laws of language rather than on the 
logic conventions. 	 Such a propensity to use 
pragmatic conventions would affect inferential 
activities but have little effect on algorithmic 
activities (such as calculating fractions, solving 
equations, etc.) hence the distinction that is 
well-known to Mathematics teachers between being 
good at Geometry (that requires the most use of 
hypothetico-deductive thought) and good at Algebra 
(that requires the most use of algorithms).' 
Zepp (1987b) set out to discover whether students who 
had studied mathematics for several years might use a 
different set of logical principles for reasoning 
mathematically than that used for everyday reasoning. 
For instance, would these students avoid the error of 
assuming that the converse of a conditional statement 
held and would they be less likely to assign 'or' its 
exclusive interpretation in mathematical contexts? He 
concluded that mathematical content in reasoning 
problems added to the difficulty of formal logic. 
Students who performed adequately when a task was free 
of mathematical content resorted to confused guessing 
when the same task was presented in a mathematical 
context. He concluded that many students apply a 
method of reasoning in concrete situations which, 
although not the logic of mathematics, is applied 
fairly consistently. When asked to apply reasoning 
with mathematical objects, the students did not adopt 
the correct logic nor did they apply their own 
'everyday' logic. The mathematical content simply 
confused them and they adopted inconsistent strategies. 
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Given that mathematical reasoning depends critically 
upon understanding logical relationships, it is not 
surprising that linguistic connectives are considered 
important devices for learning and doing mathematics. 
Imperfect as they are, it is they that must bear the 
burden of expressing logical relationships. 	 Using 
children and adults as Ss, Johansson (1977) compared 
the level of mastery of the words 'and' and 'or' with 
performance in logical tests of conjunction and 
disjunction. He found a correlation between the level 
of understanding of the words and the quality of 
performance on the logical tests. 	 Dawe (1982) 
investigated the ability of bilingual children to 
reason deductively in mathematics. He found that the 
single most important factor differentiating English 
children's performance on a test of mathematical 
reasoning- was a knowledge of linguistic connectives and 
that this factor also separated high from low achievers 
amongst bilinguals. His conclusion was that 
development of the ability to use linguistic 
connectives in their logical sense was important for 
success in mathematics. 
The foregoing account discusses the mismatch between 
logical and linguistic connectives expressed in 
English. One might reasonably ask to what extent this 
is generalisable to other languages where linguistic 
connectives may well be expressed very differently. 
'Different languages, including European languages, 
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vary enormously in the richness of their logical 
connectives vocabulary.' (Wilson, 1984). In the same 
paper, Wilson also points out the rather surprising 
fact that there are Commonwealth languages which lack 
such connectives (see also CASME, 1975). It is 
reported (Cohen, 1977, p. 94) that, in Chinese, there 
are no words equivalent to 'and' and 'or'. 	 The 
conjunction of two statements p and q is expressed as 
'there is p, there is q' and disjunction as 'if not p 
then q'. Moore (1982) reports that the Navajo language 
has no standard word for 'if', a fact which he 
associated with evidence that hypothetical thinking is 
not readily accepted by some Navajo speaking students. 
He also felt that this might go some way in explaining 
the poor performance of Navajo students on Piagetian 
conservation tasks. 
Comrie (1986) attempted a cross-linguistically valid 
characterisation of natural language conditionals. He 
hypothesised that, if a language had any conditional 
construction at all, then it would have one which is 
equivalent to the logical conditional and not only one 
which is to be construed as the biconditional. Marking 
of the antecedent clause seems to be fairly universal 
although there are exceptions, for instance Mandarin, 
where most conditional statements are ambiguous and 
rely on context to supply the correct interpretation. 
Marking of the consequent is less common and often 
optional as with the English 'then'. It is also usual 
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for the antecedent to precede the consequent and in 
some languages this is obligatory. 	 Although there 
appear to be some universal features of conditionals, 
it has been found that their expression can differ 
substantially from the English form 'if ... then' 
(Traugott et al, 1986, p. 5). 
The ambiguity surrounding the word 'or' in English 
might be resolved, one would suppose, were the 
inclusive and exclusive forms to have distinct 
linguistic expressions. Attempts to identify languages 
which distinguish these forms have not been wholly 
successful. Copi (1986, p. 272) claims that Latin 
makes this distinction as does Quine (1974, p. 12). 
However, Dik (1968, p. 274) denies that the two forms 
in question parallel the logical distinction. The 
Kpelle in Liberia were also thought to have a separate 
linguistic expression for the two forms (Gay and Cole, 
1967). 	 Zepp (1989), having examined many world 
languages, has failed to find one which has an 
unambiguous word for exclusive as distinct from 
inclusive disjunction. He points out that this seems 
to indicate a fundamental difference between the 
foundations of mathematics and that of language 
development. 
Evidence suggests that there is considerable variation 
in the provision made by different languages for 
encoding logical connectives. If we accept the weaker 
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form of Whorf's hypothesis we might speculate as to the 
likely effect of such differing linguistic provision on 
the formation of the associated concepts. 	 For 
instance, were a language to distinguish inclusive and 
exclusive disjunction more effectively and habitually 
than English, might it not be the case that the 
speaker's attention has been focussed in such a way 
that an appropriate cognitive schema is more readily 
available to him? If a language forces its speakers to 
distinguish conditional from biconditional statements, 
would they be less likely to make the error of 
reasoning from the converse? Are some or all of the 
logical concepts 'nearer the top of the cognitive deck' 
for some language users rather than others and, if this 
is so, can this be attributed to language factors? Or, 
are the problems resulting from the mismatch between 
logical and linguistic connectives universal features 
of all languages? 
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Chapter 4 
RELEVANT RESEARCH FINDINGS 
There are several areas of research pertinent to this 
study. Amongst these are investigations which have 
attempted to elucidate how linguistic connectives are 
understood and how this understanding (or lack of it) 
influences success in deductive reasoning. 	 Of the 
various forms of reasoning, it is propositional 
reasoning which depends critically upon the logical 
relationships which the connectives define. Therefore 
we shall not review the extensive research on reasoning 
with categorical syllogisms where successful inference 
depends upon understanding quantifiers such as 'some' 
and 'all'. 
The 'classical' view of human concepts is that they can 
be defined according to logical relationships between 
criterial features (for example, see Bourne, 1974). 
For instance, a particular concept might be defined as 
all those items possessing attribute A together with 
either B or C, i.e. the logical conjunction of A with 
the disjunction of B and C. Furthermore, the formation 
of concepts was thought to occur through a process of 
discrimination learning by which the criterial 
attributes and their rule of combination were 
identified and associated with positive examples of the 
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concept. This view spawned a body of research which 
investigated the relative difficulty of learning 
different concepts using non-verbal stimulus materials. 
This type of investigation virtually ceased in the late 
1970s when the classical view was replaced by theories 
based on schemata (see chapter 2) and prototypes (Rosch 
and Mervis, 1975). 	 However, these 'concept 
identification' studies are of interest because they 
have shown that, given certain types of stimulus 
elements, some logical concepts are easier to identify 
than others. 
Also of interest are attempts to establish whether the 
results obtained in the areas outlined above generalise 
to speakers of languages other than English, 
particularly non-European languages. 
According to Piaget (1957), truth functional aspects of 
cognition undergo a gradual development reaching 
maturity when an individual is approximately 11 - 14 
years of age, 	 a stage which he terms 'formal 
operations'. This is the stage at which the capacity 
for the full range of logical deductions is attained. 
Our prime interest is in the relation between logic and 
language factors in those who have reached Piaget's 
stage of formal operations. We shall therefore do no 
more than make passing reference to some of the many 
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studies which have examined developmental factors in 
the interpretation of linguistic connectives and in 
deductive reasoning. 	 Should this project reveal 
differences in the performance of adults in different 
language groups, the burden of future research will be 
to elucidate the underlying developmental patterns. 
Concept identification studies 
A number of studies have focussed on concept learning 
behaviour. In these, typically the S is presented with 
a sequence of stimulus materials which vary along a 
number of dimensions, e.g. colour, form, size. 	 The 
experimenter has in mind a subset defined by, say, one 
value (termed an 'attribute') of each of two dimensions 
and a rule for combining these values. Thus for any 
particular concept, not all dimensions are relevant. 
In general, the rule for combining attributes is such 
that the presence or absence of either or both defines 
whether or not a particular stimulus is an example of 
the concept. For instance, if the relevant attributes 
are A and B, a conjunctive concept has as its only 
exemplars those stimuli which exhibit both attributes 
and inclusive disjunction is exemplified by those 
stimuli which display either or both of the attributes 
A and B. Stimuli which are examples of exclusive 
disjunction possess attribute A or attribute B but not 
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both. 	 The conditional concept 'if A then B' is 
exemplified by all stimuli except those which exhibit A 
but not B and the biconditional by those with both 
attributes or neither. 
After presentation of each stimulus the S is required 
to identify it as an example (positive instance) or 
non-example (negative instance) of the concept and is 
then told whether or not the is correct. Trials are 
repeated until the S makes a sequence of correct 
responses indicating that he has identified the 
essential features distinguishing examples of the 
concept from non-examples. The length of this sequence 
varies although 16 consecutive correct responses is 
often the criterion. Sometimes previously presented 
stimuli are allowed to remain in view sorted into their 
correct response categories, otherwise they are 
removed. Clearly the former paradigm simplifies the 
S's task somewhat by alleviating the memory burden 
associated with the necessity to remember the 
information obtained from previously presented stimuli. 
In order to be able to distinguish examples of the 
concept from non-examples, the S must identify the 
relevant stimulus dimensions and decide which are the 
criterial attributes. He must also identify the rule 
'Throughout this thesis, 'he' has been used to refer to 
an arbitrary individual whose gender is irrelevant. 
This is for no reason other than to avoid repetition of 
the cumbersome construction 'he or she'. 
governing how these attributes are combined. In some 
investigations the S is told the relevant attributes 
and must determine the rule of combination. In others 
the rule is known and the relevant attributes must be 
identified. The former is often termed 'rule learning' 
and the latter 'attribute identification'. 'Complete 
learning' is used to describe concept identification 
tasks where neither the attributes nor the rule of 
combination is known. 
A consistent finding of research into conceptual rule 
learning is that Ss find some rules easier than others. 
Neisser and Weene (1962) report that their adult Ss 
found conjunction, inclusive disjunction and the 
conditional easier than exclusive disjunction and the 
biconditional. Within the first group of concepts, the 
conditional was more difficult than the other two. A 
practice effect was noted - Ss' performance improved 
when the same concept was presented a second time. 
Neisser and Weene explain their findings by proposing 
that the conceptual rules tested form a hierarchy of 
successive complexity if the operations of negation, 
conjunction and disjunction are regarded as primitives. 
Level I concepts are those which are defined by the 
presence or absence of just one dimensional attribute. 
Concepts classified at Level II are those which can be 
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expressed as combinations of two Level I concepts using 
the primitive connectives. 	 Hence conjunction, 
inclusive disjunction and the conditional (interpreted 
as pvq) are Level II concepts. Level III concepts are 
combinations (using primitive connectives) of those at 
Level II and therefore include exclusive disjunction 
((PA q) v (p i\ 4)) and the biconditional (IDA q) v ( 5A -4)). 
In an attempt to explain why higher level concepts 
might be more elusive, it was suggested that a 
contributory factor might be the difficulty of 
formulating them verbally. These concepts could 
therefore be less familiar so that Ss might find them 
more difficult to keep in mind. 
Whilst Neisser and Weene's findings lend some support 
to their hypothesis, there remains the question as to 
why it is that conjunction and inclusive disjunction 
should be proposed as the primitive connectives rather 
than some other subset of the ten distinct connectives 
tested. The authors themselves point out that 'the 
hierarchy is merely a tautology until it is related to 
empirical findings' but do not explain on what basis 
those particular connectives were selected in the first 
place. Even if it is accepted that conjunction and 
inclusive disjunction are the primitive connectives, 
there is a problem with the allocation of certain 
concepts to Level II. For instance, the conditional is 
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expressed as fciv q and assigned to Level II on this 
basis. However (p n q) V (15/1 q) v (5 A 4) is an 
alternative expression for this connective in terms of 
conjunction and inclusive disjunction. Were the 
conditional to be interpreted in this form, it would 
then be assigned to Level IV. 
Haygood and Bourne (1965) conducted a series of concept 
identification experiments designed to discover whether 
the differential ability to learn conceptual rules 
might be eliminated if Ss were not required to identify 
relevant attributes as well as the rule of combination. 
Only Neisser and Weene's (1962) Level II concepts were 
used so that exclusive disjunction and the 
biconditional were not tested. Of the three concepts 
conjunction, inclusive disjunction and the conditional, 
the latter was again found to be more difficult than 
the other two. 	 Two factors are offered by way of 
explaining the greater difficulty of identifying the 
conditional concept. With two attributes on each of 
three dimensions, more stimulus elements fall into the 
truth table category FF (i.e. lack both relevant 
attributes) than any other truth table category. Hence 
the conditional has as positive instances a larger 
proportion of the stimulus population than either of 
the other two concepts. Furthermore, unlike 
conjunction and inclusive disjunction, the conditional 
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requires the TT cases (both attributes present) to be 
placed in the same response category as the FF cases 
(both attributes absent). 	 The set of positive 
instances of the conditional concept is therefore large 
and non-homogeneous. An additional factor suggested as 
contributing to the relative difficulty in identifying 
the conditional concept is the fact that the non-
commutativity of the rule requires Ss to distinguish FT 
and TF cases and assign them to different categories. 
In a subsequent experiment, Haygood and Bourne (1965) 
tested Ss on four concept identification tasks where 
the concepts tested were the conditional, 
biconditional, conjunction and inclusive disjunction. 
Biconditional and conditional concepts were more 
difficult than conjunction and disjunction. Again the 
authors propose the assignment of TT and FF stimuli to 
the same class as contributing to the greater 
difficulty of the conditional and biconditional 
concepts. 
The presence/absence of two relevant attributes 
partitions the stimulus population into four classes. 
Haygood and Bourne (1965) suggest that, when relevant 
attributes are known, Ss identify conceptual rules by 
acquiring information as to the correct assignment 
(example/non-example) of each of the four classes. The 
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implication is that Ss employ some kind of informal 
version of the truth table as a mediating device in the 
identification process. 	 It is proposed that 
differences in the ease of identifying different 
concepts may be due to differing amounts of experience 
with the concepts or to unexpected assignments of 
certain truth table categories. 	 However, with 
training, these differences tend to disappear so that 
Ss develop an appropriate strategy for identifying the 
concepts with equal facility. 
In a later paper, Bourne (1970) describes an experiment 
to investigate the relative difficulty of identifying 
four conceptual rules. The order of difficulty of 
these rules, from least to most difficult, was 
conjunction, inclusive disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional. Examination of the truth table 
categories which Ss assign to the incorrect response 
category reveals that these assignment errors vary from 
concept to concept. 
	 In the process of identifying 
inclusive disjunction, errors are most frequent in the 
mixed truth table categories TF and FT, i.e. with 
stimuli possessing one or other of the two relevant 
attributes but not both. For the conditional the TF 
category was the one suffering from the most incorrect 
assignments, whereas for the biconditional, stimuli 
with neither attribute (FF) were the most problematic. 
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With conjunction, errors were much the same for all the 
truth table categories. 	 The assignment errors for 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional are to a 
large extent those which would result from the 
identification of each concept as conjunction. Bourne 
therefore concludes that some of the differences in 
rule difficulty may be accounted for by a predilection 
for conjunctive concepts which must be suppressed when 
identifying other concepts. 	 However, this seems a 
rather unsatisfactory explanation given that the 
biconditional differs from conjunction in the 
assignment of only one truth table category (FF) and 
yet it was the most difficult of the four concepts 
tested. 
There are substantial inter-rule transfer effects when 
Ss are presented with a sequence of problems requiring 
the identification of different concepts (Haygood and 
Bourne, 1965; 	 Bourne, 1970). 	 Again, some form of 
mediating truth table is offered by way of explanation. 
Once learned, the truth table strategy can be applied 
to any of the 16 possible truth functional concepts and 
no concept is then more difficult to identify than any 
other. All require information concerning the correct 
allocation of each of the four truth table categories 
and Ss should therefore be able to identify any of 
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these concepts after at most one assignment error in 
each of the four categories. 
Hiew (1977) investigated whether appropriate training 
would facilitate acquisition of the truth table 
strategy and thereby enhance performance on concept 
identification tasks. The training consisted of 12 
concept identification problems covering the four 
concepts conjunction, inclusive disjunction, the 
conditional and biconditional. 	 For one group of Ss, 
the three problems testing each concept were presented 
in random order with the concept changing after each 
problem. For another group, the three problems testing 
the same concept were presented consecutively, the 
concept changing after the third, sixth and ninth 
problems. 	 After the training sequence, all Ss were 
tested on three tests of generalisation - a different 
truth functional concept, a truth functional concept 
involving three (rather than two) attributes and a 
truth functional concept involving two attributes where 
the stimulus elements were drawings of faces rather 
than geometric shapes. The null hypothesis was that Ss 
for whom the training stimuli were presented in random 
order would be more likely to learn the superordinate 
truth table strategy and would therefore perform better 
on the three generalisation problems. This was indeed 
the case. 	 Further support for the mediating truth 
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table is given by the results of Dodd et al (1979). 
Truth table pretraining was found to improve 
performance in identifying concepts, presumably because 
it provided Ss with an appropriate strategy for all 
subsequent tasks. 
Yet another explanation for differential rule 
difficulty is offered by Denny (1969). 	 Where 
previously presented stimuli are not available to the 
S, the information obtained from them must be held in 
short-term memory. It is suggested that there is an 
interaction between the processing necessary for the 
more complex conceptual rules and memory for previous 
stimulus instances. Previous stimuli were more readily 
forgotten if the rule was more complex. 	 Where the 
short-term memory burden was reduced by allowing 
previously presented stimuli to remain in view, sorted 
into their appropriate response category, differential 
rule difficulty was greatly reduced. Denny concluded 
that the more complex conceptual rules are more 
sensitive to the effects of short term memory burden. 
However, no explanation is offered as to what are the 
characteristics of conceptual rules which make some 
more complex than others. It does not seem that the 
greater ease in identifying certain concepts can be 
attributed simply to greater familiarity with them. 
Were this to be so, one might expect that the relative 
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rule difficulty would be less pronounced for young 
children. However, it has been shown that disjunctive 
concepts are more difficult to identify than 
conjunctive ones even for children as young as 5 or 6 
years old (King, 1966; Snow and Rabinovitch, 1969). 
Whilst the superordinate truth table may explain the 
performance of Ss with some pretraining on concept 
identification problems, it does not explain why naive 
Ss so consistently find some concepts easier than 
others nor why the same concepts always cause the most 
difficulty. Bourne (1974) proposes a model based on 
inference operations which correctly predicts the 
observed order of increasing difficulty: conjunction, 
inclusive 	 disjunction, 	 the 	 conditional 	 and 
biconditional. 	 The model assumes a predisposition 
towards conjunctive categories, reported by Bruner et 
al (1956) to be a feature of cognitive activity in 
Western culture. Faced with a concept identification 
task in which the relevant attributes are known, the 
naive S initially responds on the basis that the rule 
is conjunction. He therefore assigns TT stimuli to the 
positive response category and the remaining classes 
(TF, FT and FF) to the negative response category. 
During the course of identifying the concept, the S 
receives informative feedback which will correct errors 
of allocation if the concept is not conjunction. The 
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inference model assumes that, should these lead the S 
to change the response category of FF stimuli, then he 
will similarly change the response categories for TF 
and FT instances. He will also attempt to maintain 
different response categories for the FF and TT 
categories; 	 a change in one of these will cause a 
change in the other. Conjunction is therefore easy 
because it is consistent with the S's pre-experimental 
bias. Inclusive disjunction is more difficult because 
it requires the TF and FT categories to be assigned 
differently from FF stimulus elements. It is proposed 
that an increment in difficulty occurs when any of the 
inference operations are violated and that the 
magnitude of this increment is proportional to the 
number of different stimulus elements whose response 
category runs counter to a given inference. This is 
dependent on the proportion of stimulus elements in 
each truth table category and hence on the number of 
attributes on each relevant dimension. 
There is some evidence that conceptual rule learning 
performance is not independent of stimulus materials 
(Bourne, 1979). Certain pairs of attributes tend to 
integrate. Their combination presents itself as a unit 
and is therefore more conducive to a conjunctive 
interpretation. It is suggested that, on the dimension 
of number (of geometric forms), 'oneness' is likely to 
69 
integrate with any other dimension so that, for 
example, the attributes 'one' and 'circle' are likely 
to be viewed conjunctively. On the other hand, some 
combinations of attributes are more difficult to 
integrate and tend to be viewed separately thereby 
encouraging a disjunctive interpretation. Colour and 
form seem to fall into this category. 
In a later paper (Ketchum and Bourne, 1980), it is 
proposed that 'the local integrality' hypothesis 
described above is too simple to explain rule bias. It 
is suggested that certain attributes such as colour are 
perceptually more salient. The S therefore tends to 
respond positively to an instance which is positive 
with regard to colour regardless of the 
presence/absence of the other relevant attribute. The 
tendency to respond to a highly salient attribute as 
positive results in a propensity for a disjunctive 
sorting. If no perceptually salient feature is 
relevant, Ss will tend to sort stimulus elements 
conjunctively. 
It is clear from the foregoing account that, in concept 
identification tasks, some concepts are easier to 
identify than others. A consistent finding is that 
conjunction and inclusive disjunction are identified 
more successfully than exclusive disjunction, the 
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conditional and biconditional. 	 The reason for this 
differential rule difficulty is far from clear however, 
and none of the explanations offered seems entirely 
satisfactory. 
Interpretation of linguistic connectives 
A number of studies have attempted to elucidate how 
linguistic connectives are interpreted in a particular 
context and to compare this interpretation with the 
corresponding logical form. 	 In general the 
experimental tasks involved are such that they elicit 
some or all of the truth table which a S associates 
with a particular linguistic connective. Usually this 
is achieved by providing the truth values of two simple 
propositions p and q and requesting Ss to assess the 
truth value of compound propositions such as 'if p then 
q'. 	 Alternatively, the truth value of the compound 
statement is given and the S's task is to provide 
possible truth values for the simple components. 
Errors are taken to have occurred when the truth values 
elicited do not correspond to those which define the 
corresponding logical connective. 
Bart (1974) investigated the understanding of 
linguistic connectives in adolescents aged 14 - 19 
years. Test items were compound propositions 
consisting of two simple components conjoined with the 
usual linguistic form of logical conjunction, 
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disjunction and the conditional. 	 Ss were asked to 
assume the truth of just the first component and to 
evaluate the compound proposition as always true, 
always false or neither. 	 Propositions containing 
negation were found to be more difficult than those 
which did not. Also conjunction was slightly easier 
than disjunction and the conditional was more difficult 
than either. 
Damarin (1977a) required her Ss (pre-service elementary 
teachers) to evaluate the truth of compound statements 
given the truth values of their simple components. Two 
sets A and B were depicted with their elements 
(geometrical shapes). 	 The first simple proposition 
proposed that a particular shape was a member of the 
set A and the second that another was a member of the 
set B. Truth or falsity of the simple components could 
therefore be judged by examination of the pictured 
sets. 
	 The major finding reported was that Ss 
overwhelmingly tended to treat propositions involving 
conditional and biconditional connectives as though 
they were conjunctions, declaring them true only when 
both simple components were true. 	 Although less 
pronounced, there was also a tendency to treat 
disjunctive statements in this way. 
These results were replicated with another sample of 
pre-service teachers (Damarin, 1977b) when Ss were 
given compound propositions and asked to evaluate for 
which combinations of truth values of the simple 
components the proposition was true. 	 The compound 
propositions consisted of two components. The first 
stated whether a number M was odd or even and the 
second made a similar statement about a number N. It 
was also reported that Ss were more likely to assign an 
inclusive interpretation to the word 'or', a finding 
which seems to conflict with the widely held view that, 
in natural language, disjunction is exclusive (see 
chapter 3). 
In a study to investigate adult Ss' interpretation of 
conditional sentences, Evans (1972) found a tendency 
for Ss to view these as true when both components were 
true and false when the antecedent was true and the 
consequent false. The statement tended to be viewed as 
irrelevant when the antecedent was false. 	 (This 
finding has also been reported by Wason (1966).) 
Evans' results also led him to postulate a 'matching 
bias' - a S is less likely to respond with 'irrelevant' 
when the truth table category matches the items named 
in the conditional statement. He systematically 
negated the components of the conditional proposition 
so that the truth of the simple components p and q 
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constituted a different truth table category for each 
of the conditional propositions. For example, given 
the conditional 15-q, the truth of p and q renders the 
first component false and the second true so that the 
conditional is true. For 	 however, these truth 
values give a false conditional statement. Evans found 
that the cases where the antecedent was false were less 
likely to be judged as irrelevant when these were the 
cases where p and q were true. 
A similar investigation of the interpretation of 
disjunctive sentences (Evans and Newstead, 1980) showed 
that there were more errors of interpretation when just 
one of the components of the disjunctive proposition 
was negated. 	 Also the majority of Ss interpreted 
disjunction inclusively, assessing TT cases as 
consistent with the disjunctive statement. No evidence 
of 'matching bias' was found, however. 
Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969), using university 
students as Ss, 
	 showed that the way in which a 
conditional statement is expressed affects its 
interpretation. Ss were presented with sentences of 
the form: 'if p then q', 'not p if not q', '(not p) or 
'never p without q'. 	 These correspond to the 
logically equivalent forms: p-p.q, 	 p vq and p A -4 
respectively. 
	 The classification of TT cases as 
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confirming, TF cases as disconfirming and FT and FF 
cases as irrelevant was elicited by the first and last 
forms (p-*q and pA 4) . 'Not p if not q' was similarly 
treated as irrelevant when the antecedent (now 4) was 
false. In interpreting the disjunctive form 1-5v q, Ss 
did not classify stimuli as irrelevant but tended to 
favour the correct conditional interpretation. 
Airasian et al (1975) investigated the understanding of 
logical statements in adolescents presumed to have 
reached the stage of formal operations. The results 
led to the proposal of a hierarchy, the levels of which 
are conjunction, exclusive disjunction, inclusive 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional. 
Understanding of each is a pre-requisite for the 
understanding of all subsequent connectives in the 
hierarchy. However, these findings are difficult to 
interpret since the linguistic form of the test 
statements used is not given. 
A number of studies have focussed on how understanding 
of logical connectives develops in children. For 4 - 6 
year olds, conjunction and exclusive disjunction are 
easier than inclusive disjunction and a negated 
component of the compound proposition substantially 
increases the difficulty of comprehension (Suppes and 
Feldman, 1971). 
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Paris (1973) carried out a comprehensive investigation 
of the understanding of verbally expressed compound 
propositions utilising 'and', 'or', 'if ... then', '... 
if and only if then ...' in children and adults. Ss 
were shown a slide depicting, for instance, a boy on a 
bicycle and a dog lying down. They were then asked to 
assess the truth or falsity of a statement such as 'The 
boy is on a bicycle or the dog is lying down. 'And' 
was well understood throughout the age range. 	 'Or' 
tended to be interpreted as inclusive disjunction but 
there was a greater tendency to treat it exclusively 
amongst the older Ss. For younger children, errors in 
assessing the truth of a statement containing 'or' 
tended to occur when the TF or FT instance was depicted 
although this tendency was diminished when the 
statement contained 'either ... or' rather than just 
'or'. Conditional statements were difficult at all age 
levels and errors in interpretation occurred largely 
for the FT and FF cases. However, errors in the FF 
cases decreased amongst older Ss but FT errors 
persisted and were very high even amongst college 
students, who therefore tended to treat conditionals as 
biconditionals. 	 (This tendency is also reported by 
Taplin (1971).) Biconditionals evoked errors mainly in 
the FF cases but decreasingly so for older Ss. The 
order of increasing difficulty in comprehending the 
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connectives is reported as: 	 conjunction, 
biconditional, inclusive disjunction, conditional. 
Sternberg's (1979) results are somewhat at odds with 
those of Paris, described above. Interpretation of the 
biconditional was found to be the most susceptible to 
error and Sternberg's Ss (7 - 13 year olds and college 
students) favoured an exclusive interpretation of 'or'. 
However, his experimental method was rather different. 
Ss were given a compound proposition and required to 
assess the truth or falsity of all four truth table 
categories. Also reported is a preference by younger 
children for the inclusive interpretation of 'or', 
which diminished with increasing age in favour of the 
exclusive interpretation. Younger children also showed 
a preponderance for a biconditional reading for 'if ... 
then' which was replaced by a greater tendency for the 
conditional reading amongst older children. However 
the biconditional interpretation was not uncommon even 
amongst college students. 	 The transition from a 
biconditional to a conditional reading seemed to occur 
earlier for a conditional statement expressed using 
'only if'. 
Nitta and Nagano (1966) found that, for Japanese 
children aged 7 to 15, conjunction was easier than 
inclusive disjunction. Conjunction was well understood 
at all age levels whereas performance on disjunctive 
items improved steadily with age. The generality of 
their findings was investigated by Neimark and Slotnick 
(1970) who repeated some of their tests with American 
children in the same age range. Whilst the general 
results were similar, there was some indication that 
Japanese children perform better than American children 
of the same age. 	 Beilin and Lust (1975) suggest that 
this developmental difference could be attributable to 
the greater ambiguity in the expression of logical 
connectives in English. 
The research findings on how linguistic connectives are 
interpreted lack consistency and are therefore 
difficult to integrate. It is clear that 'and' is 
nearly always assigned an interpretation equivalent to 
logical conjunction and that 'if then' is 
frequently not given a conditional reading. Negation 
in either component of a compound proposition seems to 
increase the difficulty of comprehension. 	 There is 
widespread disagreement as to how 'or' is interpreted 
especially when contextual cues do not indicate the 
appropriate reading. A recent view is that adults tend 
to favour an inclusive interpretation with a sizeable 
minority preferring an exclusive reading (Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne, 1991, p. 44). 
	 However, the experimental 
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evidence does not seem to support such a view with any 
consistency. 
It is interesting to note that the relative difficulty 
of interpreting linguistic connectives mirrors to a 
large extent the difficulty of identifying the 
underlying logical concepts in non-verbal concept 
identification tasks. 	 As Lenneberg (1962) observes: 
in most instances of experimental concept 
formation, there is a correlation between ease of 
naming the concept and ease of attaining it.' 	 A 
possible explanation of the relative difficulty of 
identifying logical concepts is that, for those with 
ambiguous labels, the underlying schemata are 
inadequately formed or infrequently invoked. In either 
case, the underlying concept is less familiar and 
therefore more difficult to access. 
An additional factor is the role of verbalisation, 
proposed as a significant factor in concept 
identification tasks. Archer's (1964) view is that in 
such tasks '... there may be a gradual development of 
attending to stimuli, selection of information, 
formulation of hypotheses, testing of these hypotheses, 
identification of relevant and irrelevant information, 
elimination of redundant relevant information and a 
gradual but final "firming up" of a verbal statement of 
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the concept'. However, the evidence suggests that such 
a verbal statement will be more difficult to formulate 
for certain logical concepts. 
Propositional reasoning 
Tests of propositional reasoning focus on the 
conclusions which can be drawn from compound 
propositions conjoined using linguistic connectives 
such as 'and', 'or', 'if ... then', and 'if and only 
if'. In the most commonly used form of such a test 
(often termed the 'two-premise deductive argument') the 
S is presented with a compound proposition consisting 
of two simple components. This constitutes the 'major 
premise'. A minor premise is also given. This takes 
the form of one of the component simple propositions 
(or its negation) of the major premise. 	 The other 
component (or its negation) of the major premise 
constitutes the conclusion. The S is asked to assess 
the truth of the conclusion assuming the truth of the 
premises. An example is : 'John is rich or he is 
clever' (major premise); 'John is not clever' (minor 
premise); 
	 'John is rich' (conclusion). 	 For this 
example the conclusion is true. 	 In some cases the 
truth of the conclusion is undecidable. This would be 
so in the example above if the minor premise were 
altered to 'John is clever' and 'or' was interpreted 
inclusively. A slight modification of this type of 
test is where the S is not given a conclusion for which 
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to test the validity but must attempt to supply a valid 
conclusion himself. This type of task is similar to 
those used to investigate understanding of linguistic 
connectives (described in the last section). However 
it requires a scanning of the whole truth table rather 
than just the individual rows. 
Newstead et al (1984) investigated disjunctive 
reasoning in adults with argument forms as described 
above where the major premise was varied to cover such 
contexts as promises, threats, choices, qualifications 
and abstract material. Two inference forms are valid 
for disjunctive arguments. From the falsity of one of 
the disjuncts of the major premise, the affirmation of 
the other disjunct can be inferred. 	 This form of 
inference is known as the 'denial inference'. When the 
minor premise is the affirmation of one of the 
disjuncts, the negation of the other can be inferred 
only if the disjunction is taken to be exclusive (known 
as the 'affirmation inference'). If 'or' is read as 
inclusive disjunction, nothing can be inferred. Over 
90% of Ss made the denial inference with context having 
little effect on this tendency. Ss are also reported 
to show a strong inclination to draw the affirmation 
inference appropriate for exclusive disjunction for all 
contexts other than qualification (e.g. major premise: 
'The successful applicant must have a degree or 
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experience in computing'). 	 When offered as further 
evidence that natural language disjunction is exclusive 
this is not really convincing since a number of the 
major premises used to cover other contexts are such 
that it is highly unlikely that both disjuncts could be 
true simultaneously. For instance, 'My wife will be 
either watching television or preparing a meal' and 'It 
[a poem] was written either by Ian Jennings or by Peter 
Lambert' do seem to invite an exclusive interpretation. 
Roberge (1978) investigated reasoning with major 
premises in which the connectives were 'or ... but not 
both', 'or ... or both' and also conditional premises 
expressed using 'if ... then' and 'only if'. In each 
case the minor premise was the denial of the second 
component of the major premise. 	 Reasoning with 
premises with abstract content (e.g. 'There is a J only 
if there is a W') was compared with those with concrete 
content ('If Joan is athletic then she is rich'). Also 
investigated was the effect of polarity (negation in 
either or both components) in the major premise. The 
following were the more relevant findings of this 
research. 
(1) 	 When the first component of the major premise 
contained negation, performance was superior when the 
content of the argument was concrete rather than 
abstract. When both components of the major premise 
were negative, performance was better with abstract 
content. 
(2) For both forms of disjunction, Ss found arguments 
whose minor premise was the denial of an affirmative 
second component of the major premise easier than when 
the major premise contained a negated second component. 
However, there was no such effect for either form of 
conditional argument. 
(3) Conditional arguments where the first component 
was affirmative were easier than those where the first 
component was negative. There was no such effect for 
disjunctive arguments. 
(4) Disjunctive arguments in which at least one 
component was negated were more difficult than the 
corresponding conditional arguments. 	 When both 
components of the major premise contained negation, 
exclusive disjunction was easier than inclusive 
disjunction. 
(5) Conditional arguments expressed using 'only if' 
were easier than those using 'if ... then'. 
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(6) 	 Performance was virtually error-free with 
arguments involving exclusive disjunction and for 
conditionals using 'only if' when neither component of 
the major premise was negated. For arguments involving 
exclusive disjunction, the introduction of one negated 
component in the major premise reduced performance 
considerably, especially if the content of the argument 
was abstract. 
The research projects described above are among the few 
that have investigated other than conditional 
reasoning. 	 The pre-occupation with this particular 
form has been justified by its role in evaluating the 
validity of conclusions drawn from theoretical 
assertions and hence its importance in any of the 
scientific (and, presumably, mathematical) disciplines 
(Ward et al, 1990). There are two valid inferences 
which can be drawn when the major premise has the form 
'if p then q'. 	 Where the minor premise is p, the 
conclusion q can be inferred, a form of valid argument 
known as 'modus ponens'. When the minor premise has 
the form 4, the valid conclusion is /5 ('modus 
tollens'). Two invalid inferences are: given 15 as the 
minor premise, drawing the conclusion 4 (known as 
'denying the antecedent') and, given the minor premise 
q, inferring p ('affirming the consequent'). However, 
each of the latter inferences is valid if the major 
premise is interpreted as a biconditional statement. 
Taplin's (1971) results suggest that, for adults, modus 
ponens is easier than modus tollens and both these 
forms are easier than denying the antecedent and 
affirming the consequent. 	 Only 18% of his Ss 
consistently (and correctly) denied the validity of 
denying the antecedent whilst the corresponding 
percentage for affirming the consequent was 29. Nearly 
half of all Ss erroneously considered these inferences 
valid. 	 However, expanding the major premise to 
countermand the invited inference that the major 
premise was biconditional was found to reduce these 
errors (Rumain et al, 1983; Byrnes and Overton, 1988). 
A similar hierarchy of difficulty for the four forms of 
argument was also found by Jansson (1975) for pre-
service elementary teachers. 
A number of factors have been found to influence 
success in a variety of tasks which have been used to 
test conditional reasoning. Negation in the major 
premise was found to increase the difficulty in 
assessing the validity of the conclusion in grade 
levels 4 to 10 (Roberge, 1969). 	 Pollard and Evans 
(1980) also found that the polarity of the major 
premise affected the performance of adults. Ss were 
found to have a greater tendency to affirm negative 
conclusions leading these researchers to postulate a 
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'conclusion bias' in favour of negative conclusions. 
However performance on modus ponens arguments seems 
relatively immune to this effect. 
The subject matter of the premises and conclusion also 
seems to affect conditional reasoning performance 
(Staudenmayer, 1975). Ss are more consistent in their 
inferences when the argument is concerned with abstract 
rather than concrete material although in this case 
they are no less likely to interpret the major premise 
as a biconditional. 	 Ss reasoning with abstract 
material also show more consistency than those 
reasoning with material which is concrete but where the 
relation between antecedent and consequent in the major 
premise is anomalous (e.g. 'If she waters the tropical 
plant then the light will go on'). 
A rather different form of conditional reasoning test 
is the so-called 'selection task'. 	 In its original 
form (Wason, 1966; Wason, 1968) Ss are shown four cards 
and told that each has a letter on one side and a 
number on the other. The cards are presented with one 
side visible showing a vowel, a consonant, an even 
number and an odd number. Given the rule 'if there is 
a vowel on one side of the card, then there is an even 
number on the other side', Ss are required to select 
all (and only) those cards which must be turned over to 
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discover whether the rule is true or false. 	 The 
essential feature of the task is, given p, p, q, 75, and 
the conditional rule p4q, which combination of truth 
values of p and q could disprove the rule? The answer 
is p and 4 and this determines the correct combination 
of cards which must be inspected. 	 In the example 
above, the card with a vowel and the card with an odd 
number should be turned over. The task as described 
above is notoriously difficult with fewer than 10% of 
adult Ss selecting the correct pair of cards (Manktelow 
and Evans, 1979). Ss frequently select the card 
corresponding to p and many incorrectly select q as 
well. However very few indeed choose 4. 
In the twenty-five years since the task was first used, 
a considerable volume of research has been generated 
attempting to explain why the selection task causes 
such problems for intelligent Ss. It was found that 
performance was greatly improved if the task used 
realistic material rather than abstract symbols (Wason 
and Shapiro, 1971; Johnson-Laird et al, 1972; 	 Van 
Duyne, 1974). 	 However, later studies failed to 
replicate the facilitating effect of realistic material 
(Manktelow and Evans, 1979; 
	 Griggs and Cox, 1982). 
This led to the suggestion that it is not simply 
realistic material which facilitates performance but 
rather that the material must combine realistic content 
with a scenario familiar to the S and for which he has 
already learned the appropriate testing strategies 
(Pollard and Evans, 1987). In this case, the S is not 
displaying improved logical reasoning but his own 
relevant experience is cued by the scenario evoked by 
the experimental materials and he is thus led to the 
correct response. This explains the earlier finding 
(Cox and Griggs, 1982) that the facilitation observed 
with certain forms of realistic material did not 
transfer when Ss were subsequently presented with the 
original form of the selection task. 	 George (1991) 
also reports a form of 'scenario effect' - Ss were more 
likely to choose q when such a choice was pertinent to 
a specified goal. 
Evans (1972) explains the common selection of p and q 
by way of a 'matching bias' - Ss tend to choose the 
cards named in the rule. Evans and Lynch (1973), using 
symbolic material, investigated the effect of polarity 
in the conditional rule and found that Ss tend to 
choose the cards corresponding to p and q even when the 
rule was P-sq or p-4.4. (In the latter case, p and q 
is the correct selection.) Manktelow and Evans (1977) 
confirmed the matching bias effect for realistic 
material. 
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Whilst a comprehensive theory explaining performance on 
the various forms of the selection task has yet to be 
developed, it is currently thought that a number of 
factors contribute to the difficulty of the task. 
George (1991) suggests that these include linguistic 
factors (such as interpretation of the conditional 
connective), knowledge factors about the topic of the 
conditional statement and utility factors related to 
the S's current goal. 
From the foregoing account, it is clear that human 
beings' reasoning is frequently illogical in the sense 
that it fails to conform to the laws of formal logic. 
Conclusions are drawn which are not sanctioned by logic 
and valid inferences are overlooked. Nevertheless, it 
is also clear that a certain degree of logical 
competence is possessed even by young children and that 
adults, when reasoning illogically, are often able to 
recognise that their proposed inference is flawed. 
A view once fashionable was that formal logic described 
the cognitive processes involved in reasoning (Boole, 
1854; Kant, 1855) or was at least isomorphic to these 
processes (Piaget, 1957). This now seems unacceptable 
for a variety of reasons. One is that no linear 
correlation appears to exist between the number of 
logical steps involved in a process of inference and 
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the difficulty of making that inference (Osherson, 
1975). 	 The inevitable conclusion is that a logical 
step does not necessarily correspond to a mental step. 
Another problem is that a number of logically valid and 
easily inferred conclusions would be viewed as bizarre 
in normal discourse (Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991). 
For example, from the premises p and q the conclusions 
p v q, (p v q) A p, p A p are valid although there is 
little evidence for them in the logical repertoire of 
ordinary individuals. Whilst logic is not now taken to 
be representative of thinking processes, it is held to 
be an essential tool for evaluating the output from 
those processes, however they are carried out. Formal 
logic can therefore be regarded as normative rather 
than descriptive. 
In any model of deductive reasoning it seems necessary 
to postulate at least two components. 	 One is 
responsible for the comprehension of the premises and 
for encoding their salient features in a form suitable 
for manipulation in memory. The second is a processing 
element responsible for carrying out the operations on 
the encoded premises and producing a valid inference if 
this is possible. Braine (1978) refers to the former 
as the 'performance component' and the latter as the 
'logical component'. He further proposes that the 
performance component contains two main programs. One 
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is concerned with comprehension of the premises and 
determines what information is to be encoded. The 
other determines the routines and strategies necessary 
for constructing a line of reasoning. 
The current theories which attempt to explain deductive 
reasoning have concerned themselves exclusively with 
the logical component. They describe this by proposing 
one of three cognitive structures. These are general 
purpose inference rules (Braine, 1978; 	 Rips, 1983), 
pragmatic reasoning schemata (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985) 
and mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1982; Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne, 1991). Inference rules define the deductive 
steps which can be applied in an argument and thereby 
determine what can be concluded from propositions which 
have been established. They are substitution instances 
of inference rule schemata - formulae which specify the 
general form of inference rules. An example of such a 
schema would be: 
p or q, 	 not p 
q 
where the conclusion below the line is a valid 
inference from the premises written above it. 
Pragmatic reasoning schemata differ only in that the 
rules invoked are dependent upon such factors as the 
content and context of the problem. They propose that 
ordinary life experiences induce abstract knowledge 
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structures. 	 Hence an individual reasons with rules 
which are sensitive to context and which are invoked on 
the basis of a pragmatic interpretation of the 
situation thereby activating the relevant schema. The 
'mental models' notion is rather different. It assumes 
that, in a reasoning situation, a model is set up whose 
structure is identical to that of the state of affairs 
with which the reasoning is concerned. The essence of 
the theory is that the models contain maximal implicit 
information and minimal explicit information. 	 For 
instance, a disjunctive statement such as 'There is a 
circle or there is a triangle' invokes two models, one 
in which there is a triangle and one in which there is 
a circle. 	 The information 'there is no circle' 
eliminates the second model leaving only the first from 
which the inference 'there is a triangle'is made . No 
inference rules are necessary. Conclusions are drawn 
and tested for their validity by attempting to find 
alternative models which do not support them. 
Given that human reasoning is so resistant to 
introspection, there is understandable disagreement as 
to which of the above more accurately models the 
reasoning process. However, from the point of view of 
this study, what is important about all these models of 
reasoning is that they imply a 'translation' process 
from a problem represented in language to an abstracted 
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mental representation. 	 No model incorporates any 
provision for faulty reasoning so presumably, if this 
encoding process is carried out successfully, error-
free deduction will occur subject to such constraints 
as the availability of space in working memory. 	 It 
therefore seems that it is the encoding stage which is 
implicated as the major source of the many and varied 
errors which are known to occur in human reasoning. 
Of the theories of deduction outlined above none has 
yet addressed the process of comprehension. 	 Indeed 
Evans (1989, p. 67) considers that '... such theories 
are seriously incomplete in that they fail to describe 
the necessary encoding and decoding stages that must 
precede and follow reasoning.' Whilst errors in the 
translation process may be due to a variety of factors 
(for example, motivation, inattention), for problems 
expressed in language, language comprehension must be 
one of the major causes of encoding errors. There are 
a number of ways in which language factors have been 
implicated. 
	 It has been suggested (Politzer, 1986) 
that one explanation of poor performance on reasoning 
tasks may be that mental logical structures are 
constituted but do not co-ordinate well with the laws 
of language use. The two systems are in some way 
contradictory. Braine (1978) explains some of the 
common errors of syllogistic reasoning as due to '... 
the intrusion into formal reasoning of habits 
characteristic of practical reasoning and ordinary 
language comprehension.' 	 In a comprehensive 
investigation of reasoning with conjunctive, 
disjunctive, conditional and biconditional connectives, 
Sternberg (1979) compared interpretation with reasoning 
performance. By comparing the overall errors made at 
the encoding stage with those made in deductive 
reasoning tasks, he concluded that most of the 
reasoning errors could be accounted for by encoding 
errors. Taplin et al (1974) drew a similar conclusion 
for conditional connectives. 
Where linguistic connectives are concerned, part 
(perhaps all) of their 'meaning' is the specific 
inferences which they permit. For an inference rule 
model of reasoning, a failure to encode such a 
connective correctly will invoke an inappropriate 
inference rule. 	 Mental models utilise an accurate 
representation of the reasoning problem and again must 
depend critically on the correct interpretation of the 
relationship between premise components. Whilst there 
are a wide range of factors which could lead to a 
breakdown in the process of representation, mis-coding 
of linguistic connectives will inevitably lead to 
erroneous reasoning. Given the evidence that they are 
not generally understood in their logical form, there 
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seems no doubt that at least some reasoning errors must 
be directly attributable to poor comprehension of these 
language forms. 
Cross-linguistic research 
Very few researchers have interested themselves in 
cross-linguistic comparisons of concept identification 
or deductive reasoning tasks. Yet if, as seems likely, 
mis-comprehension of linguistic connectives is a source 
of reasoning errors, one would not be surprised to find 
some differences in performance amongst the speakers of 
languages which use different linguistic forms to 
convey logical concepts. Cole et al (1968) reported 
that the Kpelle language distinguished between 
inclusive and exclusive disjunction. (The Kpelle are a 
tribal people inhabiting North Central Liberia.) 	 A 
concept identification experiment was therefore carried 
out where the performance of Kpelle Ss was compared 
with that of Americans. It was found that the Kpelle 
identified conjunctive and inclusive disjunctive 
concepts with equal facility whereas the Americans 
found conjunction easier than inclusive disjunction. 
It was therefore proposed that identification of 
logical rules might be related to the ease with which 
they could be expressed linguistically. However, it 
was suggested (Ciborowski and Cole, 1972) that the 
stimulus materials might have Hmeiti influenced the 
experimental results. 
	 Conjunctive and disjunctive 
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concepts were conveyed using four patches of coloured 
cloth presented in two pairs (e.g. red/green and 
red/yellow). Combinations of two colours, one from 
each cloth pair, defined the conceptual rule which the 
S had to identify. 	 However, whilst the stimulus 
materials might affect performance, it is not clear why 
Kpelle and American Ss performed differently given that 
the same experimental paradigm was used for each group. 
Newstead and Griggs (1983) do not consider the 
criticism of Cole et al's experimental method to be a 
serious one, especially in view of the results obtained 
by Ciborowski and Cole (1972). 	 In an attempt to 
clarify whether the differential difficulty of 
conjunctive and disjunctive concepts was a culture-
specific phenomenon, the performance of Kpelle and 
American Ss was compared using more standard concept 
identification stimulus materials. Ss were required to 
identify the relevant attributes and the rule for 
combining them (either conjunction or inclusive 
disjunction). Similar results to those of Cole et al 
were obtained when previously presented stimulus 
instances were not available. However, when the memory 
burden was alleviated by allowing previous stimuli to 
remain in view sorted into their respective response 
categories, there was no evidence of a difference in 
performance between the two cultural groups. Although 
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far from conclusive, these studies are amongst the few 
which provide some support for the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. However, it has been pointed out (Newstead 
and Griggs, 1983) that the Kpelle Ss were bilingual in 
English and Kpelle, a factor which might well have 
influenced the experimental results. 
The ability of the Kpelle to perform deductive 
reasoning tasks has also been investigated (Cole and 
Scribner, 1974, pp. 160 - 169). When asked to evaluate 
the conclusion of a traditional syllogism, uneducated 
Kpelle appear not to accept the logical nature of the 
task. They respond on the basis of personally known 
facts or general knowledge rather than by processing 
only the information supplied. The underlying 
reasoning may well be logical but it proceeds from 
premises other than (or in addition to) those provided 
by the experimenter. 	 For educated Kpelle however, 
responses were very much as those reported for Western 
Ss. Education appears to instil an appreciation of the 
logical relations implicit in the task and hence 
diminishes the reliance on factual content. 
Zepp (1982) investigated bilingual students' (aged 11 
to 15) understanding of the linguistic connectives 
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'and', 'or' and 'if ... then • • • in English and 
Sesotho, the latter being the Ss' first language. 
These connectives are expressed rather differently in 
the two languages. 	 The experimental materials used 
consisted of cards with sides labelled A and B each of 
which was coloured red, green or black. Ss were shown 
one side of the card and were required to use a given 
statement to deduce whatever they could about the other 
side. For example, when shown a red side A and told 
'side A is not red or side B is black' the correct 
conclusion is that side B is black. Given the same 
statement and shown a black side A, no conclusion can 
be drawn about the colour of side B. Students at lower 
grade levels were found to perform better when tested 
in Sesotho whilst the older students tested in English 
outperformed those tested in their native language. 
One explanation offered is that the younger students 
have a poor command of English which improves during 
their secondary education (carried out primarily in 
English). 	 However, as Zepp points out, it is 
interesting to note that the logical skills acquired do 
not seem to transfer readily to the first language. 
This is further evidenced by the fact that some of the 
older students tested in Sesotho nevertheless wrote 
their answers in English. Also interesting is that the 
older students all agreed (along with their mathematics 
teacher) that logic was more difficult in Sesotho and 
that they preferred to learn mathematics in English. 
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An investigation of possible Whorfian effects on the 
interpretations of logical sentences was attempted by 
Zepp et al (1987) using much the same experimental 
method as that described above. The performance of 
first language English speakers was compared with that 
of first language Chinese speakers with each group 
tested in their first language. 	 Another group of 
bilingual students whose first language was Chinese was 
tested in English. Although there was some evidence 
that the performance of the bilingual group suffered 
from lack of adequate fluency in the second language, 
no other significant differences were found. Logical 
errors were not specific to either Chinese or English. 
Zepp therefore postulates that, in all languages and 
cultures, the conditional sentences which children hear 
are taken (and meant) as biconditionals. 	 Thus the 
child comes to learn that the converse and inverse of a 
true conditional statement are also true. This does 
not however explain failure to reason from the 
contrapositive. It is suggested that this might be due 
to the temporal aspects of conditional statements where 
the antecedent usually precedes the consequent in time. 
Reasoning from the contrapositive therefore requires a 
transformation involving an alteration in the time 
sequence. 
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Further evidence for the absence of Whorfian 
differences in logical reasoning was obtained by Zepp 
(1987a) in a subsequent study using the same 
experimental paradigm. Chinese-English bilinguals were 
tested in Chinese (their first language), given 
instruction in logic in English and then re-tested in 
Chinese. 	 Performance in the second test showed 
considerable improvement. This contradicts the results 
of Zepp's earlier (1982) research and suggests that 
logical principles learned in a second language 
transfer readily to situations where the first language 
is utilised. 	 Zepp (1986) also reports that an 
illiterate deaf-mute S performed in a manner comparable 
with that of verbal Ss on a concept identification task 
involving conjunctive and disjunctive concepts. This 
seems to refute Cole et al's (1968) conjecture that 
ease of concept formation is related to the ease of 
expression of that concept. 
There is little that can be concluded from the very few 
studies reported in English which have attempted a 
cross-linguistic comparison of the concepts underlying 
logical connectives. 
	 Results are difficult to 
interpret and, to some extent, mutually contradictory. 
However, evidence in favour of Whorfian differences, 
although slim, seems sufficient to merit further 
investigation. 
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Chapter 5 
LINGUISTIC CONNECTIVES IN JAPANESE AND ARABIC 
The following account outlines how linguistic 
connectives are expressed in Japanese and Arabic. A 
brief description of the essential features of each 
language (particularly those which differ from English) 
is included so as to establish a context for the 
discussion which follows. 	 The connectives described 
are those which potentially convey the sense of logical 
conjunction, disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional. Also included are other uses of these 
lexical and grammatical items so that potential sources 
of ambiguity can be appreciated. 
General sources of the information included in this 
chapter are: Kuno, 1973; Bloch, 1946; Alfonso, 1980; 
Naganuma and Mori, 1962; Hakuta et al, 1982; Tritton, 
1943; Beeston, 1970; Smart, 1986; Wright, 1971; 
Haywood and Nahmad, 1965. 
Japanese 
Japanese is a 'SOV language' - the usual word order in 
a sentence with a transitive verb is subject, object, 
verb. There is some flexibility in the order of 
subject and object but it is obligatory for the verb to 
occupy the sentence-final position. As is typical of 
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such languages, Japanese has no prepositions and the 
relations which these convey are expressed using 
postpositions - particles which follow the word or 
clause which they qualify. Postpositions are also used 
to signal the grammatical functions of nouns, for 
instance in marking subject and object. Co-ordinating 
particles are also postpositional. 
Verb conjugation is not affected by the gender or 
plurality of its subject and there are only two tenses, 
present (or non-past) and past. Adjectives behave very 
similarly to verbs and are inflected to distinguish 
(amongst other things) present, past, affirmative and 
negative. Nouns are not generally marked for plurality 
(although it is possible to do so) nor for gender and 
Japanese lacks definite and indefinite articles. 
The Japanese writing system consists of a mixture of 
imported Chinese ideographic characters called 'kanji' 
together with phonetic characters called 'kana' used 
for their sound alone. There are two kana syllabaries, 
hiragana and katakana, each consisting of 48 
characters. Imported foreign words for which there is 
no ideographic character in use are usually written 
phonetically using katakana. Prior to the Japanese 
language reforms after World War II, most Japanese 
newspapers stocked over 5000 kanji in type and highly 
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educated Japanese would know as many as 20,000 
ideographs (Seward, 1983, p. 4). Currently, just under 
2000 kanji are taught to schoolchildren along with the 
two kana syllabaries and publications aimed at the 
general populace are recommended to restrict themselves 
to 2111 specific kanji. 
The Japanese language is well known for its linguistic 
provision for distinguishing levels of politeness and 
respect. There are four levels of sentence style which 
are selected on the basis of intimacy of speaker and 
addressee. 	 For each level of style, two honorific 
forms exist, selected on the basis of the speaker's 
respect for either the subject or object of the 
sentence (Kuno, 1973). 
Japanese has been described as a language 'whose 
insightful description requires more use of notions 
related to the affect of speakers (such as their point 
of view, empathy, and camera angle) than does English.' 
(Hakuta and Bloom, 1986.) 
	 For instance, in Japanese 
the speaker must signal whether an affirmative 
statement stems from his own first hand knowledge or 
from hearsay, even when he is certain that what he has 
heard (and is now reporting) is factually correct. 
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Context is said to play a more important role in 
understanding Japanese than it does for English 
discourse. It is considered impolite to be too overt 
and explicit. Indirectness is valued and 'reading 
between the lines' is therefore an important skill 
(Yotsukura, 1977). 
Conjunctions 
There are several different morphemes in Japanese which 
correspond to the English word 'and'. Unlike English, 
Japanese distinguishes between conjunction of nouns, 
adjectives, verb phrases and sentences. 
Conjunction of nouns is achieved by using 'to' or 'ya' 
between conjuncts. The former is appropriate when the 
list of conjoined nouns is complete, i.e. there are 
none that the speaker has omitted to mention. If used 
in a sentence such as 'I visited Paris and Rome', 'to' 
would indicate that I visited only those cities. On 
the other hand, 'ya' is used where the list is 
incomplete and includes other items not mentioned. If 
'ya' were used rather than 'to' in the example above, 
the implication would be that I visited other places as 
well. Nouns (and adjectives) may also be conjoined by 
juxtaposition as in 'I visited Paris, Rome, London, New 
York'. However, this can sound childish if over-used. 
'To' and 'ya' can also be used to link noun phrases. 
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'Ni' can replace 'to' but is very much less common. It 
tends to be used for listing and generally requires 
more than two conjuncts to be enumerated. 
'To' has a number of other meanings. It is used as a 
signal to indicate that the preceding words constitute 
directly reported speech, as in 'The boy asked his 
father "What are you doing?" '. It is also utilised to 
signal indirectly reported speech. 'To' can convey the 
sense of a conditional in that it connects an 
antecedent with its natural, inevitable or immediate 
consequent (see below). The sense of the English 'or' 
is conveyed by 'to' in comparisons or choices, e.g. 
'Which do you prefer, coffee or tea?' or 'Who is 
taller, Paul or Jim?'. 
A conjunctive linking of nouns and noun phrases can 
also be achieved using '... mo 	 mo' where 'mo' 
follows each of the conjuncts (including the last). 
This gives the sense of 'and also' as in 'We have 
offices in London and also in Paris'. When the verb in 
the sentence is negated '... mo mo' means 'neither 
... nor', so that in the last example, merely negating 
the verb produces the equivalent of 'We have offices in 
neither London nor Paris'. This is in contrast to 
'neither ... nor' sentences in English where the verb 
retains its affirmative form. It is also interesting 
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to note that, in this particular Japanese construction, 
negating the sentence p n q is understood as p A Ei 
rather than 	 p A q 	 (or 	 ID v 4), the logical 
interpretation of the negated form. 
Verbs and adjectives in Japanese constitute very 
similar grammatical forms and adjectives are inflected 
for nine of the ten categories for which verbs are 
inflected. 	 Conjunction of adjectives and verbs is 
achieved by inflecting all except the last of the 
conjuncts with the ending '-te'. The verb occupies the 
final position in a Japanese sentence so that 
conjunction of sentences can also be achieved by 
inflecting the final verb in the first sentence into 
its '-te' form. However, this tends to be used for 
'and then' and is not appropriate when the two 
conjuncts describe actions or states which occur 
simultaneously. 	 In this case the '-i' inflexion is 
used. Although the '-te' ending does not imply any 
causal relationship between conjuncts, it can be used 
in the same way that 'and' is, to link cause and 
effect, e.g. 'I shouted at him and he ran away'. In 
fact the '-te' inflection is the most frequently used 
form of the Japanese verb. As well as signalling 
conjunction, it is used to indicate that an action is 
(or was) taking place over a period of time. (It is 
akin to, but not identical to, the English gerund.) In 
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this sense it resembles the progressive form, e.g. 'It 
is raining'. However Japanese is more insistent upon 
the progressive form where English would allow a 
sentence in its present tense. For example, the 
following are optional forms of the same sentence in 
English: 	 'I teach mathematics in London' or 'I am 
teaching mathematics in London'. The progressive '-te' 
form of the verb in this sentence would be obligatory 
in Japanese. 
Juxtaposition may be used to combine sentences but this 
form of conjunction is less common in Japanese than in 
English. 	 Two sentences of the form 'A is B' are 
conjoined using 'de' as the conjunctive connective, 
e.g. 'This is yours and that is mine'. 'De' also has a 
number of other uses. It is the particle denoting the 
means or instrument attached to some action and in this 
sense translates as 'with' or 'by means of' as in 'He 
writes with a pencil'. It also denotes the place where 
an action is performed as in 'He learned it at 
college'. 	 It marks amounts of time or money and 
indicates measures of what is necessary to complete 
some action. In addition, it marks a reason for some 
fact and is equivalent to 'for' in 'She is famous for 
her cooking'. 
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'Shi' can be used to link symmetrical clauses about a 
common topic and is often used to enumerate reasons, 
e.g. 'Its raining and the wind is blowing; let's go 
home.' In linking two sentences or clauses where what 
is described in the first precedes what is described in 
the second, 'soshite' can be used. This word therefore 
translates as 'and then' as in 'She sat down and (then) 
opened the book'. 
Were the natural language items for 'and' to be used in 
logic, presumably the expression of conjunction would 
be different depending upon the nature of the 
conjuncts. For this reason perhaps, logical 
conjunction is expressed using 'katsu' between 
conjuncts, a form not used in everyday language. 
Disjunctions 
The particle 'ka' between two nouns or phrases signals 
disjunction. 	 It has a number of other functions 
however. When affixed to the end of an affirmative 
sentence, 'ka' converts it to a question. For example, 
affixed to the Japanese translation of 'Jack speaks 
German', 'ka' would give the equivalent of 'Does Jack 
speak German?'. It is also used in the same way to 
mark requests for information, such as 'Where are you 
going?'. The use of 'ka' at the end of a sentence can 
also be used to convey doubt or disbelief. These two 
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uses are distinguished by means of intonation. 	 A 
similar intonational distinction can be achieved in 
English. 	 Consider, for example, 'You passed your 
examinations?' which, depending upon the intonation, 
can convey a straightforward question or an expression 
of surprise or disbelief. Interrogative words such as 
'who', 'what' and 'where' are converted to 'someone', 
'something' and 'somewhere' respectively if they are 
followed by 'ka'. 
Disjunction can also be expressed using 'nari' after 
each disjunct. This form is considered rather formal 
and tends to carry the implication that there may be a 
better alternative as in 'Ask John or Mary (or someone 
better)'. 	 'Aruiwa' (classed as a connective adverb) 
can also be used between disjunctive clauses 
particularly where there is a degree of uncertainty in 
the speaker's mind as to which of the disjuncts is the 
case. It is also used in a sentence offering a choice 
of examples, e.g. '... pets such as dogs or cats or 
rabbits ...'. 'Soretomo' is used between disjunctive 
questions such as 'Did you buy a car or did you buy a 
bicycle?'. Its use is optional and it can be omitted. 
However 'ka' cannot be substituted. In comparisons and 
choices 'to' is used for 'or' (see above). 'Matawa' is 
also used to convey disjunction between nouns and 
phrases and is the form used for logical disjunction. 
Conditionals 
There are several forms of conditional sentences in 
Japanese and the variation of meaning conveyed by them 
is subtle and complex. An important difference between 
Japanese and English conditionals is that, in the 
former, it is necessary to make clear the relationship 
between the antecedent and consequent. On the other 
hand, Japanese conditionals do not generally 
distinguish whether the antecedent is hypothetical ('If 
such-and-such were the case ...'), is to be realised in 
the future ('When such-and-such is the case ...'), has 
been realised in the past ('When such-and-such was the 
case ...') or is currently so ('Such-and-such being the 
case ...'). 	 There is therefore potential ambiguity 
about the state of the antecedent, that is, whether the 
state of affairs which it describes is hypothetical or 
actual. This distinction can be made clear in English 
through the choice of 'when' or 'if'. 
Conditionals roughly equivalent to the English form 'if 
... then ...' or 'provided that ...' can be expressed 
using the conditional ending - '-ba' for verbs and '- 
kereba' for adjectives - in the antecedent clause. 
These endings usually signal a condition which must be 
satisfied for the performance or completion of 
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something else. However, this is the least common of 
Japanese conditional forms. 
The particle 'to' has already been described in its 
role as a conjunctive connective. 	 'To' can also be 
used between antecedent and consequent in a conditional 
statement where the consequent always follows the 
antecedent. It therefore conveys the sense of 'when' 
or 'whenever' as in 'When winter comes the swallows fly 
south'. 'To' is also used to connect antecedent and 
consequent when the latter is the natural or inevitable 
result of the former, e.g. 'If you jump then you'll 
hurt yourself'. 	 When 'to' is used as a conditional 
connective, the consequent must be a statement of fact 
and not a command or request as in 'If you go shopping, 
will you buy me some bread?'. 
When the antecedent represents an action completed 
before that described in the consequent, the 
conditional is normally expressed using the ending '- 
tara' on the antecedent verb. 	 This would be the 
appropriate form for 'If you eat that, then you'll be 
sick'. 'To' can often be used as an alternative to the 
'-tara' verbal form but its use would emphasise that 
the consequent is the inevitable result of the 
antecedent. The '-tara' form on the other hand, would 
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stress the temporal sequencing of the antecedent and 
consequent. 
In counterfactual conditionals; 'to', '-ba', '-kereba' 
and '-tara' are used, subject to the conditions 
described above, and with the verb in the consequent 
clause in the past tense. 
A conditional statement may also be expressed using 
'nara' between antecedent and consequent where there is 
no causal sense to be conveyed. Where the idea of a 
condition needs to be emphasised 'nara' carries '-ba' 
as a suffix although 'naraba' tends to be viewed as 
more formal than 'nara'. 'Nara' expresses a 
presumption about the truth or actualisation of the 
antecedent but cannot be used when the antecedent 
describes an event which is certain to occur. 	 The 
consequent can be any kind of statement other than one 
of completed fact. The sense of 'naraba' is perhaps 
best conveyed by 'If it is the case that ... then...'. 
Where the '-tara' ending cannot be used because the 
antecedent does not precede the consequent in time, 
'nara' or 'naraba' can often be substituted, as in 'If 
I go shopping, then I'll buy some bread'. 'Naraba' is 
the connective used to express the logical form of the 
conditional statement equivalent to p---)..q. 
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The potential ambiguity in Japanese conditionals 
regarding whether or not the antecedent is hypothetical 
or an actuality (realised in the past, present or 
future) can be resolved by prefixing the sentence with 
'moshi'. 	 This functions as a signal alerting the 
addressee that a supposition or hypothesis follows. 
The interpretation of the conditional is then 'if ... 
then ...' rather than 'when ...'. However, 'moshi' is 
not used when it is obvious or certain that the 
antecedent has occurred or will occur. 
Biconditionals 
There is no literal translation of 'if and only if' in 
Japanese and there is no way of expressing a 
biconditional statement except as the conjunction of 
two conditionals. 
Arabic 
Arabic belongs to the Semitic group of languages, all 
of which employ a cursive script written and read from 
right to left. The family includes Modern Hebrew and 
Amharic. A characteristic of these languages is that 
most words are built on a root consisting of three 
consonants. Variations in meaning are achieved by 
vowels added to the root and by prefixes, suffixes and 
infixes. Arabic is a VSO language - the usual word 
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order for a transitive sentence is verb, subject, 
object. 
Nouns in Arabic are masculine or feminine and are 
inflected to distinguish singular, dual and plural 
(more than two). There are three noun cases roughly 
corresponding to nominative, accusative and genitive. 
Adjectives follow the nouns they qualify and agree with 
them in gender, case and number. 
Arabic has a highly developed verb system, the 
structure of which is very different from that of 
English. Verbs have only two tenses - the perfect 
(referring to completed actions) and the imperfect 
(referring to actions in the future or not yet 
completed). 	 Verbs distinguish the gender and the 
number of their subject; there are singular, dual and 
plural forms. The imperfect form of the verb has three 
so-called 'moods', the indicative, subjunctive and 
jussive, 	 which are used after certain co-ordinating 
particles. 	 There are two further moods - the 
imperative (for commands) and the energetic (rarely 
used). All tenses and moods may be active or passive. 
The term 'Arabic' is used to cover a number of forms of 
the language. Local dialects vary considerably to the 
extent that, for instance, those used in Morocco and 
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Iraq are to a large extent mutually unintelligible. 
However, the vernaculars are spoken forms and the 
written form of the language, generally termed 
'literary Arabic' is standard throughout the Arabic-
speaking world. 
In its written and spoken forms, literary Arabic is the 
language of the mass media, academic lectures and 
public addresses. Because it is so widely used on 
radio and television, in its spoken form it is becoming 
increasingly understood by even illiterate Arabic 
speakers. 	 Colloquial forms, although well-suited to 
the practicalities of day-to-day exchanges, are 
generally inadequate for intellectual exchanges about 
abstract topics. Conversations amongst the educated 
are therefore carried out in a mixture of the literary 
and colloquial forms. 
Literary Arabic (or modern standard Arabic, as it is 
sometimes known) is closely related to classical 
Arabic. 	 (In fact, some authors do not distinguish 
these two forms.) This is the language of the Qur'an, 
considered the greatest linguistic achievement in the 
Arabic language and, as such, the ultimate authority on 
questions of grammar and style. Modern Arabic has a 
wider vocabulary and is somewhat simpler in its grammar 
and syntax but, to a large extent, the Arabic grammar 
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taught in schools today differs little from that 
developed in the seventh century. 
Conjunctions 
Conjunctions are used very much more frequently in 
Arabic than in English and sentences frequently begin 
with the equivalent of 'and'. The basic conjunctive 
co-ordinator is 'wa' (prefixed to the word following) 
which may be used to link sentences or nouns. It is 
not generally used to link adjectives governing the 
same noun, although it can be if these form the 
predicate of a nominal sentence, e.g. 'Your car is 
bright and clean'. Otherwise adjectives are linked by 
juxtaposition, as in English. 'Wa' may also be used to 
introduce what are sometimes termed 'circumstantial 
clauses'. These present an attendant circumstance to 
the main topic of the sentence. Examples are 'They 
walked to the town while the rain was falling' or 'He 
walked towards me with his hat in his hand'. In these 
examples 'wa' would replace 'while' and 'with' 
respectively. 
An alternative to 'wa' is 'fa' used between clauses 
rather than single words and also prefixed to the word 
following. However this carries the additional 
implication of a temporal or causal sequence as in 'He 
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got up and went out' so that it is equivalent to 'and 
then'. 
'Wa' is the particle used in formal logic to convey 
conjunction. 
Disjunctions 
The particle 'aw' is used in very much the same way as 
the English 'or', to connect the disjuncts in 
statements or questions. This is also the form used in 
logic to convey disjunction. 	 'Either . . . or' 
translates directly as 'imaa ... aw'. With the verb 
following it in its subjunctive form 'aw' means 
'unless' or 'until'. 
In questions such as 'Is that John or Jim?', 'am' may 
be used as the disjunctive connective instead of 'aw'. 
It has been suggested (Wright, 1971, Volume II, p. 308) 
that there is a difference of meaning between 'aw' and 
'am' when used in questions. 	 If 'aw' is used, this 
suggests ignorance as to whether either or neither of 
the disjuncts is the case, whereas 'am' implies that it 
is known that one of the disjuncts is true and that 
information is being sought as to which. 
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Conditionals 
In conditional sentences the verb in both antecedent 
and consequent is in the perfect or jussive. However, 
there is no particular temporal significance in the 
verbs of conditional sentences and context is often the 
only guide to the timing of the two components. 
In a counterfactual conditional, or one where the 
condition expressed in the antecedent is unlikely to be 
fulfilled, 'law' introduces the antecedent and 'la' is 
prefixed to the first word of the consequent. Usually 
no distinction for tense is made in the antecedent so 
that the sense of, for instance, 'If he had arrived 
...' or 'If he were to arrive ...' must be construed 
from the context. 
For other conditional statements 'in' or 'idhaa' 
introduces the antecedent. The consequent must be 
introduced by 'fa' (prefixed to the first word) if it 
is anything other than a straightforward positive 
statement. In the logical form of the conditional 
'idhaa' precedes the antecedent and 'fa' is usually 
prefixed to 'inns' so that the form used is 'idhaa 
fainna'. 'Inna' is sometimes included in natural 
language conditionals especially where the consequent 
is a nominal sentence. In this sense it translates 
loosely as 'indeed'. This particle is also commonly 
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used at the beginning of sentences of the form 'A is B' 
(with the subject in the accusative). Its use is more 
a matter of style since it adds nothing to the meaning 
of the sentence. 
Biconditionals 
The logical biconditional is expressed using '... idhaa 
wa idhaa faqaT ...' where 'faqaT' translates as 'only'. 
The literal translation is therefore 'if and if only'. 
This form is used only in logic and mathematics and not 
at all in everyday language. It seems almost certain 
that it is a construction which has been 'borrowed' and 
translated directly from the English. 
Of these two languages, Arabic seems more like English 
in the way that it expresses logical forms. 	 The 
natural language constructions which these two 
languages use to convey the respective logical concepts 
seem to have meanings which are very similar in their 
everyday usage. Japanese, on the other hand, appears 
to have adopted specific expressions for logical 
connectives which are not commonly used natural 
language constructions. One would therefore suppose 
that they are more likely to be construed in the 
logical sense. This is particularly the case for 
'katsu' (the expression for logical conjunction) which 
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is of such rare usage that it does not appear in most 
Japanese/English dictionaries. 
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Chapter 6 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Cross-linguistic studies of the understanding of 
logical concepts are few in number and inconclusive in 
their findings (see chapter 4). 	 However, they do 
suggest differential facility with logical concepts 
across certain linguistic groups and the possibility 
that such differences could be language-related. Hence 
the diversity in the expression of linguistic 
connectives between Japanese, English and Arabic seems 
to warrant the investigation of whether there are 
associated differences in certain aspects of the 
logical performance of their respective speakers. This 
empirical study should therefore be viewed as 
exploratory, previous research suggesting no specific 
hypothesis to be tested. The nature of any significant 
differences revealed will suggest hypotheses to be 
examined in the course of further research. 
The experiments described below have two primary aims: 
(1) to investigate whether there is variation between 
the three language groups with regard to the 
understanding of linguistic items which are used to 
convey logical concepts; 
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(2) to investigate whether there is variation between 
the three language groups in performance on logical 
concept identification tasks. 
Should the groups show variation with regard to both 
these factors, then a further aim is to establish 
whether the nature of these differences suggests 
possible cause-effect relations of the type proposed in 
Whorf's hypothesis. 	 An additional consideration in 
designing the experimental tasks was that the overall 
results could be compared with those of other studies 
which have reported on concept identification and the 
interpretation of linguistic connectives in English. 
Two tests were administered to adult Ss, each of whom 
was a native speaker of either English, Japanese or 
Arabic. Every S completed both tests so that 
individual performances could be compared if 
appropriate. 
	
The first was designed to investigate 
performance on a concept identification task where the 
concepts tested were logical conjunction, disjunction 
(exclusive and inclusive forms), the conditional and 
biconditional. Also of interest was the description of 
a concept used by those Ss who were successful in 
identifying it. The aim of the second test was to 
enable a comparison of the provision in the three 
languages for expressing these logical forms. Of 
interest was the question of whether or not the 
appropriate 	 connectives 	 elicit 	 the 	 logical 
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interpretation. It was hoped that the results of the 
first test would indicate whether any differing 
provision in the lexicon (revealed in the second test) 
was associated with differing performance in related 
concept identification tasks. 
The tests were administered in the order indicated 
because it was felt that this would minimise any 
possibility of transfer effects. No explicit reference 
to any of the logical forms was made during the 
administration of the first test whereas the second was 
a written test containing the linguistic items normally 
taken as representing the logical forms. 
Ss were tested individually and both tests were carried 
out entirely in the S's mother tongue. This included 
all written and verbal instructions. In the case of 
the Japanese Ss, the experimenter was a Japanese who 
was a graduate in Psychology. He had shown interest in 
this research project at an early stage and had, as a 
small part of his undergraduate course, assisted with 
some of the background research on Japanese language 
and culture. He also administered the tests in the 
pilot study. Although his first language was Japanese, 
his English was virtually fluent by the time the main 
study was carried out. 
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The experimenter for the Arabic speakers was a 
Jordanian graduate in Mathematical Sciences. She had 
participated in the pilot study as a subject, became 
interested in the project and was keen to follow its 
subsequent development. Her first language was Arabic 
but her English was sufficiently fluent for her to be 
considered bilingual. 
Each of the two experimenters was responsible for the 
translation of the second test from English into their 
mother tongue. 	 These were checked using back- 
translation carried out by two native English speakers, 
one a graduate in Arabic language and the other a 
competent speaker and reader of Japanese. Apart from 
administering both tests, the experimenters were also 
responsible for translating S's protocols in the first 
test into English. Each was paid £150 for their 
assistance. 
Subjects 
All Ss were native speakers of either English, Japanese 
or Arabic. 	 (By far the majority of the English 
language group were from the US and hence 'English' in 
this study refers to 'American English'.) All members 
of the Japanese and Arabic groups could speak some 
English although their proficiency was very varied. 
Some were fluent, although they did not consider 
English to be their first language. 
	 Others had 
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considerable difficulty in making themselves understood 
in English. 
All of the English and Arabic speakers were students at 
Richmond College, an international college in London 
with a curriculum typical of small American liberal 
arts colleges. (Both experimenters were graduates of 
Richmond College.) Unfortunately, at the time when the 
data were collected, the contingent of Japanese 
students at the college was insufficient to provide the 
minimum of 50 Ss. Therefore, approximately 30 of the 
Japanese Ss were Richmond undergraduates and the rest 
were students at other London colleges. 	 Whilst it 
would have been preferable to confine the Japanese 
sample to the same student population, there seemed to 
be no reason to suppose that the inclusion of students 
from other colleges would have any influence on 
experimental results. 
Subjects were selected on no particular basis other 
than a willingness to participate. 	 Approaches to 
individuals in the English and Arabic language groups 
were made more or less at random. Virtually all the 
Japanese students at Richmond College were asked if 
they would be willing to participate. 
	 Of all the 
potential Ss approached, very few declined the 
invitation to be tested although there was no reward 
for doing so. 
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Data relating to the age and gender distribution of Ss 
in each of the language categories are given in table 
6.1 below. 
Table 6.1: Age and gender distribution of subjects 
All subjects 	 Males 	 Females 
Language N min. max. mean N mean N mean 
group 	 age age age 	 age 	 age 
English 50 17 43 22 17 21 33 23 
Japanese 51 18 27 22 16 23 35 22 
Arabic 52 17 24 20 33 20 19 19 
(Japanese Ss originally numbered 53 but two were 
eliminated because they were upset by the first task 
and were clearly not in a frame of mind to continue. 
However, no other S showed any sign of distress and all 
those remaining seemed interested and involved in the 
tasks.) 
Students are admitted to Richmond College from a very 
wide variety of national secondary school systems in 
diverse geographical areas. However, all are required 
to have completed twelve years of full-time education 
and to have achieved a minimum grade of C+ (grade-point 
average 2.5) in the American high school grading system 
or its equivalent. If admitted from the British school 
system, students must have attained a minimum of five 
GCSEs with a grade of A, B or C in what the college 
prospectus terms 'acceptable academic subjects' 
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including mathematics or a science. In fact, roughly 
40% of the Freshman intake fail the diagnostic 
mathematics test administered during their first week 
at the college. For those who fail this test, their 
standard of mathematics would certainly be below that 
which would earn them an A, B or C at GCSE. These 
students are therefore required to take a one-semester 
course designed to raise their mathematical skills to 
this level. 
The college is fee-paying and students are therefore 
mainly, although by no means exclusively, from 
financially secure middle class families. Whilst most 
students study for the BA degree in Business 
Administration, a number of other majors are offered. 
A small minority of students (mainly Japanese) leave 
the college after achieving the AA (Associate of Arts) 
degree. This has no subject specialisation and can be 
achieved in two years whereas the BA degree normally 
takes four years. The distribution of major areas of 
study for participating Ss is given in table 6.2 below. 
However, it must be borne in mind that, at Richmond 
College (as in all American liberal arts colleges), 
students are required to study a wide range of 
subjects, in addition to those which are relevant to 
their field of specialisation, throughout their four-
year course. 
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Table 6.2: Distribution of major areas of study of 
participating Ss. 
Language Group 
English 	 Japanese Arabic 
Psychology 17 2 0 
Computer Science 5 0 7 
Economics 2 3 0 
Business 9 11 34 
Communications 1 0 0 
Mathematics 1 1 0 
Engineering 2 1 3 
Lens Media 1 0 0 
Accounting 1 0 1 
English Literature 3 4 2 
History 3 4 0 
French 0 1 0 
Education 1 0 0 
Politics 2 2 0 
Social Sciences 1 1 1 
Fine Art 1 10 1 
Philosophy 0 1 0 
Science 0 1 3 
AA degree 0 4 0 
Undecided 0 5 0 
Total 50 51 52 
Along with questions about their biographical details, 
Ss were asked whether they had ever studied any formal 
logic. 	 (All such information was elicited after 
completion of both tests.) 	 Ten English speakers, 2 
Japanese and 39 of the Arabic language group claimed 
that they were familiar with elementary logic (truth 
tables and validation of arguments). 
An attempt was made to ascertain the level of 
mathematics attainment for each S, but this proved 
difficult given the wide variety of school systems in 
which their secondary education had been completed. It 
was clear, however, that levels of achievement in 
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mathematics and attitudes to the subject varied very 
greatly within each language group. 
Experiment 1 
Test materials 
Stimulus materials were adapted from those used by 
Neisser and Weene (1962) but using geometrical shapes 
rather than letters of the alphabet, since the latter 
would clearly not be equally familiar to all three 
language groups. 	 The basic stimulus element was a 
string consisting of four shapes each of which could be 
a circle, triangle, star or square. Six A3 sheets were 
prepared. On one was printed all possible 44 = 256 
such strings. 	 Each of the remaining five sheets 
contained the subset of these strings corresponding to 
one of the five concepts under investigation 
(conjunction, exclusive and inclusive disjunction, the 
conditional and biconditional). On these five sheets, 
the strings were printed in columns, each string 
occupying a 3 cm by 1 cm rectangular space. 
For each of the five concepts, the relevant sheet 
contained precisely those strings which exemplified the 
concept defined in terms of the presence or absence of 
two of the four shapes. For example, if the concept 
was 'triangle and square', the sheet would contain all 
(and only) those strings which included at least one 
triangle and at least one square. The two salient 
shapes were chosen at random for each concept and were 
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printed on the bottom right hand corner of the relevant 
sheet. The order of strings on each sheet was random. 
The five concepts tested and the subset of strings 
representing each one are described below. 
Concept 	 Strings 
'Triangle and star': 	 Those containing at least one 
(pA 	 triangle and at least one star 
(64 strings). 
'Square or circle or 	 Those containing at least one 
both': (pvq) 	 square or at least one circle 
or both (192 strings). 
'Circle or star but 	 Those containing at least one 
not both': (pyq) 	 circle but no star and those 
containing at least one star 
and no circle (128 strings). 
'If triangle then 	 Those containing at least one 
square': (p.-*q) 	 triangle and at least one 
square and all those 
containing no triangles at all 
(192 strings). 
'If and only if 	 Those containing at least one 
star then square': 	 star and at least one square 
(134-±q) 
	 and those containing neither 
stars nor squares (128 
strings). 
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For each of the five concepts, a sample of 16 strings 
was selected from the complete set, four corresponding 
to each of the truth table categories. For instance, 
if the relevant shapes were 'circle' and 'square', the 
16 strings would consist of four containing both shapes 
(truth table category TT), four with at least one 
circle but no square (TF), four with at least one 
square but no circle (FT), and four with neither shape 
(FF). Within each truth table category, the strings 
were selected at random. 	 Each of the 16 strings 
selected for each concept were printed on a 7cm by 1.8 
cm rectangular card and the cards shuffled into random 
order. 
Test procedure 
The S was shown the sheet containing the full set of 
256 strings. 	 It was explained how each string was 
composed of some or all of the four shapes circle, 
triangle, star and square. Ss were told that, as far 
as the test was concerned, the order of shapes within a 
string was irrelevant as was the order in which the 
strings were printed on the sheet. It was emphasised 
that the only important characteristic of any string 
was whether a particular shape was present or absent. 
How many times a shape occurred within the string was 
of no relevance. 
Several strings were pointed out and described in terms 
of the shapes present and absent. This was continued 
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until E was confident that S understood how the strings 
were constructed and how the sheet which he was 
currently viewing contained all possible such strings. 
The S was then told that he would be shown a series of 
sheets on each of which was printed a subset of the 
complete set of strings. 	 It was explained that the 
strings on a sheet were all those which had a common 
characteristic relating to the presence or absence of 
two particular shapes. In each case, S would be told 
which were the two relevant shapes and these were 
printed on the sheet to remind him. His task was to 
examine each sheet in turn and to determine the common 
property of the strings which it contained. The S was 
told that the time taken to identify the concept would 
be recorded but that he may take as long as was 
necessary to discover the common characteristic. 	 It 
was explained that, when S had announced that the 
concept had been identified, the sheet would be removed 
and that he would be shown 16 strings, one at a time, 
and asked whether or not each was an example of the 
concept. After this had been completed, he would be 
asked to describe the concept, i.e. the common property 
shared by all the strings. 
Any questions concerning procedure were answered whilst 
care was taken not to pre-empt any of the concepts to 
be tested. When E was confident that S understood what 
was required of him, the first sheet was presented. 
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For each concept, the time was recorded from 
presentation of the sheet until S announced that he had 
identified the concept. 	 Responses to the 16 test 
strings were recorded as was the S's verbatim 
description of the common characteristic shared by all 
strings. 
For any given concept, the 16 test strings were 
presented in the same (random) order and no feedback 
was given to responses to these strings. The order of 
presentation of the five concepts was random and varied 
for Ss within a given language group. Across language 
groups, the nth S (n = 1, 2, ..., 50) in each of the 
three groups tackled the concepts in the same order. 
It is to be noted that this experimental procedure is 
not that of 'standard' rule learning tasks (as 
described in chapter 4). 	 In the latter, the S is 
required to respond to individual, sequentially 
presented stimulus elements by stating whether or not 
each is an example of the concept. Through informative 
feedback, the S is to infer the relevant features which 
distinguish examples from non-examples. 	 This 
particular paradigm was used because it was believed to 
simulate the means by which human concepts are formed. 
The purpose of this experiment was different, however. 
It was designed to discover how familiar the concepts 
were and how easily they could be abstracted from a set 
of exemplars, rather than how they were learned. In 
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the traditional concept identification task, Ss must 
cope with the memory burden imposed by the lack of 
accessibility of previous stimuli if these are not 
allowed to remain in view. Furthermore, the S must 
adopt one of a number of possible strategies in order 
to integrate the information gleaned from each stimulus 
element (see Bruner et al, 1956). 	 Both of these 
factors constitute a source of inter-subject 
variability which was considered largely irrelevant to 
purpose of the current investigation. 
Experiment 2 
After all five concept identification tasks had been 
completed, S was asked to commence the second test. 
Test materials 
Each S was given a test sheet at the top of which were 
shown four squares. One was small and black, one large 
and black, one small and white and one large and white. 
The squares were labelled A, B, C and D respectively 
and were displayed as shown in figure 6.1. (The order 
of the squares was reversed for the Arabic speaking Ss 
to correspond with the direction of their script.) 
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Figure 6.1. Figures used in test 2. 
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A 
	 B 
	 C 
The sheet also contained 16 numbered statements and Ss 
were asked to respond to each by stating which of the 
four squares were consistent with the statement and 
which were not. Each S recorded his responses on the 
sheet by placing a tick or cross as appropriate in each 
of four boxes, one corresponding to each square. Test 
sheets for each language group are included in 
appendices la - lc. 
Each of the 16 statements was a compound proposition 
constituted from two simple propositions, one 
concerning the colour of the square (black/white) and 
the other concerning its size (small/large). Each 
compound proposition was formed by conjoining the two 
simple components using one of the linguistic 
connectives expressing the logical operations of 
conjunction, disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional. 	 An example of such a compound 
proposition in English might be 'If the square is 
large, then it is white'. The appropriate linguistic 
connectives in Japanese and Arabic were taken from the 
section of a high school textbook (in the appropriate 
language) dealing with elementary truth functional 
logic. 	 The connectives used are those described as 
labelling the logical operations in chapter 5. 	 As 
stated in that chapter, there is no way of expressing 
the biconditional in Japanese except by the conjunction 
of two conditional propositions. This was therefore 
the form used. 
The statements were ordered in 4 blocks of 4. Within 
each block, each connective appeared once and each 
colour/size combination once. Each block contained two 
statements where size was mentioned before colour (e.g. 
'The square is large and it is white') and two where 
colour was mentioned before size (e.g. 'The square is 
black or it is small'). 
Instructions for filling in the test sheet were 
included. This test was not timed. 
Test procedure 
The S was given the test sheet and asked to follow the 
instructions contained therein. 
	 Any questions 
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requesting clarification of the test procedure were 
dealt with. 
The approximate total time to complete both tests 
varied from 30 to 60 minutes. 
Pilot study 
A pilot study was carried out, the results of which 
suggested a number of modifications which were 
incorporated in the main study. It also revealed some 
minor translation errors which were corrected in the 
Japanese and Arabic versions of the second test. 
In the pilot run, each of the five test sheets used in 
the first test (one corresponding to each concept) 
contained all 256 strings arranged in two groups. 
Those on the left-hand side of the sheet were examples 
of the concept whilst those on the right-hand side were 
the remaining non-examples. Ss were therefore shown 
positive and negative instances simultaneously. Some 
tended to concentrate on the negative instances 
(especially where these were fewer in number) and hence 
to identify and describe the negation of the intended 
concept. Whilst the relative ease of identification of 
a concept and its negation would form the basis of an 
interesting investigation, such a comparison was not 
intended in this project. It was therefore decided to 
use only positive instances so that Ss would be obliged 
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to describe the concept itself rather than what the 
concept was not. 
The sixteen test strings in the pilot study were 
selected at random for each concept. This meant that 
the four truth table categories were not equally 
represented and, in particular, for one concept, none 
of the strings selected exemplified the case where both 
relevant shapes were absent. 	 It was not therefore 
possible to ascertain whether a S would have classified 
these correctly. Including four cards in each truth 
table category (as in the main study) enables a check 
for consistency in classifying each category. 
The geometric figures used in the second test in the 
pilot study were four pairs each consisting of a 
triangle and a circle, with the triangle printed to 
the left of the circle. The four pairs were: black 
triangle, white circle (figure A); white triangle, 
black circle (B); white triangle, white circle (C); 
black triangle, black circle (D). 	 Ss were provided 
with eight numbered statements and asked to respond by 
stating which of the four pairs of shapes were 
consistent with the statement and which were not. A 
chance remark from one S revealed that she had 
difficulty in interpreting a conditional statement due 
to the relative positions of the two shapes. She could 
not make sense of the statement 'If the circle is black 
then the triangle is white' when the triangle was to 
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the left of the circle. It was therefore decided to 
use single geometric shapes varying on two dimensions 
(colour and size) rather than two shapes varying on a 
single dimension (colour). 
The eight statements used in the second test were 
extended to 16 in the main study. 	 These together 
exhausted 	 all 	 possible 	 combinations 	 of 
connective/colour/size. This was to enable a fuller 
investigation of some surprising inconsistencies in 
responses to statements containing the same linguistic 
connective which were noted in the pilot study. 
In the pilot study, different Ss were used for each of 
the two tests so that there was no possibility of 
transfer effects. It was decided that it would be more 
useful to require the same Ss to complete both tests so 
that their performance could be compared if necessary. 
It was felt that transfer effects were unlikely to be 
significant if the tests were administered in the order 
indicated. 
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Chapter 7 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
The purpose of experiment 1 was to compare performance 
on five concept identification tasks where the concepts 
tested were conjunction, inclusive and exclusive 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional. The 
concepts were defined in terms of the presence/absence 
of two relevant figures (known to the S) in a set of 
four-figure strings. 	 All positive instances were 
presented simultaneously for each concept. Whilst we 
are primarily interested in a comparison of aspects of 
performance between language groups, we shall also 
consider the relative performance for concepts within 
language groups. 
In assessing a S's performance on a particular concept 
identification task, two factors are of interest: 
(a) responses to the 16 test strings, and (b) the 
verbal description of the concept. Whilst we might 
expect a high correlation between these two performance 
factors, we have already noted that linguistic 
connectives are used ambiguously. Therefore we cannot 
assume that successful classification of the test 
strings is automatically associated with a description 
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which makes clear the distinction between examples and 
non-examples of the concept. 
A S who accurately classifies the test strings as 
examples or non-examples may be deemed to have 
identified the concept and to have some adequate mental 
representation against which the strings can be tested. 
For the purposes of this test, a S was taken to have 
identified a concept if the following criterion was 
satisfied: errors in classifying the strings numbered 
no more than two and, when two errors were made, these 
referred to strings in different truth table 
categories. 
This condition may seem somewhat arbitrary and 
therefore requires some justification. 	 Since there 
were four test strings in each of the four truth table 
categories (TT, TF, FT, FF), a S who makes two or fewer 
errors must have correctly allocated all strings in at 
least two categories. The condition that two errors 
must be in different truth table categories ensures 
that at least three of the four strings in each 
category have been correctly assigned. With two errors 
in one category, it is not clear whether or not that 
category was judged as exemplifying the concept, and 
hence whether or not the correct concept was being 
identified. 	 The probability of achieving this 
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criterion on the test strings by chance is sufficiently 
small (113(0.5)16 = 0.00172) to be discounted. 
For each concept, S's verbal description was classified 
according to whether or not it provided a correct 
unambiguous definition of the concept, i.e. whether or 
not it adequately distinguished examples of the concept 
from non-examples. (We consider verbal descriptions in 
more detail in the next section of this chapter.) For 
a particular concept, we shall denote the set of Ss who 
satisfy the test string criterion by C and the set of 
those who gave an accurate description of the concept 
by D. For each concept the set of all Ss may then be 
partitioned into four disjoint sets according to which 
of the two conditions are satisfied: 
(i) Cn D: the set of those who achieved criterion on 
the test strings and who gave a correct unambiguous 
description of the concept; 
(ii) cn D: the set of those whose performance on the 
test strings did not satisfy the criterion but who gave 
an accurate description of the concept; 
(iii) C n 6: the set containing all who achieved 
criterion on the test strings but who did not describe 
the concept accurately; 
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- (iv) Cn D: the set of those whose performance on the 
test strings did not satisfy the criterion and whose 
verbal description did not define the distinction 
between examples and non-examples of the concept. 
A summary of the results for each of the concepts 
biconditional (BIC), conditional (COND), conjunction 
(CONJ), inclusive disjunction (INCOR) and exclusive 
disjunction (XOR) is given in table 7.1 below. This 
gives the numbers in each of the four disjoint subsets, 
classified by language group and gender. 
For each concept, the numbers of males and of females 
in the set C was calculated, collapsed across language 
groups. The numbers of males and females in the set D 
was obtained similarly. Using a log-linear model, the 
likelihood ratio test was applied to these data to 
establish, for each concept, whether there were any 
differences in the proportions of males and females in 
the sets C and D, i.e. whether males were any more or 
less likely than females to achieve success on the test 
string criterion or whether there were gender 
differences in the ability to describe the concept 
accurately. The results are given in tables 7.2 and 
7.3 below. 
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Table 7.1: Results of experiment 1 classified by 
language group and gender 
	
C(-ID 	 en D 	 C(-lb 
M 	 F 	 M 	 F 	 M 	 F M 
e n 5 
F 
English 8 17 	 2 9 7 0 0 7 
BIC Japanese 8 21 	 4 9 3 5 1 0 
Arabic 9 10 	 2 3 5 1 17 5 
English 8 17 	 2 5 3 0 4 11 
COND Japanese 8 19 	 3 7 0 3 5 6 
Arabic 9 8 	 2 2 0 1 22 8 
English 16 29 	 1 2 0 2 0 0 
CONJ Japanese 16 34 	 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Arabic 28 17 	 2 0 1 0 2 2 
English 16 24 	 0 1 0 4 1 4 
INCOR Japanese 13 35 	 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Arabic 23 16 	 4 1 2 0 4 2 
English 10 16 	 2 2 1 3 4 12 
XOR Japanese 9 26 	 3 2 2 3 2 4 
Arabic 12 12 	 3 1 5 0 13 6 
(M: number of males, F: number of females, 
C: the set of Ss who attained the test sting 
criterion, 
D: the set of Ss who gave a correct description of the 
concept.) 
Table 7.2: Results of likelihood ratio tests for 
gender differences in attaining criterion 
in identifying test strings. 
Concept x Z  d. f . 
BIC 8.64 3 < 5% 
COND 3.67 3 > 5% 
CONJ 0.03 3 > 5% 
INCOR 6.37 3 > 5% 
XOR 2.14 3 > 5% 
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Table 7.3: 	 Results of likelihood ratio tests for 
gender differences in correctly describing 
the concept. 
Concept 	 .X2 	 d.f. 
BIC 9.05 3 < 5% 
COND 2.32 3 > 5% 
CONJ 2.50 3 > 5% 
INCOR 8.37 3 < 5% 
XOR 3.99 3 > 5% 
Gender differences, significant at the 5% level, in the 
proportion of Ss in set C (those who achieved criterion 
on the test strings) were found for the biconditional 
concept. Therefore, for this concept, two-tailed tests 
of the difference in proportions of males and females 
in the set C were carried out for each language group. 
A significant difference in the proportion of males 
(.8824) and the proportion of females (.5152) was found 
for the English speakers (z = 2.56, P < 1%). For the 
other two language groups there were no significant 
gender differences for proportions in the set C for the 
biconditional concept. 
For Ss who correctly described the concept (set D), 
significant gender differences were found for the 
biconditional and for inclusive disjunction (see table 
7.3). For the biconditional, the sole source of this 
difference was found to be the Arabic group where the 
proportion of males was .3333 and the proportion of 
females .6842 	 (z = 2.44, P < 1%). 
	 For inclusive 
disjunction, a significant difference was found between 
the proportion of males (.8750) and the proportion of 
females (1.000) in set D for the Japanese language 
group (z = 2.13, P < 5%). There were no other 
significant gender differences. 
The gender differences found are inconsistent with 
respect to concept and language group. Furthermore, 
the directions of the differences are inconsistent with 
respect to gender. 	 For the biconditional and the 
English language group, males outperformed females in 
achieving the test string criterion, whereas for the 
same concept and the Arabic speakers, females 
outperformed males in correctly describing the concept. 
The differences found do not suggest that, for any 
language group, differential gender performance is a 
consistent feature of this type of concept 
identification task. 	 Furthermore, no gender 
differences have been reported for any of the concept 
identification tasks referred to in chapter 4 and no 
significant differences in the performance of males and 
females have been found in experiments investigating 
the understanding of logical connectives (Paris, 1973; 
Sternberg, 1979). It seems probable that the observed 
gender differences are an experimental artifact and 
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therefore males and females are treated as a single 
sample in the discussion which follows. 
The results of experiment 1 for each concept/language 
group collapsed across gender are given in table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: Results of experiment 1 by language group 
BIC 
English 
Japanese 
Arabic 
English 
C (1 D 
25 
29 
19 
25 
onD 
11 
13 
5 
7 
cnb 
7 
8 
6 
3 
Cni3 
7 
1 
22 
15 
COND Japanese 27 10 3 11 
Arabic 17 4 1 30 
English 45 3 2 0 
CONJ Japanese 50 0 1 0 
Arabic 45 2 1 4 
English 40 1 4 5 
INCOR Japanese 48 1 1 1 
Arabic 39 5 2 6 
English 26 4 16 
XOR Japanese 35 5 5 6 
Arabic 24 4 5 19 
(Table entries are numbers of Ss) 
(C: the set of Ss who attained the test sting 
criterion, 
D: the set of Ss who gave a correct description of the 
concept. ) 
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COMPARISON OF RESULTS BETWEEN LANGUAGE GROUPS 
Identification of concepts 
Since we know that linguistic expressions of logical 
concepts do not always convey those concepts 
unambiguously (see chapter 4), we cannot use a S's 
description of a concept as an indicator that the 
concept has been correctly identified. To be confident 
that a concept has been abstracted, we need to be 
assured that a S has some mental representation which 
enables him to distinguish examples from non-examples. 
We shall therefore take accurate classification of the 
test strings (i.e. membership of the set C) as the 
criterion for successful concept identification, 
although the nature of the descriptions used by these 
Ss will also be of interest. 	 The percentage of Ss in 
this set for each language group is shown in figure 
7.1. For each concept, we use CE, C. and CA to denote 
the sets of English, Japanese and Arabic speakers 
respectively who achieved criterion on the test 
strings. For every concept, the percentage of 
successful Ss in the Japanese language group is highest 
and the percentage of successful Arabic speakers least. 
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Figure 7.1: Percentage of language group in set C by 
concept 
(CE: set of English speakers who attained the test 
string criterion; 
CJ: set of Japanese speakers who attained the test 
string criterion; 
CA: set of Arabic speakers who attained the test -
 
string criterion.) 
Chi-square tests for independence of language group and 
success in identifying test strings were carried out 
for each concept. The results, given in table 7.5., 
are all significant at 5% and therefore indicate that, 
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for all five concepts, success in attaining the test 
string criterion is not independent of language group. 
Table 7.5: Results of chi-square tests for 
independence of language group and success 
in achieving the test string criterion. 
Concept X.2  d.f. 
BIC 6.71 2 < 5% 
COND 7.23 2 < 5% 
CONJ 6.19 2 < 5% 
INCOR 7.04 2 < 5% 
XOR 6.51 2 < 5% 
To establish the source of these language group 
differences, significance tests for differences in the 
numbers of Ss in the set C were carried out, by 
concept, for each pair of language groups. The results 
are given in table 7.6. 
Table 7.6: Results of chi-square tests of independence 
of language group and success in achieving 
the test string criterion for each pair of 
language groups. 
	
English/ 	 English/ 
	 Japanese/ 
Japanese 	 Arabic 	 Arabic 
BIC 	 0.85 	 2.62 	 6.44*  
COND 	 0.08 	 4.71 	 6.06*  
CONJ 	 3.15 	 0.97 	 6.25*  
INCOR 	 2.26 	 1.53 	 6.93*  
XOR 	 4.03 	 0.19 	 5.99*  
(* indicates significant at the 5% level; d.f. = 2.) 
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The difference between the proportion of Japanese Ss 
and the proportion of Arabic speaking Ss who attained 
criterion on the test strings was significant at the 5% 
level for all five concepts. These differences are 
summarised in figure 7.2. 
It might be expected that a S who could distinguish 
examples of a concept from non-examples would also give 
an accurate description of that concept and vice 
versa. The results indicate that this is likely but by 
no means certain. Not all those Ss who identified the 
concept offered a description which matched their 
criteria for assigning the test strings and not all 
those who gave a correct description assigned the test 
strings in accordance with that description. Further, 
for those Ss who attained the test string criterion, 
the likelihood that an accurate description was given 
varied from concept to concept. Figure 7.3 shows, for 
each concept and language group, the percentage of 
those Ss identifying the concept (according to the test 
string criterion) who also described the concept 
correctly. 
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Figure 7.2: Proportion of each language group in set C 
by concept 
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E------ 	 indicates significant difference 
at the 5% level 
(E: English language group; 
J: Japanese language group; 
A: Arabic language group.) 
152 
BIC 
COND 
CONJ 
INCOR 
XOR 
'WI 
NAM MAO NAM NAM NAA0 Ws74 	 wo
tO. 	 •••; 
*x 	 MAO AMA MAO 
*X 
AM Ale OA. AM AM AA 	 AM 
mi. 	 40 
A 
v v.,. 	
M 
vv.,. 	 we N.  
AA 	 * WA 
VA4 	 •S 
NAn0 OM 
O ONA iMe. 	 ,•••••••, Amo 4* 	 M4 tote4 	 0:0 44..# 	 MAO 
M: 	 MM MAO 
: '0 	 ........ wo AMP 	 MAO 
KAI 	 .V. 11, MAP 
Ka 	
Iwo 
wo. 
:::::: 
	
MAO NAM AM 	 Now AM 	 wo. AM WA 	 AMA 
440 
t46t 	 tat 
BIC 
	 COND 
	
CONJ 	 INCOR 
	 XOR 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
 
English 
 
Japanese 	 Arabic 
      
153 
Figure 7.3: 	 Ss in set cnD as a percentage of those 
in set C. 
Table 7.7 shows, for each concept, the results of chi-
square tests for independence of language group and 
ability to describe the concept for those Ss who 
successfully identified it. None are significant at 
the 5% level. We can conclude that if a S had an 
effective model of the concept which enabled him to 
distinguish examples from non-examples then, no matter 
what his language group, he was equally likely to be 
able to give an adequate description of the concept. 
Table 7.7: Results of chi-square tests for 
independence of language group and success 
in describing the concept for Ss in set C. 
Concept 1  X d.f. 
BIC .05 2 > 5% 
COND .39 2 > 5% 
CONJ .57 2 > 5% 
INCOR 2.34 2 > 5% 
XOR .33 2 > 5% 
Condensing results across language groups, the 
proportions of all subjects in set C who also described 
the concept correctly are as follows: 	 BIC: 0.78; 
COND: 0.91; CONJ: 0.97; INCOR: 0.95; XOR: 0.86. 
Hence for these Ss, the order of difficulty of 
describing the concept was (from least to most 
difficult): conjunction, inclusive disjunction, the 
conditional, exclusive disjunction and the 
biconditional. 
We can perform a similar analysis for the proportion of 
those Ss who described the concept correctly who also 
attained criterion on the test strings. These 
proportions are shown in figure 7.4 and the results of 
the analysis are given in table 7.8. 
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Figure 7.4: Ss in set cnD as a percentage of those 
in set D 
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Table 7.8: Results of chi-square tests for 
independence of language group and success 
in identifying test strings for Ss in 
set D. 
Concept d.f. 
BIC 0.89 2 > 5% 
COND 0.54 2 > 5% 
CONJ 3.01 2 > 5% 
INCOR 5.00 2 > 5% 
XOR 0.05 2 > 5% 
Here again, there are no significant differences 
between language groups. Given that a S described the 
concept correctly, he was equally likely to attain the 
test string criterion regardless of his language group. 
Condensing results across language groups, the 
proportions of those who gave an accurate description 
who also identified the test strings are: BIC: 0.72; 
COND: 0.77; CONJ: 0.97; INCOR: 0.95; XOR: 0.87. 
The results of these two tests provide some post-hoc 
justification for distinguishing performance on the 
test strings from concept description. Whilst there is 
clearly some association between these two factors, it 
is clear that Ss do not necessarily identify examples 
of the concept by their stated criterion for doing so. 
Verbal Descriptions of Concepts 
We now look at the types of verbal description used by 
Ss to define the concepts. Our purpose in doing so is 
to investigate how logical concepts are coded in 
natural language. For instance, are there differences 
between language groups in the use of the linguistic 
items normally taken to convey the logical forms? 
For each concept there are several alternatives which 
define it in such a way that examples are distinguished 
from non-examples. 	 In nearly all cases, the 
description can be translated into its underlying 
logical form and determining whether it describes the 
concept accurately consists of comparing its truth 
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table with that of the appropriate connective. If the 
truth values of the two expressions are identical for 
each pair of truth values of the simple components, 
then the expressions are logically equivalent and 
define the same logical concept. 
Translation of Ss' protocols into truth functional form 
is not always straightforward, particularly where the 
expression used is complex. 	 Almost invariably, 
descriptions consist of a string of binary compound 
propositions (i.e. compound propositions with two 
simple components) linked by the lexical form of a 
logical connective, usually (but not always) 
conjunction or disjunction. 	 The binary propositions 
are such that, of their two components, one is a 
statement about one of the two relevant shapes and the 
second is a statement about the other. We shall refer 
to these binary propositions as 'elementary 
propositions'. 	 Examples of elementary propositions 
are: 	 'There is a circle and no triangle' or 'If 
there's a square then there's a star'. A description 
of, say, the biconditional concept might take the form 
'If there's a square then there's a triangle and if 
there's a triangle then there's a square'. 
	 This 
consists of the conjunction of the two elementary 
propositions 'If there's a square then there's a 
triangle' and 'If there's a triangle then there's a 
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square'. If we denote 'there's a square' by p and 
'there's a triangle' by q, we can 'translate' this 
description into the truth functional form 	 (p-o,q) A 
An elementary proposition is either: (a) a binary 
proposition consisting of two simple components, or (b) 
the negation of a binary proposition consisting of two 
simple components. Therefore, all elementary 
propositions are composed of (or are composed of the 
negation of) a proposition p 	 (or its negation) 
conjoined to another proposition q (or its negation) 
by one of the logical connectives conjunction, 
inclusive or exclusive disjunction, the conditional or 
biconditional. 	 Hence the following all symbolise 
elementary propositions: pA 	 pvq, pkg. The 
most succinct description of each concept would, of 
course, consist of one elementary proposition with p 
and q joined by the appropriate connective. One 
description of a concept will be viewed as more complex 
than another if it contains more elementary 
propositions. Here we are considering complexity as a 
function of the length of the description and we shall 
not therefore attempt to distinguish levels of 
complexity amongst the elementary propositions 
themselves. 
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A method of arriving at a description which can be 
applied to all five concepts is to classify strings 
which appear on the sheet into disjoint categories 
according to the presence/absence of each of the two 
relevant shapes and then to describe each of the 
disjoint categories. 	 For example, the strings 
exemplifying exclusive disjunction may be viewed as 
falling into the two categories 'circles with no stars' 
and 'stars with no circles' and described as 'There are 
circles with no stars or stars with no circles'. This 
adequately summarises the common property of all 
strings on the sheet and translates to the truth 
functional form (p n -4) v (p A q) . For a description 
arrived at in this way, each of the disjoint categories 
corresponds to the conjunction of a statement p or 
its negation with another statement 	 q 	 or its 
negation. The concept can then be described by forming 
the inclusive (or exclusive) disjunction of these 
conjunctive categories. The application of this 
'algorithm' will result in what is termed the 
'disjunctive normal form' of the concept. 
Disjunctive normal forms for each of the concepts are: 
biconditional : (p n q) v ( p- A 4) 
conditional : (p A q) v (13 A q) v (p A q) 
conjunction : (p A q) 
inclusive disjunction : (p A q) v (3 A q) v (p A 4) 
exclusive disjunction : (5 A q) v (p A 4) 
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Since the number of disjoint categories which exemplify 
each of the concepts is not the same, nor is the number 
of elementary propositions which comprise the 
disjunctive normal form. 	 This form requires three 
elementary propositions for the conditional and 
inclusive disjunction, two for the biconditional and 
exclusive disjunction and just one for conjunction. 
Although every care was taken in translating Ss' verbal 
descriptions into propositional form, a certain amount 
of 'interpretive licence' is unavoidable given the 
ambiguous way in which linguistic connectives are used 
in natural language. A description which really did 
not distinguish those strings exemplifying the concept 
from those which did not was classified as incorrect. 
However, there were a few descriptions which 
communicated the concept adequately although they had a 
literal logical interpretation which was clearly not 
what the S intended. For instance, 'and' was sometimes 
used between compound propositions where inclusive or 
exclusive disjunction was clearly the intended 
connective. 	 An example is in describing the 
biconditional. 	 Some Ss, who had successfully 
identified the concept according to the test string 
criterion, 	 defined this as: 'There are stars with 
squares and no stars with no squares'. 
	 The two 
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elementary propositions pAq and pA q are used here 
to define the two disjoint sets of strings which 
appeared on the sheet - those including both shapes and 
those including neither. 	 If 'and' is translated as 
conjunction, this would result in the compound 
proposition (p A q) A ( -15 A q) which would have truth 
values of 'false' for all truth values of its simple 
propositions and therefore no strings would be examples 
of the concept. Since the sheet was clearly not blank, 
the conclusion is that the correct form (pAq) v (13A4) 
was intended. 
There is also the problem with the translation of 'or' 
as inclusive or exclusive disjunction. 	 Here again, 
which interpretation was intended was usually obvious 
from the responses to the test strings. In some cases 
either form would be correct as in the disjunction of 
(pAq) and (PA q) to define the biconditional (referred 
to above) or in any disjunctive normal form. In these 
cases, and in those where the distinction is not 
important, 'or' has arbitrarily been taken to indicate 
inclusive disjunction. 
In only a very few cases was it not possible to 
translate a S's description into truth functional 
propositional form. This was usually because the S 
attempted to define the concept in terms of some 
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irrelevant feature of the strings, for example, the 
frequency of occurrence of a particular shape. 
Ambiguities in interpretation requiring resolution, 
other than those referred to above, are described under 
the results for individual concepts. These follow 
below. 
Results for individual concepts 
Biconditional 
For Ss whose performance on the test strings indicated 
that they had identified the biconditional concept, the 
most commonly used correct description for all language 
groups was equivalent to the disjunction of (pAq) and 
one of the logically equivalent forms (P A q) or 
(pvq). It is sometimes difficult to distinguish which 
of these is intended. 	 'No squares and no stars' is 
clearly to be translated as TA 4, whereas 'neither 
squares nor stars' seems suggestive of pv q. It is 
less clear whether 'both star and square together or 
not at all' should be translated as the disjunctive 
normal form (pAq) v (TA -4) or as (p A q) v (pvq). 
For this reason, and because the complexity of each 
expression in terms of number of elementary 
propositions is the same, responses in both categories 
are grouped together for the purposes of analysis. 
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Of the correct descriptions used by Ss in the set C, 
all but one consisted of at least two elementary 
propositions. The exception was a Japanese S who gave 
a description suggestive of the negation of the 
exclusive disjunction: pmq ('The square and the star 
do not occur separately'). No S in any language group 
gave a description which had any hint of the lexical 
'if and only if ...'. 
A breakdown of the correct descriptions used is given 
in table 7.9 below. The numbers of Ss using each form 
is divided into those in the set C n D (attainment of 
criterion on test strings and correct description ) and 
those in the set C 11 D (failure on test string 
criterion although correct description). 
Amongst the Japanese Ss in Crl D, only two different 
descriptions of the biconditional were used, whereas 
six different descriptions were offered by the English 
speakers in this set and five by the Arabic group. 
Hence, of all Ss AN who identified the biconditional 
concept (according to the test string criterion) 
correct descriptions offered by the Japanese group were 
less varied than those of either the English or Arabic 
language groups and none consisted of more than two 
elementary propositions. 
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Table 7.9: Breakdown of correct biconditional 
descriptions 
CID 
(p A q) v (15A -4) 	 or 	 18 
English 
CID 
8 
0 
1 
Japanese 	 Arabic 
CID 
	
anD 	 cn 	 D 
	
CnD 
	
28 	 13 	 15 	 5 
	
0 	 0 	 1 	 0 
	
0 	 0 	 1 	 0 
(p A q) 3 (p v q) 
(1,--->q) A 	 (q-->1)) 	 3 
(pAq) v [iLACi-+(i3A 4)] 	 1 
(p v q)-+ (p A q) 	 1 1 0 0 	 0 0 
(p A q) v (15 A q) v (pv q) 	 1 0 0 0 	 0 0 
(P-',q) A (r)- (f5 A 4)] 	 1  1 0 0 	 0 0 
p 	 q 	 0 0 1 
[ (p A q) v (pv q)) 	 0 0 0 0 	 1 0 
A (P A 4) 
(p A q) v (1514) 	 0 0 0 0 	 1 0 
TOTAL 	 25 11 29 13 	 19 5 
Recall that Ss who failed to attain criterion on the 
test strings did so because they made three or more 
classification errors or because they made two errors 
in the same truth table category. In the case of Ss 
offering a correct description of the biconditional who 
failed the test string criterion, nearly all made two 
or more errors in the FF category, i.e. they mis-
classified strings containing neither of the two 
relevant shapes. Of the 11 English Ss in the set 
C (1 D, 8 made errors only in the FF category and a 
further 2 combined two or more errors in that category 
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with single errors in other categories. 	 Similar 
results apply to the Japanese Ss. Of the 13 in the set 
C n D, 9 had errors only in the FF class. Of the 5 
Arabic Ss in the set en D, 3 mis-classified all 4 
strings where both shapes were absent. 	 Hence, for 
those Ss who failed the test string criterion even 
though they gave a correct description of the concept, 
errors of assignment of strings where both shapes were 
absent were the most common. 
The mis-classification of strings containing neither of 
the two relevant shapes represents a tendency to 
respond as if the concept were conjunction. 	 This 
tendency was also exhibited by some who failed on both 
the test string and description criteria, i.e. those in 
the set Eno. Of the seven English speakers in this 
set, 4 described the concept as the conjunction of p 
and q and responded to the strings in a manner 
consistent with this description. (The remaining three 
Ss gave definitions which could not be translated into 
propositional form.) Only one Japanese failed both 
criteria, giving a description which could not be 
translated into truth functional form but who mis- 
classified two FF strings. By far the greatest 
'failure' rate was in the group of Arabic Ss where 22 
failed both criteria. Of these, six described and 
classified as if the concept were conjunction and two 
more described conjunction but made classification 
errors inconsistent with that description. 	 Of the 
remaining 18, six descriptions could not be assigned a 
propositional form. The remaining eight Ss gave as 
many different descriptions and made errors in various 
and sundry truth table categories. 
Amongst those who correctly classified the test strings 
(according to the criterion used) but described the 
concept incorrectly (i.e. the set Cn D), no pattern 
was evident. 	 The seven English speakers in this 
category gave seven different incorrect descriptions. 
Of the eight Japanese however, six described the 
concept as the conjunction of p and q although they 
were clearly not assigning the strings according to the 
truth table for conjunction. The six Arabic speakers 
in the set C n D, like their English counterparts, 
varied in the descriptions they gave. 
Conditional 
Of all the five concepts, the conditional gave rise to 
the greatest variety of descriptions, most of which 
included redundant elementary propositions. 
	 Of the 
correct descriptions, only two consisting of one 
elementary proposition were offered. These were the 
lexical equivalents of 13--+q ('If there was a triangle 
then there was a square.') and the logically equivalent 
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form p ^ q (normally stated as 'There was never a 
triangle without a square.'). 	 Most other accurate 
verbal descriptions included one of these two amongst 
the elementary propositions combined with other forms. 
Redundancy is therefore a feature of nearly all 
descriptions involving two or more elementary 
propositions. 
For Ss who attained the test string criterion, as with 
the biconditional concept, Japanese correct 
descriptions were very much less varied with 17 of the 
27 (63.0%) using one of the two descriptions equivalent 
to p.,4q or the disjunctive normal form (pAq)v(i3A q)v 
(PA 4). The two most popular correct descriptions used 
by the English speakers in set C were p--)- q 	 and 
(p n q) v (13 A q) v (p n Zi) but these accounted for only 9 
of the 25 (36.0%) Ss in this category. The two 
descriptions (p n q) v (15 A q) v (13 A -4) and the lengthy 
(pn -4) v (pAq) v (ISA q) v (pvq) accounted for 7 of the 
17 (41.2%) correct descriptions offered by Arabic 
speakers who attained the test string criterion. For 
Ss in set C, only seven different correct descriptions 
were used by the Japanese language group compared with 
10 for the Arabic and 11 for the English speakers. 
A breakdown of correct descriptions is given in table 
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7.10. 
Table 7.10: Breakdown of correct conditional 
descriptions 
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p A q 
p-- > q 
English 	 Japanese 	 Arabic 
CnD CnD cnD enD CnD C- n D 
5 
3 
(p A q)--)P 	 1 
q v (4->P) 	 1 
(P A 4) V ( -15 A GO 	 3 
(pA -4) v (p->q) 	 1 
(p-+q) v (q-- p) 	 0 
(p A 4) v (p-+q) 	 0 
(p-,q) v (i5 A q) 	 0 
(i 5 A q) v (pA 4) 	 0 
(3 A 4) v 
 (PA 4) 	 0 
(p A q) v q Ne (p A -4) 	 0 
(p A q) v (13 A q) v (p A 4) 4 
(p A q) v (I3A g) v (pA  El) 1 
(p A q) v (p -*q) v (15 n -4) 2 
(P A .4) Y (P-->q) v (i5A q) 0 
(13A -4)v (15Aq)v (pAq) 0 
(pAg) vg v[4-4(13A4)] 1 
(p A q) v (IS A q) v (p A 4) 3 
v (PA 4) 
(PA q) v  (PA -4) v (j3n q) 0 
v(pvq) 
TOTAL 25 
0 8 4 1 1 
0 6 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 2 2 2 
2 9 2 4 0 
0 1 0 2 0 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 3 0 
7 27 10 17 4 
Of the correct descriptions offered by Ss who attained 
the test string criterion, the proportions which 
involved only one elementary proposition were 32.0% for 
English speakers, 51.9% for the Japanese and 5.9% for 
the Arabic speakers. 	 The Japanese Ss in CrID also 
showed a greater tendency to use the disjunctive normal 
form (pA q) v (15A q) v (15A 4- ) with 33.3% falling into 
this category as opposed to 4.0% for the English 
speakers and 23.5% for the Arabic. 
Of Ss who described the conditional concept correctly 
but who failed the test string criterion, errors in the 
FF truth table category predominated. Of the 7 English 
Ss in this class, 6 mis-classified 2 or more strings 
where both shapes were absent. Of the 10 Japanese in 
c n D, 8 made two or more FF errors whilst all four 
Arabic Ss in this class made two or more FF errors. 
There were few Ss who achieved the test string 
criterion but failed to offer an accurate description 
of the conditional and no particular pattern was 
evident amongst them. Incorrect descriptions offered by 
those who failed the test string criterion were very 
varied in the case of the 15 English and 11 Japanese Ss 
who fell into this category. Of the 30 Arabic Ss in 
-5 0 D, 7 gave the description (p A q) v (13 A q) v (p A 4) , 
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the disjunctive normal form for inclusive disjunction. 
However, none of these gave responses to the test 
strings consistent with this description. 
Conjunction 
Table 7.11 below shows the breakdown of correct 
descriptions of conjunction. 
Table 7.11: Breakdown of correct conjunctive 
descriptions 
English 	 Japanese 
CnD 	 Er1D 	 CnD 	 CnD 
Arabic 
CnD 	 CnD 
p A q 	 41 3 	 47 0 44 1 
'at least one p 	 4 
and one q' 
0 	 3 
0 	 0 
0 
0 
0 0 
(p 	 q) v (15n q) v (p A 4) 	 0 
TOTAL 	 45 3 	 50 0 45 2 
The description '(There was) a triangle and a star,' or 
something very close to it, was offered as the 
description of the conjunctive concept by nearly all 
Ss. 	 There were only two other descriptions of 
conjunction. One of these was 'at least one triangle 
and one star' which appears to take account of the 
number of times a shape occurs, an irrelevant property 
of the strings. Two Arabic Ss used (p A q) v (i5 A q) v 
(pA4), one of whom failed the test string criterion. 
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Of the very few Ss who described the concept 
successfully but failed the test string criterion, 
errors in the FF category were responsible for both the 
Arabic failures and one of the three English Ss. The 
other two English speakers in this group failed because 
of errors in the mixed (FT, TF) truth table categories. 
Disjunction 
The ambiguity of the natural language 'or' creates 
problems in the translation of certain descriptions 
into truth functional form. 	 For example, a S who 
describes exclusive disjunction as 'square or circle' 
cannot be said to have defined the concept 
unambiguously since we cannot be sure that he does not 
have inclusive disjunction in mind. The only way to 
resolve this difficulty is, where a description is 
simply 'p or q', to examine performance on the test 
strings and thereby infer the form of disjunction that 
'or' is intended to convey. Identification of three or 
more of the TT strings as examples of the concept is 
taken to indicate that inclusive disjunction was 
intended whilst identification of the majority of TT 
strings as non-examples is assumed to indicate that the 
disjunction is exclusive. 	 There is, of course, a 
problem: should a S who fails the test string 
criterion because of exactly two errors in the TT 
category be assigned to the set D or D? Fortunately, 
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this arose only once. One Arabic S described exclusive 
disjunction using 'either ... or' and made two TT 
allocation errors (in addition to two TF errors). 
Since the proportion of Arabic Ss in the set D was 
higher than that for either of the other language 
groups, it was decided to allocate this S to the set D 
so as not to inflate any differences which might be of 
significance. 
Where either disjunctive concept is described as 'p or 
q', the description has been coded as pvq or p 
according to performance on the test strings. 	 In 
descriptions where either interpretation is possible 
(for example, 'square or circle or both the square and 
the circle' for inclusive disjunction), a 'default 
coding' of p v q has been used. 	 (This choice of 
coding is somewhat arbitrary and, given the 
disagreement over whether natural language use of 'or' 
corresponds to inclusive or exclusive disjunction, 
pyq could equally well have been used.) 
Inclusive Disjunction 
The most succinct description of the inclusive 
disjunction is 'There is (either) a square or a 
circle'. (Ss' descriptions did not give any indication 
that 'either' was used to distinguish exclusive from 
inclusive disjunction and therefore responses using 
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'either ... or' are combined with those using 'or' 
alone.) Of correct descriptions for Japanese Ss who 
attained criterion on the test strings, 33 (68.7%) fell 
into this category as opposed to 16 (40.0%) English and 
5 (12.8%) Arabic offerings. The difference between 
each pair of these proportions is significant at the 1% 
level (one-tailed test). 	 Hence, of the Ss who 
identified the concept, the Japanese were more likely 
than either of the other two groups to describe it 
using the most succinct form with only one elementary 
proposition. 
For those who identified the concept and used 'or' or 
'either ... or' to describe it, these clearly have an 
inclusive sense. Others felt it necessary to add 'or 
both' suggesting that, for them, 'or' is ambiguous and 
needs a 'clarifier' or even that 'or' is understood 
exclusively. 	 These descriptions (which have been 
'translated' as (p v q) v (pAq)) accounted for 37.5% of 
the descriptions of English Ss in C n D, 16.7% of 
(criNj  and 20.5% of (criD)A. 
Whilst these two categories of responses accounted for 
the majority of accurate Japanese and English 
descriptions, this was not so for the Arabic speakers. 
For them, the disjunctive normal form (pAq)v(pAq)v 
(pn 4) accounted for 33.3% of the C(1 D descriptions, 
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whereas for the English and Japanese groups, the 
corresponding percentages are only 12.5 and 4.2 
respectively. A further 7 (17.9%) of (CrlD)A described 
the concept as 'the square and the circle appeared 
together or separately' which is also suggestive of the 
disjunctive normal form, although it has been 
'translated' as (p n q) v (p 1 q) • 
A complete breakdown of correct descriptions of 
inclusive disjunction is given in table 7.12. 
Again the Arabic descriptions were more varied - 9 
different descriptions of inclusive disjunction were 
used as opposed to 7 by English Ss and 5 by the 
Japanese. 
Of those Ss who correctly described the concept, only 
one English and one Japanese speaker failed the test 
string criterion. Of the Arabic Ss who gave a correct 
description of the concept, the five who failed the 
test string criterion used the disjunctive normal form 
or the related (pAq) v (p.vq). Of these, two failed to 
attain criterion because of errors in the FF category 
and three because of errors in the mixed truth table 
categories TF and FT. 
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Table 7.12: Breakdown of correct descriptions of 
inclusive disjunction 
English 	 Japanese 	 Arabic 
CnD 	 CnD 	 cnD CnD CnD enD 
pvq  16 1 33 1 5 0 
(p v q) v (p A q) 15 0 8 0 8 0 
(PA q) 	 (P- A q) 
v (p A q) 
(p A q) v (p z q) 
5 
0 
0 
0 
2 
4 
0 
0 
13 
7 
3 
2 
(pvq) 0 0 1 0 1 0 
(p v q) v (p A q) v (13 A q) 
v (p A Zi) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 (p v q) v (p A q) v (5 A 4) 
(p A q) v (p A 4) v (15 A q) 
v (P A 4) 
(p v q) v (p le q) 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
(p v q) v (13 v q) 1 0 0 0 0 0 
(PA q) v (pmq) %, (PA4) 1 0 0 0 0 0 
(p vq) V { (PA q) 1 0 0 0 0 0 
--&? 	 (PIC q) 
TOTAL 40 1 48 1 39 5 
Only one Japanese S failed both the test string and 
description criteria. Of the 6 Arabic and 5 English Ss 
who did so, a variety of descriptions was offered and 
no particular pattern is evident. 
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Exclusive Disjunction 
Of the Ss who described this concept using an single 
'or' statement, there was a more pronounced tendency to 
add 'either' than with the descriptions of the 
inclusive disjunction. 	 However Ss who added the 
clarifier 'but not both' (p A q) also had a tendency to 
use 'either' so again there is no strong evidence that 
'either' is being used to distinguish exclusive from 
inclusive disjunction. 
The most popular category of response for all groups 
was equivalent to (p v q) v (p A q) , accounting for 53.8% 
of (C nD) E, 45.7% of (Cn D) j and 	 33.3% of (c n D) A 
descriptions. 	 However the Arabic speakers again 
favoured the disjunctive normal form (p A q) v OS A q) 
(16.7% of (C n D) A descriptions) or a form close to it - 
(p A FI) v (/3 A q) v (p A q) (a further 29.2%) . These two 
forms accounted for 45.8% of all correct descriptions 
offered by the Arabic Ss in set C, whereas no Japanese 
and only one English S used either of them. 
Five of the 35 Japanese Ss in set C who successfully 
described the concept and one each of the English and 
Arabic Ss used 'only one of circle and star' or 'circle 
and star appeared separately', a form suggestive of 
p q. These are listed separately in the breakdown of 
correct descriptions in table 7.13. 
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Table 7.13: Breakdown of correct descriptions of 
exclusive disjunction 
English 	 Japanese 	 Arabic 
cnD anD cnD anD cnD anD 
P -le q 	 8 	 0 	 14 	 0 	 4 	 1 
(or/either ... or) 
pAcq (only one of 	 1 	 0 	 5 	 0 	 1 	 0 
.../ ... separately) 
(p v q) A (p A q) 	 14 	 4 	 16 	 1 	 8 	 1 
(P A -') V (i5 A q) 	 1 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 4 	 2 
	
(P A 4) V (3 A q) v (p A q) 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 7 	 0 
	
(p vq) v (p A q) v (p A 4') 1 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 
(p A q) v (p 3e q) 	 1 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 	 0 
TOTAL 	 26 	 4 	 35 	 1 	 24 	 4 
Of the four English Ss who, although they described 
exclusive disjunction, failed the test string 
criterion, two failed because of mis-classification of 
the FF strings. One mis-classified all four TT cases 
and was therefore classifying strings according to the 
truth table for inclusive disjunction even though the 
description included (pAq). The only Japanese in e71D 
made three FF errors. Of the four Arabic speakers in 
C n D, only one failed because of errors in the FF 
category. 
Of those who achieved criterion on the strings but who 
gave a description which was not that of exclusive 
disjunction, two of the three English and three of the 
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five Japanese described the concept as 'not both the 
circle and the square', i.e. p A q. Although this is 
not equivalent to exclusive disjunction, these Ss all 
classified the FF strings as non-examples and therefore 
responded consistently with the correct exclusive 
disjunction interpretation. 
Of those who failed both the description and test 
string criteria (16 English, 6 Japanese and 19 Arabic 
speakers), 31% English, 67% Japanese and 58% Arabic 
speakers described the concept as inclusive disjunction 
and classified the test strings accordingly. 
Presumably they had failed to recognise that strings 
where both shapes were present were not represented on 
the sheet. The remaining English and Japanese Ss in 
this class all identified the concept as the negation 
of the conjunction pA q and nearly all classified the 
test strings consistently with this identification. 
The remaining Arabic speakers used varied descriptions 
including pAq• 
In view of the ambiguity of the word 'or' and the 
question of whether 'or' in natural language normally 
conveys inclusive or exclusive disjunction, it is 
useful to compare individual Ss' descriptions of 
inclusive and exclusive disjunction. Ss in the set cnD 
for both these concepts (20 English, 34 Japanese and 
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18 Arabic speakers), were grouped according to whether 
they described either of the concepts simply using 'or' 
or 'either ... or' without making clear the inclusive 
or exclusive sense, or whether they used some other 
description for either form which made clear which 
sense was intended. Table 7.14 shows the distribution 
of Ss in cn D for both disjunctive concepts grouped 
into four classes according to the description they 
used for each form. The four classes are: those who 
used 'or' or 'either ... or' for both concepts; those 
who used 'or' or 'either 	 or' for inclusive 
disjunction but not exclusive disjunction; those who 
used 'or' or 'either ... or' for exclusive disjunction 
but not inclusive disjunction; those who used other 
than 'or' or 'either ... or' for both forms of 
disjunction. 
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Table 7.14: Distribution of correct descriptions of 
inclusive and exclusive disjunction for 
those Ss who attained criterion on test 
strings for both concepts. 
ENGLISH Description of 
e7„clusive disjunction 
'or'/'either 	 other 
... 	 or' 
Description 
of ip.nclusive 
disjunction 
'or'/'either 
... 
	
or' 
other 
0 	 5 
6 	 9 
5 
15 
6 	 14 20 
JAPANESE Description of 
exclusive disjunction 
Description 
of Lnclusive 
disjunction 
'or'/'either 	 other 
... 	 or' 
'or'/'either 
... 	 or' 
other 
	
12 	 11 
	
2 	 9 
21 
11 
14 	 20 34 
ARABIC Description of 
exclusive disjunction 
Description 
of inclusive 
disjunction 
'or'/'either 	 other 
... 	 or' 
'or'/'either 
... 	 or' 
other 
1 	 2 
2 	 13 
3 
15 
3 	 15 18 
For these Ss, the pattern of Japanese descriptions is 
rather different from those of the Arabic and English 
language groups. For the latter groups, roughly equal 
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numbers within the group used 'or' or 'either ... or' 
to describe exclusive disjunction as used these to 
describe inclusive disjunction. No English speaker and 
only one Arabic speaker used 'or' or 'either ... or' 
for both concepts. Of the 34 Japanese Ss in cnD for 
both disjunctive concepts, 11 (32%) used 'or' or 
'either 	 or' for inclusive disjunction but not 
exclusive disjunction, whilst only 2 (6%) used one of 
these descriptions for exclusive disjunction alone. 
However, 12 (35%) used 'or' or 'either ... or' for both 
concepts. 	 Seven of these used 'or' for inclusive 
disjunction adding 'either' to describe exclusive 
disjunction. 	 Only one S used 'or' for exclusive 
disjunction and 'either 	 or' for inclusive 
disjunction. 	 The remaining 4 Ss used the same 
description ('or' or 'either 	 or') for both 
inclusive and exclusive disjunctive concepts. 
These results suggest that the Japanese Ss had a 
greater tendency to use 'or' or 'either ... or' for 
inclusive disjunction rather than exclusive disjunction 
unlike the other two language groups who were equally 
likely to use one of these descriptions for either 
form. Furthermore, the Japanese speakers were more 
likely to use 'or' or 'either ... or' to describe both 
forms but when they did so, they tended to use 'or' for 
181 
inclusive disjunction and to add 'either' to 
distinguish exclusive disjunction. 
Complexity of Verbal Descriptions 
In order to compare the complexity of the verbal 
descriptions, the number of elementary propositions in 
each was counted for each cnD description and the mean 
calculated for each language group and each concept. 
The results are given in table 7.15. (A small number 
of descriptions included mention of just one of the two 
shapes rather than the usual pair, e.g. '... and if 
there's a triangle then there's a triangle and a 
square'. This part of the description was counted as 
1.5 elementary propositions.) 
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Table 7.15: Numbers of elementary propositions in 
correct verbal descriptions of concepts 
used by Ss attaining the test string 
criterion. 
English Japanese Arabic 
BIC 
n = 1 
n = 2 
n = 2.5 
n = 3 
0 
22 
1 
2 
1 
28 
0 
0 
0 
17 
2 
0 
Mean 2.10 1.97 2.05 
s2 0.0800 0.0333 0.0235 
n = 1 8 14 1 
n = 1.5 2 0 0 
n = 2 4 1 4 
COND n = 2.5 0 0 1 
n = 3 7 11 8 
n = 4 4 1 3 
Mean 2.24 1.96 2.79 
s2 1.2024 1.0727 0.6194 
n = 1 45 50 44 
n = 2 0 0 0 
CONJ n = 3 0 0 1 
Mean 1.0 1.0 1.04 
s2 0.0 0.0 0.0869 
n = 1 16 34 6 
n = 2 16 12 16 
INCOR n = 3 7 2 15 
n = 4 1 0 2 
Megn 1.82 1.33 2.33 
s 0.6444 0.3056 0.6325 
n = 1 9 19 5 
XOR n = 2 16 16 12 
n = 3 1 0 7 
Mean 1.69 1.46 2.08 
s2 0.2899 0.2482 0.4931 
(n = number of elementary propositions) 
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For every one of the five concepts, the mean number of 
elementary propositions used by Ss in C riD was least 
for the Japanese language group, equalled only by the 
English speakers for conjunction. 	 For all concepts 
except the biconditional, the mean number of elementary 
propositions was greatest for the Arabic speakers. 
The results of one-way analysis of variance applied to 
the data in table 7.15 are given in table 7.16 below. 
Table 7.16: Results of one-way ANOVA for equality of 
mean number of elementary propositions for 
Ss in cn D across language groups (by 
concept). 
Concept 	 Source SS 	 d.f. 	 MS 
Between groups 0.251 	 2 	 .126 
BIC 	 Within groups 3.413 	 70 	 .049 	 2.58 > 5% 
Total 3.664 	 72 
Between groups 7.237 	 2 	 3.619 
COND 	 Within groups 69.552 	 66 	 1.054 	 3.43 < 5% 
Total 76.790 	 68 
Between groups 0.060 	 2 	 .030 
CONJ 	 Within groups 3.911 	 137 	 .028 	 1.06 > 5% 
Total 3.971 
	 139 
Between groups 21.569 	 2 	 10.784 
INCOR 	 Within groups 65.110 	 124 	 .525 	 20.54 < 1% 
Total 86.677 	 126 
Between groups 5.590 	 2 	 2.895 
XOR 	 Within groups 28.058 	 82 	 .342 	 8.17 < 1% 
Total 33.647 	 84 
Significant differences between language groups in the 
mean number of elementary propositions were found for 
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descriptions of the conditional and both forms of 
disjunction. 	 To establish the source of these 
significant differences, Tukey's Honestly Significant 
Difference (HSD) was calculated for each of these three 
concepts. These are shown below (table 7.17). 
Table 7.17: Tukey's HSD for mean number of elementary 
propositions. 
Tukey's HSD 
= 5% 
COND 	 .764 
INCOR 	 .371 
XOR 	 .373 
(cX = familywise error rate.) 
From these we can conclude that, for the conditional, 
the difference between the means for the Japanese and 
Arabic language groups is significant. For inclusive 
disjunction the difference between all three pairs of 
means is significant. For exclusive disjunction, the 
difference between the means of the Japanese and Arabic 
language groups is significant and so is that between 
the Arabic and English groups. These significant 
differences are summarised in figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5: Mean number of elementary propositions in 
descriptions of concepts 
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Corresponding differences are also to be found in the 
number of Ss who described a concept using the simplest 
possible form (in terms of elementary propositions). 
For Ss who attained criterion on the test strings, 
there was a significant effect of language group on the 
proportions whose descriptions consisted of a single 
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BIC 
COND 
CONJ 
INCOR 
XOR 
elementary proposition for the conditional (XL = 9.95, 
d.f. = 2, P < 1%), inclusive disjunction (XI = 27.69, 
d.f. = 2, P < .1%) and exclusive disjunction (XL = 
6.99, d.f. = 2, P < 5%). 	 Differences in these 
proportions existed for the Japanese and Arabic groups 
for all three of these concepts. (COND: x 1 = 9.81, 
d.f. = 2, P < 1%; 
	
INCOR: X.2 = 27.36, d.f. = 2, P < 
0.1%; XOR: XL= 6.60, d.f. = 2, P < 5%). For inclusive 
disjunction, the differences between these proportions 
were also significant for the English and Japanese 
L 
language groups ()C = 7.30, d.f. = 2, P < 5%) and also 
for the English and Arabic groups ( X = 7.47, d.f. = 
2, P < 5%). 	 These results indicate that, for the 
conditional and both forms of disjunction, Japanese 
descriptions tended to be shorter than those offered by 
the Arabic group and the Japanese descriptions were 
more likely to be composed of just one elementary 
proposition. 
The differences between the mean number of elementary 
propositions in descriptions of a concept mirror to a 
large extent the results for the proportion of Ss in 
each language group who correctly identified the 
concept (see figure 7.2). A scatter diagram of mean 
number of elementary propositions and proportion of Ss 
attaining criterion on the test strings for each 
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language group/concept combination is given in figure 
7.6. 
Figure 7.6: Scatter diagram of mean number of 
elementary propositions in correct 
descriptions of concept (for Ss in set C) 
against proportion of language group 
identifying the concept. 
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Across concepts, there appears to be an inverse 
correlation between success rate in identifying it and 
the mean length of the description used by successful 
Ss. 	 In other words, there is a strong tendency for 
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0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
easier concepts to be associated with shorter 
descriptions. 
Times to task completion 
We now look at times to task completion for each 
concept with a view to establishing whether any inter- 
language group differences exist. 	 (The time to task 
completion for a concept is the time from presentation 
of the sheet containing all exemplars to when S 
announced that he had identified the concept.) Table 
7.18 gives the mean and standard deviation of the times 
to task completion for Ss in the sets C and C for each 
concept/language group combination. 
Table 7.18: Mean and standard deviation of times to 
task completion for Ss in the sets C and 
C. 
X 
CE  
147.9 
CE  
97.6 
CJ  
133.9 
CJ 
 
101.1 
CA  
103.3 
CA 
 
89.2 
BIC s 163.1 90.4 98.6 106.1 62.7 63.6 
n 32 18 37 14 25 27 
X 309.2 228.7 219.1 232.2 116.2 135.1 
COND s 181.6 196.7 183.1 199.5 83.7 88.4 
n 28 22 30 21 18 34 
X 58.6 71.0 78.2 - 65.2 72.5 
CONJ s 36.4 39.2 56.5 - 44.3 49.1 
n 47 3 51 0 46 6 
X 154.1 177.3 110.8 192.0 107.0 104.5 
INCOR s 121.4 200.1 97.3 83.0 79.0 73.3 
n 44 6 49 2 41 11 
X 57.7 48.2 81.8 82.0 73.8 71.1 
XOR s 50.9 39.2 64.6 80.6 40.5 40.5 
n 30 20 40 11 29 23 
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(Times are in seconds) 
For each concept a two-way analysis of variance was 
carried out on times to task completion to investigate: 
(a) whether these differed across language groups, 
(b) whether they differed for the sets C and C, 
(c) whether there were any interaction effects between 
language groups and the sets C and E. 
The results are given in table 7.19. 
Table 7.19: Summary of two way ANOVA for times to task 
completion. 
Source SS d.f. MS 
Language group 34301 2 17150 1.46 > 5% 
C/C 34604 1 34604 2.95 > 5% 
BIC Interaction 8046 2 4023 0.34 > 5% 
Error 1722193 147 11716 
Total 1799144 152 
Language group 558569 2 279284 10.24 < 1% 
C/C 10114 1 10114 0.37 > 5% 
COND Interaction 76023 2 38012 1.39 > 5% 
Error 4008553 147 27270 
Total 4653259 152 
Language group 9288 2 4644 2.05 > 5% 
C/C 669 1 669 0.30 > 5% 
CONJ Interaction 49 1 49 0.02 > 5% 
Error 334513 148 2260 
Total 344518 152 
Language group 74957 2 37478 3.28 < 5% 
C/C 4166 1 4166 0.36 > 5% 
INCOR Interaction 11419 2 5709 0.50 > 5% 
Error 1681076 147 11436 
Total 1771618 152 
Language group 20420 2 10210 3.47 < 5% 
C/C 638 1 638 0.22 > 5% 
XOR Interaction 525 2 262 0.09 > 5% 
Error 432011 147 2939 
Total 453595 152 
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There was no effect of success/failure in identifying 
the concept on times to task completion. 	 In other 
words, Ss who failed to identify the concept spent no 
more or less time on the task than those who were 
successful. Neither was there any interaction between 
this factor (success/failure) and language group. 
However, there was an effect of language group for 
inclusive and exclusive disjunction (significant at 5%) 
and also for the conditional (significant at 1%). 
For the three concepts which showed a language group 
effect, Tukey's HSDs were calculated to determine 
significant differences in the mean time to task 
completion between pairs of language groups. These are 
given in table 7.20 together with overall means for 
time to task completion for -each language group/concept 
combination. 
Table 7.20: Mean times to task completion 
Language group 
Concept English Japanese Arabic HSD 
p(= 5% 
BIC 129.76 124.90 95.98 
COND 273.80 224.51 128.56 77.75 
CONJ 59.30 78.20 66.06 
INCOR 156.88 113.96 106.42 50.04 
XOR 53.92 81.86 72.58 25.29 
(Ok = familywise error rate.) 
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For the conditional, the mean time for the Arabic 
speakers was significantly different from that of the 
Japanese and that of the English speakers. The mean 
time for the Arabic group was significantly different 
from that of the English speakers for inclusive 
disjunction. For exclusive disjunction, the mean times 
for the English and Japanese groups were significantly 
different. These differences are summarised in figure 
7.7. 
Figure 7.7: Mean times to task completion 
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COND 
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The number of males and females in the Japanese and 
English language groups was much the same 
approximately twice as many females as males. However 
these proportions were reversed for the Arabic group 
which contained almost twice as many males as females. 
To establish whether this factor contributed to the 
significant differences between mean times for the 
Arabic speakers and the other two groups, two-sample t 
tests were carried out for each language group on the 
times to task completion summed across the five 
concepts. The results, given in table 7.21, show that 
there were no gender differences in time spent on the 
concept identification tasks for any language group. 
Table 7.21: Results of two-sample t tests for total 
times to complete all five tasks. 
Language group 
n 
Males 
17 
Females 
33 
English R 758.4 630.0 1.30 > 5% 
s 329.0 320.0 
n 16 35 
Japanese X 600.4 634.0 0.37 > 5% 
s 280.4 300.5 
n 33 19 
Arabic X 454.1 496.5 0.60 > 5% 
s 234.6 256.5 
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COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITHIN LANGUAGE GROUPS 
Identification of concepts 
We now look at a comparison of performance on each of 
the five concept identification tasks within the three 
language groups. Figure 7.8 shows, for each language 
group, the proportion of Ss who satisfied the test 
string criterion. 	 It suggests that the order of 
difficulty in identifying the concepts was much the 
same for all three groups. The least difficult was 
conjunction followed by inclusive disjunction and the 
most difficult for all groups was the conditional. 
A multiple comparison test (Grizzle et al, 1969) for 
equality of the proportions of Ss correctly identifying 
each concept (i.e. satisfying the test string 
criterion) was carried out for each language group. 
The results are given in table 7.22. 
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Figure 7.8: Percentage of language group in set C for 
each concept. 
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Table 7.22: Results of tests of equality of 
proportions of Ss in set C by language 
group. 
Language group 3(.2 d.f. 
English 48.8 4 < 1% 
Japanese 55.8 4 < 1% 
Arabic 42.8 4 < 1% 
For every language group, the concepts fell into two 
homogeneous subgroups, the first containing conjunction 
and inclusive disjunction and the second containing 
exclusive disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional. There were no significant differences 
in proportions for concepts within a subgroup but for 
those in different subgroups, the difference in 
proportions was significant. Hence for every language 
group, the proportion identifying conjunction was 
significantly differently from each of the proportions 
identifying exclusive disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional and similarly for the proportions 
identifying inclusive disjunction. In other words, for 
all groups, conjunction and inclusive disjunction were 
significantly easier than each of exclusive 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional. 
Times to task completion 
Times to task completion were compared within each 
language group to establish whether there were any 
significant differences. 	 An analysis of variance 
(repeated measures) was carried out for each language 
group. The results are given in table 7.23. All are 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 7.23: 	 Results of ANOVA (repeated measures) for 
times to task completion within language 
groups. 
Source 	 SS 	 d.f. 	 MS 	 F P 
Between Ss 1080998 49 
Within Ss 
ENG Concept 1603750 4 400938 27.39 < 1% 
Error 2869162 196 14639 
Total 5553911 249 
Between Ss 886133 50 
Within Ss 
JAP Concept 717853 4 179463 15.1 < 1% 
Error 2377504 200 11888 
Total 3981490 254 
Between Ss 617624 51 
Within Ss 
ARAB Concept 134793 4 33698 13.9 < 1% 
Error 493178 204 2418 
Total 1245595 259 
To ascertain the source of the significant concept 
effects, the Newman-Keuls procedure was used for 
multiple comparisons of mean times to task completion 
within language groups. The results are shown in table 
7.24. 
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Table 7.24: Results of Newman-Reuls tests for 
significant differences in mean times to 
task completion within language groups. 
(Figures 	 in 	 parentheses 	 are 	 mean 	 times 	 to 	 task 
completion for the concept for all Ss in the language 
group.) 
ENGLISH 
	
XOR 	 CONJ 	 BIC 	 INCOR 	 COND 	 r 	 Wr 
	
(53.9) 	 (59.3) 	 (129.81 	 (156.91 	 (273.81 
XOR 	 (53.9) 	 - 	 5.38 	 75.8 	 103.0 	 219.9-5 67.1 
--_ 	 *--.,_ 
CONJ 	 (59.3) 	 - 	 - 	 97.6*--214.5*--4 63.1 70
_
.5
"----- BIC 	 (129.8) 	 - 	 - 	 27.1 	 -144. 0*-3 57.5 
INCOR (156.9) 	 - 	 116.9*  -2 47.9 
COND 	 (273.8) 	 - 
JAPANESE 
	
XOR 	 CONJ 	 INCOR 	 BIC 	 COND 	 r 	 Wr 
	
(78.2) 	 (81.9) 	 (114.0) 	 (124.9) 	 (224.51 
XOR 	 (78.2) 	 -3.7 -,_35.8 ,,s46.7,,_,146.3*-5 59.8 
CONJ 	 (81.9) 	 - 32.1 	 43.0 	 142.6--4 	 56.3 
INCOR (114.0) 	 - 10.9 	 110.5--3 51.3 
BIC 	 (124.9) 	 - - 	 -----99.6* -2 42.7 
COND 	 (224.5) 	 - 
ARABIC 
	
CONJ 	 XOR 	 BIC 	 INCOR 	 COND 	 r 	 Wr 
 (66.1) 	 (72.5) 	 (96.01 	 (106.41(128.61 
CONJ 	 (66.1) 	 -6.4_ 
--. 	 • 
29 9* 
	 • 
 40 3
---* 	 62•* 5--5 	 26.7 
XOR 	 (72.5) 	 - 	- 	 23.5 	 33.9 	 56.1--4 	 25.2 
_ 	 -,_ 
BIC 	 (96.0) 	 -- 	 - 	 10.4 	 32.6 * --3 	 22.9 
INCOR (106.4) 	 - - -----22.1* -2 	 19.1 
COND 	 (128.6) 	 - 
(* indicates significant difference, of = 5%.) 
The results for the English and Arabic speakers are 
similar - three homogeneous subgroups of concepts. The 
first contains conjunction and exclusive disjunction, 
members of the second are the biconditional and 
inclusive disjunction and the third contains only the 
conditional. Significant differences exist between the 
mean times for concepts in different subgroups. For 
198 
the Japanese language group, there are two homogeneous 
subgroups. 	 One contains conjunction, both forms of 
disjunction and the biconditional. The second contains 
the conditional which is therefore significantly 
different from all the other concepts. However there 
are no significant differences among concepts in the 
first subgroup. Therefore, for all language groups, 
the conditional task took significantly longer than any 
other. 	 For the English and Arabic groups, Ss spent 
less time on conjunction and exclusive disjunction than 
any other task. However, for the Japanese Ss, the time 
spent on these two tasks was no different from that 
spent on inclusive disjunction and the biconditional. 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1 
An indicator of the difficulty of a concept 
identification task for a -given language group is the 
proportion of Ss who successfully identified it. Using 
this measure to rank the concepts, we find that the 
order of difficulty within each language group is much 
the same. Conjunction and inclusive disjunction were 
the easiest concepts with the conditional as the most 
difficult for all groups. The only difference between 
language groups was in the relative difficulty of 
exclusive disjunction and the biconditional. For the 
English speakers, the success rate for the 
biconditional was slightly greater than that for 
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exclusive disjunction, whereas for the Japanese and 
Arabic groups, the success rate for exclusive 
disjunction was slightly greater than that for the 
biconditional. 	 However, within language groups, the 
differences in the proportions of Ss who successfully 
identified each of these concepts is too small to be of 
any significance and, for all groups, these two 
concepts were more difficult than conjunction and 
inclusive disjunction, and significantly so for the 
English and Arabic speakers. Hence, if we compare the 
relative difficulty of concepts, we find no noteworthy 
differences across the three language groups. 
If we compare performance on individual concepts, we 
find consistent and striking inter-language group 
differences. For all five tasks, the success rate at 
identifying the concept was highest for the Japanese 
group and least for the Arabic speakers. Furthermore, 
the difference between the proportion of successful 
Japanese and successful Arabic speakers was significant 
for every concept. 
Striking language group differences were also found in 
the nature and length of the descriptions used by Ss to 
describe the concepts. For every concept, the length 
(measured by number of elementary propositions) of the 
Japanese descriptions were, on the average, shorter 
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than those of either the Arabic or English speakers. 
Japanese descriptions were also less varied than those 
of either of the other two groups for every concept. 
The remarkable consistency of these findings across 
concepts suggests that the superior performance of the 
Japanese is not an experimental artefact. 	 For some 
reason, the Japanese as a group were better able to 
identify the concepts and to describe them 
economically, although the relative difficulty of the 
concepts themselves was no different for the Japanese 
than for either of the other groups. 
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Chapter 8 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2 
The object of experiment 2 was to investigate how the 
linguistic items normally taken to codify logical 
connectives were interpreted in each of the three 
language groups investigated. The test used to obtain 
this information consisted of 16 compound propositions 
each of which was composed of two simple components 
conjoined with the lexical form of either conjunction, 
disjunction, the conditional or biconditional. 	 (The 
linguistic connectives used for each of the language 
groups are described in chapter 5). Of the 16 compound 
propositions, there were four containing each of the 
four linguistic forms. This enabled a check for 
consistency of interpretation. 
In each compound proposition, one component made a 
statement about the size of a square (small/large) and 
the other was a statement about its colour 
(black/white). Four squares were printed on the test 
sheet, one representing each size/colour combination: 
large/white, large/black, small/white, small/black. Ss 
were required to respond to each compound proposition 
by stating which of the four squares were consistent 
with that proposition and which were not. 
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For a given compound proposition, the four squares 
represent each of the four truth table categories TT, 
TF, FT and FF. For instance, consider the proposition 
'If the square is large then it is white'. 	 In this 
case the large white square constitutes the case where 
both simple components are true, that is the TT case. 
Both components are false for the small black square so 
that this represents the FF truth table category. The 
small white and large black squares constitute the FT 
and TF cases respectively. 
From his or her responses to each of the 16 compound 
propositions, a S's truth table for that proposition 
could be inferred. For instance, suppose a S responds 
to the proposition 'If the square is large then it is 
white' by indicating that the large white and small 
black squares are consistent with it whereas the large 
black and small white squares are not. 	 This 
corresponds to an interpretation in which the compound 
proposition is judged as true only when its simple 
components are both true (the TT case) or both false 
(FF). This corresponds to the underlying truth table 
for a biconditional and we therefore deduce that this 
is the S's interpretation of the logical relationship 
between the two simple propositions. In a similar way, 
truth tables, and hence underlying logical connectives, 
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were inferred for each S for all 16 of the test 
propositions. 
Since each truth table category (represented by the 
four squares given) could be marked consistent or 
inconsistent, there are 24 = 16 possible responses to 
each test proposition. However, nearly all responses 
offered by the Ss tested corresponded to the truth 
tables for one of the following: 
	 pA q, p v q, 
pAcq, p (affirmation of p) or q (affirmation of 
q). 	 Responses corresponding to truth functional 
propositions other than these were rare and varied and 
have therefore been grouped together in the analysis 
which follows. Table 8.1 shows, for each of the 16 
test propositions, the number of responses in each 
language group corresponding to the truth table 
representations of conjunction, inclusive and exclusive 
disjunction, the conditional, 	 biconditional and the 
affirmation of p (the first component of the compound 
proposition) and of q (the second component of the 
compound proposition). Shaded cells are those where 
the inferred logical interpretation is that which the 
linguistic connective is supposed to convey. 
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Table 8.1. Summary of results of experiment 2 
Prop. Response 
no. 
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8 
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The results indicate that propositions in which the 
components were joined by the equivalent of 'and' (1, 
8, 12 and 15) were interpreted as logical conjunctions 
by nearly all Ss regardless of language group. 
Statements containing the linguistic form of 
disjunction (3, 5, 11 and 14) tended to be interpreted 
as inclusive disjunction by the majority of Ss. 
Exclusive interpretations were negligible for the 
Japanese and Arabic groups. However, each disjunctive 
statement elicited an exclusive interpretation from 
approximately 10% of the English speakers. Of those 
responses which did not correspond to either of the 
logical forms of disjunction, nearly all indicated that 
the statement had been construed either as a 
conjunction or as the affirmation of one of its two 
components (usually the first) with the other 
disregarded. 
If we view the logical interpretation as the 'correct' 
one, by far the greatest error rate occurred in 
interpreting the linguistic conditionals and 
biconditionals. Of the conditional statements (2, 6, 
10 and 16), statement 2 elicited a conditional 
interpretation from nearly 20% of the Arabic speakers. 
Otherwise a conditional response to any of these 
statements did not exceed 12% of any language group. 
Linguistic biconditionals (statements 4, 7, 9, and 13) 
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were even less successful in eliciting an 
interpretation consistent with a logical biconditional 
for the English and Arabic groups. However, each one 
of the biconditional statements was given the correct 
logical reading by approximately 25% of the Japanese 
group. Of those who failed to interpret conditionals 
or biconditionals as logic dictates, the majority of 
responses to these statements revealed an underlying 
truth table corresponding to logical conjunction, i.e. 
only the TT case was considered to be consistent with 
the test proposition. 
In table 8.1, the rows corresponding to statements 
containing the same linguistic connective are not 
identical. We can therefore deduce that Ss were not 
always consistent in their interpretation of a given 
linguistic form. For instance, a S might interpret two 
of the four propositions expressed using 'if ... then' 
as conditionals whereas the other two might elicit 
(from the same subject) the truth table corresponding 
to conjunction. 	 To establish whether the 
interpretations occurred with any degree of 
consistency, each of the four responses to the 
propositions containing the same connective were 
compared for each S. If an individual's responses to 
three or more of the four statements containing the 
same linguistic form indicated the same logical 
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interpretation, then that S was deemed to have 
interpreted that connective consistently. Furthermore, 
S's logical interpretation of the connective was 
inferred to be that corresponding to the truth table of 
the three or more consistent responses. If no three 
responses corresponded to the same truth functional 
form, then the S's interpretation of that linguistic 
connective was classified as inconsistent. 
Table 8.2 shows, for each group of four propositions 
containing the same linguistic connective, the 
frequency distribution of consistent logical 
interpretations. For each group of four propositions, 
table entries are numbers of Ss in each language group 
who gave three or more responses corresponding to the 
logical form indicated. 
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Table 8.2: Frequency distribution of truth functional 
interpretations of linguistic connectives. 
Ling. 
conn. 
Logical interpretation 
_ 
pAq pvq p-r.q p4-.(1 pie q p q . 'noon- 
sistent 
48 2 Eng 
'and' 51 Jap 
48 1 1 2 Arab 
6 27 5 3 9 Eng 
'or' 5 33 2 1 10 Jap 
4 31 3 1 13 Arab 
40 2 1 1 6 Eng 
'if 	 ... 37 6 8 Jap 
then' 36 8 3 5 Arab 
41 1 2 1 1 4 Eng 
'if and 33 12 6 Jap 
only if' 38 4 2 8 Arab 
Results for individual connectives are considered 
below. 
Results for individual connectives 
Conjunction 
Four propositions were of the form 'p and q', e.g. 'The 
square is black and it is large'. For Ss in all three 
language groups, virtually all of the responses to 
these propositions indicated an interpretation 
consistent with the truth table for conjunction. Of 
the English speakers, 48 (96%) responded in this manner 
to three or more of the propositions containing 'and'. 
Corresponding figures for Japanese and Arabic speakers 
are 51 (100%) and 48 (92.3%). Only 2 Ss (Arabic 
speakers) gave consistent responses indicative of an 
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interpretation other than logical conjunction and, for 
the few whose responses were inconsistent, no 
particular pattern of errors was evident. 
Disjunction 
Of Ss who interpreted three or more of the four 
propositions containing 'or' consistently, the most 
popular response in all language groups corresponded to 
inclusive disjunction. Ss who interpreted the majority 
of 'or' propositions in this way numbered 27 (54%) 
English, 33 (64.7%) Japanese and 31 (59.6%) Arabic 
speakers respectively. Differences between these 
proportions are not significant ( X2. = 1.20, d.f. = 2, 
P > 5%). 	 Whilst none of the Japanese and Arabic 
speakers showed any tendency to interpret 'or' as 
exclusive disjunction, 5 English speakers gave a 
majority of responses which indicated an exclusive 
reading. This suggests that 'or' in English may be 
more likely to be read exclusively than disjunctions in 
Japanese and Arabic. 
In all three language groups, there were a small number 
of Ss who interpreted 'or' propositions as 
conjunctions. 
	 The numbers of Ss in the English, 
Japanese and Arabic groups who exhibited this tendency 
were 6, 5 and 4 respectively. 
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Of the four linguistic connectives, 'or' had a greater 
tendency to elicit inconsistent interpretations. 
Responses which fell into this category generally 
included inclusive disjunction along with the 
affirmation of p or of q. 
Conditional 
No matter what their language group, there was a 
pronounced tendency for Ss to respond to conditional 
propositions as if they were conjunctions. Ss whose 
responses to the conditional propositions indicated a 
conjunctive reading numbered 40 (80%) English, 37 
(72.5%) Japanese and 36 (69.2%) Arabic speakers. There 
is no significant difference between these proportions 
( 	 = 1.60, d.f. = 2, P > 5%). 
Ss who interpreted these propositions as conditionals 
were few in number - 2 English, 6 Japanese and 8 Arabic 
speakers. The only other interpretation worthy of note 
was equivalent to the biconditional. The tendency to 
give a biconditional reading to the conditional 
statements was greatest amongst the Japanese of whom 
eight interpreted the majority of conditional 
propositions as biconditionals. Only 3 of the Arabic 
language group and one English speaker's responses 
indicated a consistent biconditional interpretation. 
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Biconditional 
As with the conditional propositions, there was a 
pronounced tendency, independent of language group, to 
interpret biconditional propositions as conjunctions of 
the two simple components. Of the English speakers, 41 
(82%) responded to the majority of biconditional 
propositions as if they were conjunctions. 
Corresponding figures for the Japanese and Arabic 
speakers are 33 (64.7%) and 38 (73.1%) respectively. 
Of the three language groups, a higher proportion of 
the Japanese speakers responded in a manner consistent 
with a biconditional interpretation. Twelve Japanese 
interpreted the majority of biconditional propositions 
as such whereas only 2 each of the English and Arabic 
speakers did so. 	 However, the apparently superior 
performance of the Japanese group is probably 
attributable to the fact that the biconditional 
propositions which they were interpreting were 
expressed as the conjunction of two conditionals (see 
chapter 5). 
Interpreting the biconditional as a conditional was 
rare - only 4 Arabic speakers and 1 English speaker did 
so. 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 2 
A striking result of this test is the overwhelming 
tendency for Ss, irrespective of their language group, 
to respond to all propositions other than disjunction 
as if they were conjunctions, i.e. true if both their 
simple components were true and false otherwise. 
Thirty-two (64%) of English speakers, 28 (54.9%) of 
Japanese and 30 (57.7%) of the Arabic language group 
gave truth table interpretations corresponding to 
logical conjunction for all linguistic connectives 
other than 'or'. The tendency to respond in this way 
is independent of language group (:‹7- = .91, d.f. = 2, 
P > 5%). 
Although 'or' statements were more likely to be 
interpreted 'logically' than either conditionals or 
biconditionals, of the four linguistic connectives 
tested, disjunctions had a greater tendency to elicit 
responses which were inconsistent across the four items 
testing interpretation of the same linguistic form. 
The results of experiment 2 revealed no major 
differences between language groups in the truth table 
interpretations of the linguistic connectives which are 
generally taken to convey the logical forms. Minor 
differences of interest are: 
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(a) 10% of the English speakers interpreted 'or' 
statements as exclusive disjunction whereas no S in 
either of the other two language groups did so; 
(b) Japanese and Arabic speakers were slightly more 
likely than English speakers to interpret statements 
containing 'if ... then' as logical conditionals, and 
Japanese speakers were more likely than either English 
or Arabic speakers to interpret these as 
biconditionals; 
(c) for the biconditional, the truth table 
corresponding to the logical form was elicited from 
more Japanese speakers than either of the other two 
groups but this is probably attributable to the fact 
that, for reasons given, it was expressed in Japanese 
as the conjunction of two conditionals. 
Chapter 9 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
This study was designed to investigate whether the 
widely reported mismatch between logical connectives 
and the associated English language items is 
generalisable to speakers of other languages. It also 
seeks to establish whether differences in the 
interpretation of these lexical items might be linked 
with differential familiarity with the associated 
logical concepts. 	 Success at identifying logical 
concepts from non-verbal materials was tested in 
experiment 1, whilst experiment 2 sought to obtain 
information regarding the comprehension of linguistic 
connectives when no contextual clues are available to 
aid interpretation. 	 Since the aim was to explain 
dissimilar concept identification performance in terms 
of differential linguistic provision for expressing the 
underlying logical concepts, we consider first the 
results of experiment 2. 
UNDERSTANDING OF LINGUISTIC CONNECTIVES 
Comparison across language groups 
Experiment 2 revealed only minor differences between 
language groups in the comprehension of the linguistic 
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items normally taken to convey the logical forms of 
conjunction, disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional. 	 There were no language group 
differences at all in the comprehension of 'and' 
statements which were understood as logical 
conjunctions by at least 92% of the Ss in each of the 
three groups. 
Linguistic disjunctions were less successful in 
eliciting an interpretation which corresponded to 
either of the two logical forms. Between 60% and 65% 
of each language group interpreted three or more of the 
'or' statements as either inclusive or exclusive 
disjunction. 	 For all language groups the inclusive 
interpretation was overwhelmingly favoured. However, 
there was a greater tendency for the English speakers 
to read 'or' exclusively than was the case for either 
of the other two groups. Of those who consistently 
interpreted the disjunctions in accordance with the 
truth table for either logical form, 16% of English 
speakers construed them exclusively. However, no S in 
either the Japanese or Arabic language groups gave 'or' 
an exclusive reading. 	 This suggests that it is 
possible that an ambiguous disjunction in English, 
although likely to be read inclusively, may be more 
susceptible to an exclusive interpretation. 
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Linguistic conditionals were poorly understood by all 
language groups, if we consider the logical 
interpretation to be the correct one. The overwhelming 
tendency for all three groups was to interpret 
conditionals as if they were conjunctions, i.e. true 
only when their two components were true and false 
otherwise. A conditional interpretation was marginally 
more likely to be offered by the Arabic speakers than 
by the Japanese who in turn were slightly more likely 
than the English speakers to interpret conditionals 
'logically'. There does, however, seem to be a greater 
tendency for a Japanese conditional to be interpreted 
as a biconditional. Of the consistent interpretations 
of the conditional, 19% of those offered by the 
Japanese were biconditional. Corresponding figures for 
the English and Arabic speakers were 2% and 7%. 
Biconditionals were as poor at eliciting the logical 
interpretation as conditionals and were also understood 
as conjunctions by the majority of Ss. 
	
Whilst the 
Japanese biconditionals were more often construed as 
such, the reason is almost certainly attributable to 
their expression as the conjunction of two 
conditionals. Of interest is whether biconditionals 
expressed in this way would be more successful at 
eliciting the logical interpretation for the English 
and Arabic speakers. 
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Of the four connectives tested, only linguistic 
conjunction and disjunction seem to codify adequately 
the underlying logical concepts. 	 The generality of 
this finding across language groups lends some support 
to Gazdar's (1979, chapter 4) proposal that lexical 
encoding of logical connectives in all languages is 
confined to conjunction and disjunction. 	 It does 
indeed seem to be the case that these two logical 
concepts have some particular salience which 
necessitates their encoding and that this may be 
independent of culture. 
Discussion of results for individual connectives 
The results of experiment 2 suggest that the linguistic 
codings of logical connectives in English, Japanese and 
Arabic have interpretations which are very similar in 
each language. However, the connectives themselves are 
not equally successful at conveying the associated 
logical concept. We now discuss the general results 
for individual connectives in the light of other 
research findings which have attempted to elucidate how 
linguistic connectives are understood in English. 
Experiments, such as experiment 2, which have been 
designed to elicit all or part of the truth table 
underlying a particular linguistic connective generally 
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use one of two types of task. In one, the S is given a 
truth table category and asked to evaluate the truth of 
a compound proposition. For instance, he may be asked 
to assess the truth or falsity of 'M is odd or N is 
even' given 'M = 3' and 'N = 5', the TF case. 
Alternatively the task may take the form used in this 
study - the S is given a compound statement which he is 
to assume to be true and asked to assess one or more of 
the truth table categories. Using the example above, 
the S would be given 'M is odd or N is even' and asked 
to evaluate 'M = 3, N = 5'. Either design can allow 
identification of the truth table underlying a 
connective but only if all four categories (TT, TF, FT, 
FF) are tested and the results analysed for individual 
Ss. 
Understanding of linguistic conjunction 
Regarding the interpretation of 'and' statements, there 
is little to say other than to point to the fact that 
these seem to be universally construed as logical 
conjunctions when context or conversational conventions 
do not suggest another reading. 
Understanding of linguistic disjunction 
The overwhelming tendency of Ss in this study to 
interpret the disjunction of two statements inclusively 
rather than exclusively conflicts with the oft-reported 
219 
(although contentious) view that natural language 
disjunction is exclusive. 	 Sternberg (1979) used a 
similar experimental design where Ss were given a 
compound proposition and asked to assess each truth 
table category as true, false or maybe true/maybe 
false. 	 He found that Ss were far more likely to 
interpret 'or' as exclusive, rather than inclusive, 
disjunction. Given a true proposition of the form 'p 
or q', most Ss responded 'false' to the TT case whereas 
a inclusive interpretation would lead to the response 
'maybe true/maybe false'. Newstead et al (1984) also 
report a preponderance of exclusive interpretations for 
a variety of 'or' statements. 	 However, Braine and 
Rumain (1981) found that their adult Ss favoured an 
inclusive interpretation in a task very similar indeed 
to that used by Sternberg. Damarin, using a task very 
similar to that used in experiment 2, found that no S 
consistently interpreted 'or' exclusively and, in the 
current study only 5 Ss (all English speakers) of the 
total of 153 felt that only the mixed truth table 
categories were consistent with the disjunctive 
statement. 
There seems no way of explaining the considerable 
discrepancy between various results other than through 
some feature of the experimental procedure or 
materials. 	 Newstead and Griggs (1983) suggest that 
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what is apparently an inclusive interpretation of 'or' 
statements may simply result from a strategy of 
responding in certain experimental situations. Given a 
statement of the form 'p or q' to evaluate from one of 
the truth table categories, a S first looks to see 
whether p is true. If it is, he looks no further and 
responds 'true'. 	 If p is false, he then seeks to 
ascertain whether q is true. If so he responds 'true', 
otherwise 'false'. However, this explanation of the 
apparent inclusive interpretation of 'or' is far from 
satisfactory. 	 Presumably this strategy could be 
applied to either of the two types of task used to 
elicit underlying truth tables. Therefore, why should 
it be that neither task consistently produces one or 
other of the two possible interpretations? 
Furthermore, if natural language disjunction is 
exclusive (a view which Newstead and Griggs seem to 
favour), why should so many Ss adopt a strategy which 
is at odds with their presumed understanding of the 
connective 'or'? 
A possible explanation of the different interpretations 
of 'or' is suggested by the results of a study carried 
out by Braine and Rumain (1981). Wooden blocks were 
used varying along three dimensions - colour, shape and 
size. For adult Ss given the command 'Give me all the 
green things or give me all the round things', 91% 
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responded as though they interpreted 'or' exclusively, 
i.e. they offered the experimenter blocks having one of 
the two properties (usually the first-mentioned) 
regardless of the other. 	 However, when given the 
command 'Give me all those things that are either green 
or round', 27% of the same Ss responded with blocks 
exhibiting either or both of the two properties. The 
difference between these two commands is that the 
former seems to suggest the disjunction of two actions 
- 'giving the green things' and 'giving the round 
things'. 	 On the other hand, the latter seems to 
indicate alternative properties of the things to be 
given - they must be green or round. It is possible 
that where a statement is the disjunction of two 
alternative courses of action, these are viewed as 
mutually exclusive choices even when both could be 
performed, either simultaneously or consecutively. 
With alternative attributes of a single item, perhaps a 
S is more likely to accept the disjunction as allowing 
both to be true simultaneously, provided that this is 
possible. This would explain the results of experiment 
2 where the disjunction took the form 'The square is 
white or it is large'. 	 These are alternative 
properties of the square and not alternative actions. 
Similarly Damarin's (1977b) disjunctions, which were of 
the form 'M is odd or N is even', could be viewed as 
describing properties of a pair of numbers. 
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Some support for this explanation of the different 
interpretations of 'or' statements is provided by the 
results of Newstead et al (1984) who investigated the 
effect of context on the interpretation of realistic 
disjunctive statements. Threats, promises and choices, 
all of which consisted of alternative actions, elicited 
exclusive interpretations from at least 85% of adult 
Ss. For disjunctive qualifications, on the other hand, 
just over one-half of these Ss favoured the inclusive 
interpretation. 	 All such statements defined 
alternative properties qualifying an individual for 
some role, e.g. 'The successful applicant must have a 
degree or experience in computing', 'The man I marry 
will have to be either rich or handsome'. A higher 
proportion of inclusive interpretations (23%) was also 
obtained for what Newstead et al classified as 
'concrete' disjunctives. These were also suggestive of 
alternative properties rather than alternative actions, 
e.g. 'Either the pants are dark brown or they belong to 
David', 'My son will either turn out to be rich or he 
will be intelligent'. 
It remains to account for the surprising difference in 
the results of Sternberg (1979) and those of Braine and 
Rumain (1981). 	 The disjunctions to which Ss had to 
respond were almost identical. 	 In both cases they 
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referred to the contents of a box - fruits or shapes in 
the former study, 	 toy animals in the latter. 
Sternberg's disjunctions were of the form 'There is a 
circle in the box or there is a square in the box' and 
Braine and Rumain's 'Either there's a horse or there's 
a dog in the box'. 	 Why the former should elicit 
exclusive interpretations from an overwhelming majority 
of Ss whereas for the latter inclusive disjunction was 
favoured is puzzling until one examines the 
experimental procedure more closely. 
For Sternberg's Ss the experimental task was presented 
as a game. The experimenter placed unseen objects into 
a box and, given the disjunctive statement, Ss were 
asked to assess the truth table categories, presented 
as the possible contents of the box. It seems feasible 
that the disjunctive statement could be construed as 
stating the results of alternative courses of action on 
the part of the experimenter. Hence the preponderance 
of exclusive interpretations. On the other hand, in 
the Braine and Rumain study, four boxes containing 
animals were on view with their contents visible. Each 
box represented one of the four truth table categories 
relative to the disjunctive statement given which had 
to be evaluated by reference to one box at a time. The 
statement 'Either there's a horse or there's a dog in 
the box' therefore seems to refer to alternative 
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properties of the box and, by the theory proposed, 
would be more likely to invite the inclusive 
interpretation. 
That individuals are aware of the potential ambiguity 
of statements containing 'or' is indicated by the 
results of experiment 1. For those Ss who identified 
either of the disjunctive concepts and who described 
them correctly, there was a strong tendency in all 
language groups to add the clarifier 'or both' or 'but 
not both' to the 'or' statement. Furthermore, in the 
English and Arabic groups, Ss who used a simple 'or' 
statement to describe either or both of the 
disjunctions were equally divided between the two 
forms. 	 The pattern for the Japanese was rather 
different however, with an apparent favouring of 'or' 
alone to describe inclusive, rather than exclusive, 
disjunction (see table 7.14). 
It seems reasonable to assume that contextual cues 
affect the interpretation of disjunctions in everyday 
language exchanges. For instance, pragmatic criteria 
determine the construal of certain disjunctions as 
exclusive simply because it is clear that both 
disjuncts cannot be true simultaneously. However, the 
theory outlined above seems promising as an explanation 
for the different interpretations of 'or' statements 
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where context does not necessarily suggest which is the 
appropriate interpretation. Clearly further research 
is necessary to establish the extent of its validity 
and also whether it extends to speakers of languages 
other than English. The results for disjunctions in 
experiment 2 suggest that English speakers may, in any 
case, be slightly more likely than the speakers of 
certain other languages to interpret an ambiguous 
disjunction exclusively. 
Understanding of linguistic conditionals and 
biconditionals 
Since the results of experiment 2 	 indicated very 
similar interpretations for conditionals and 
biconditionals, and because the latter connective has 
received little attention from researchers, we discuss 
these two connectives jointly. 
The tendency, observed in experiment 2, to interpret 
biconditionals and conditionals as conjunctions has not 
been widely reported. However, there are few studies 
which have investigated the understanding of both of 
these linguistic connectives in adults and, for some of 
these, the nature of the experimental task does not 
allow identification of the complete underlying truth 
table. 
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In Damarin's (1977b) study, Ss (pre-service elementary 
teachers) were presented with a task very similar to 
that used in experiment 2. They were given a compound 
proposition and asked to identify which of the four 
truth table categories could be true when the 
proposition was true. 	 The results, like those of 
experiment 2, revealed a strong predilection for a 
conjunctive interpretation for biconditionals and 
conditionals. However Bart (1974) used test items in 
which Ss were asked to assess whether a compound 
proposition was always true, always false or neither 
given the truth of its first component. Whilst this 
allows for the detection of certain errors of 
interpretation, it tests only for the evaluation of two 
truth table categories - TT and TF. 	 A correct 
conditional or biconditional reading would therefore be 
indistinguishable from a conjunctive interpretation. 
In Paris' (1973) study, Ss were asked to assess the 
truth of a compound proposition given one truth table 
category. However, the 32 item test contained several 
propositions involving the same connective and thus 
allowed overall truth category errors to be identified, 
although individual truth tables were not isolated. 
Errors for the conditional were high for the FT and FF 
cases and errors for the biconditional were high for 
the FF case. 	 These are precisely the errors which 
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would result from construing the conditional and 
biconditional as conjunction. 
Byrnes and Overton (1988) used a similar type of task 
from which Ss' truth tables could be inferred from an 
'if ... then ...' statement. Ss were given a rule such 
as 'If it has rained, then the grass is wet' together 
with the four associated truth table categories and 
asked to say whether each proved the rule true, proved 
it false or proved nothing. The responses of 69% of 
the college student Ss were consistent with a 
conditional reading and a further 28% appeared to 
interpret the conditional as a biconditional. However, 
the apparent success of this task in eliciting a 
conditional interpretation may well be due to the 
nature of the response categories. 	 The correct 
response to the TT, FT and FF truth table categories is 
'proves nothing' - these are consistent with the rule 
but do not prove it to be true. However, Ss were 
scored correct if they responded 'proves false' to the 
TF case and either 'proves nothing' or 'proves true' to 
the remainder. A response scored as correct could 
therefore arise from the 'defective truth table' 
proposed by Wason (1966). 	 A S might well respond 
'proves nothing' to the FT and FF categories, not 
because he recognises that both render the conditional 
true, but because he considers the case where the 
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antecedent is false to be irrelevant to the truth value 
of the conditional rule. 	 Such an option was not 
available in experiment 2 where each truth table 
category had to be rated as consistent or inconsistent 
with the rule. Were the Ss to respond 'inconsistent' 
to the truth categories judged to be irrelevant, the 
inferred truth table would be indistinguishable from 
that of conjunction. 
In propositional reasoning tasks however, there is no 
indication that conditional premises are construed as 
conjunctions. 	 In their investigation of adults 
reasoning from simple abstract conditional sentences, 
Taplin and Staudenmayer (1973) tested Ss on all the 
eight possible forms of the 'two-premise deductive 
argument' (see chapter 4). 	 One group of Ss was 
required to assess the conclusion as always true, 
sometimes true or never true and the other to assess it 
as always false, sometimes false or never false. 
Roughly 30% of each group responded in a manner 
consistent with a conditional interpretation whilst 
approximately 14% were inferred to have interpreted the 
major premise as a biconditional. A further 40% were 
inconsistent in their interpretations. This raises the 
obvious question - why is the conditional premise in 
the two premise deductive argument apparently so much 
more successful than the task used in this study in 
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eliciting an interpretation consistent with the logical 
conditional? From the point of view of truth table 
evaluation, Taplin and Staudenmayer's task is more 
difficult. 	 In order to respond 'sometimes true' or 
'sometimes false' a S must examine the whole truth 
table to establish for how many of the four categories 
the major and minor premises are true. The task used 
in experiment 2 requires only the individual truth 
table categories to evaluated for truth or falsity of 
the conditional statement. 	 Given that Ss are less 
successful in the latter task than the former, one can 
only conclude (along with Osherson (1975), Wason and 
Johnson-Laird (1972) and others) that, for individuals 
untutored in formal logic, propositional deductive 
reasoning does not normally utilise truth tables. 
The discrepancy between the results for conditionals in 
experiment 2 and those which are typical of 
propositional reasoning with conditionals are 
particularly puzzling when it is recognised that the 
task in experiment 2 could be treated as a two-term 
deductive argument and tackled using the same strategy. 
For example, given the statement 'If the square is 
large, then it is black', the S could treat this as the 
major premise. Upon examining, say, the large white 
square, he could note that it was large and add 'The 
square is large' as the minor premise. 
	 Responding 
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'consistent' or 'inconsistent' then amounts to 
assessing the validity of the conclusion 'The square is 
white'. The argument now consists of premises p-4q and 
p and conclusion 4. Were Ss to approach the task in 
this way, we would expect the results for conditionals 
in experiment 2 to correspond with performance on 
deductive reasoning tasks, i.e. to indicate a 
considerably greater proportion of both conditional and 
biconditional interpretations 	 (see for example: 
Taplin, 1971; Taplin and Staudenmayer, 1973; Taplin, 
Staudenmayer and Taddonio, 1974). The fact that they 
do not suggests that deductive reasoning tasks may not 
be tackled in the same way as truth category 
evaluation. 
Given the evidence that adults do, in certain contexts, 
reason successfully with conditional statements, the 
results of experiment 2 cannot be taken to indicate 
that Ss find conditionals (and biconditionals) 
indistinguishable from conjunctions. 	 As Braine and 
O'Brien (1991) point out, a conjunctive response 
pattern cannot be taken to reflect the lexical entry 
for 'if ... then' because arguments such as denying the 
antecedent and modus tollens would have contradictory 
premises. We are therefore forced to conclude that the 
experimental task induces some kind of response bias. 
One possibility is the effect of a 'matching bias' 
231 
(Evans, 1972) - Ss tend to attach particular salience 
to the items named in the rule and consider the 
mismatching cases irrelevant. The effect of a matching 
bias with biconditional propositions has not been 
investigated but presumably the conjunctive 
interpretation of these propositions could be accounted 
for similarly. However, what could not be explained is 
why the disjunctive propositions in experiment 2 were 
relatively immune to its effects. The absence of 
'matching bias' for disjunctions has also been reported 
by Evans and Newstead (1980). 
A more promising explanation of the conjunctive 
interpretations, at least for conditionals, is to be 
found in the inference schemata model of reasoning 
proposed by Braine and O'Brien (1991). It is suggested 
that part of the lexical entry for 'if ... then' is a 
conditional proof schema described as follows: 'To 
derive or evaluate If p then ... first suppose p; for 
any proposition q that follows from the supposition of 
p taken together with other information assumed, one 
may assert If p then q.' When confronted with a truth 
table category in which p is true, a S applying this 
schema would be led to respond 'true' when q is also 
true and 'false' when q is false. When the antecedent 
is false, the schema cannot be applied - a reasoner is 
not willing to make a supposition and then treat it as 
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false. 	 In this case, the conditional cannot be 
evaluated and the result is the defective truth table 
referred to above. It is proposed that the conjunctive 
pattern is the result of a pragmatic judgement that an 
irrelevant truth table category is more appropriately 
considered false than true if that is the only choice. 
If we assume that, in experiment 2, the S proceeds by 
examining each truth table category and then uses it to 
assess the validity of the conditional statement, this 
would explain the 'inconsistent' response to the FT and 
FF cases. 'Inconsistent' is considered a more 
appropriate response than 'consistent' for these 
irrelevant categories. 
A study by Evans and Newstead (1977) provides some 
support for this notion. Adult Ss were given a 
conditional rule and asked to classify each truth table 
category as rendering the rule true, false or 
irrelevant. 	 For a conditional rule where both 
components are affirmative (as used in experiment 2), 
combining Ss' responses in the categories 'false' and 
'irrelevant' gives results similar to those obtained in 
experiment 2 for the response category 'inconsistent'. 
Of interest is to what extent Ss in the study described 
here would have chosen the 'irrelevant' category had it 
been available to them. The theory predicts that the 
response 'inconsistent' would be preferred for the TF 
category and 'irrelevant' for the two cases where the 
antecedent is false. 
Although Braine and O'Brien (1991) do not deal with 
biconditional reasoning, their explanation of the 
conjunctive interpretation of the conditional can be 
extended to the biconditional if this is viewed as the 
conjunction of two conditionals. 	 The biconditional 
could then be evaluated by applying the conditional 
proof schema to each conditional component. In this 
case, the biconditional would be considered irrelevant 
when the antecedent of either conditional was false, 
i.e. for all truth table categories other than TT. If 
this is so, we would expect Ss with the option of 
responding 'irrelevant' to do so for the categories TF, 
FT and FF. Hence the biconditional response pattern 
would differ from that of the conditional only in the 
TF case. 
We can now go some way towards explaining the apparent 
discrepancy between the results of the different 
experimental tasks from which conditional truth tables 
have been inferred. 	 For tasks like that used in 
experiment 2 which involve the assessment of individual 
truth table categories, the apparent truth table 
underlying a conditional statement depends upon the 
response categories available. Where there are only 
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two, the underlying truth table for a conditional may 
appear to be that of conjunction as in this study and 
those of Damarin (1977a, 1977b) and Paris (1973). 
However, when the additional response category 
'irrelevant' is allowed, Ss appear to associate a 
conditional with the defective truth table described 
above (Johnson-Laird and Tagart, 1969; Evans and 
Newstead, 1977). 
Why is it that in propositional reasoning tasks, Ss are 
more likely to interpret an 'if ... then' statement as 
a logical conditional? Braine and O'Brien (1991) 
propose that reasoning from a conditional premise 
together with a simple component or its negation 
utilises the modus ponens schema: 'Given If p then q 
and p, one can infer q.' Deductions such as modus 
tollens are difficult because the inference schema must 
be used to produce a contradiction: if p is true then 
q is true, but q is false, therefore p is false'. 
Hence errors in reasoning may result from a failure to 
execute the necessary steps in a more complex deduction 
or from succumbing to the invited inference 'if not p 
then not q' (Geis and Zwicky, 1971). In any case, the 
truth table which is inferred from a particular pattern 
of responses to conditional arguments may result from a 
variety of causes other than a defective lexical entry 
for 'if ... then'. Therefore, it is not surprising 
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that it does not always correspond with that inferred 
from the evaluation of truth table categories. These 
types of error may also explain why as many as 40% of 
Taplin and Staudenmayer's (1973) Ss gave inconsistent 
responses. 
PERFORMANCE ON CONCEPT IDENTIFICATION TASKS 
For the concept identification tasks used in experiment 
1, two performance factors are of interest. These are: 
(a) success at abstracting the concept from the set of 
all exemplars as evidenced by the ability to 
distinguish examples from non-examples; 
(b) the ability to describe the concept in such a way 
that examples are distinguished from non-examples. 
For each of the concepts tested (conjunction, inclusive 
disjunction, exclusive disjunction, the conditional and 
biconditional), there were Ss whose descriptions of the 
concept clearly did not match their criterion for 
responding to the test strings and this tendency was 
independent of language group. 	 Therefore we can 
conclude that giving an accurate description of the 
concept does not necessarily imply successful concept 
identification in terms of the ability to distinguish 
examples from non-examples. 
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For those Ss who had a mental representation of a 
concept which enabled them discriminate between 
examples and non-examples, the success rate in 
describing the concept was not constant across 
concepts. For conjunction, inclusive disjunction and 
the conditional, more than 90% of those who achieved 
the test string criterion offered an accurate 
description. 	 However the biconditional was more 
difficult to describe with only 78% of those who could 
distinguish examples from non-examples succeeding in 
offering a correct description of their criterion for 
doing so. 
It was also found that an accurate description was not 
necessarily associated with the successful distinction 
of examples from non-examples. 	 This too was 
independent of language- group. Again the biconditional 
was the most problematic with only 72% of those who 
correctly described the concept achieving criterion on 
the test strings. 
These results suggest that the mental representation of 
a concept and the words used to describe it do not 
necessarily match. An individual may well be able to 
distinguish examples of a concept from non-examples 
with a high degree of consistency but fail to offer a 
description which adequately describes his criterion 
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for doing so. 	 This does suggest that concept 
identification studies which have used an accurate 
description as indicating successful concept 
identification (Bourne, 1966, p 4) were using an 
inappropriate criterion. 
Relative difficulty of concepts 
The order of difficulty of the five concepts (ranked by 
the proportion of Ss who achieved the tests string 
criterion) was much the same for all language groups. 
Conjunction was easiest, followed by inclusive 
disjunction and the success rate for each of these 
concepts was significantly higher than that for either 
exclusive disjunction, the conditional or the 
biconditional. The conditional was the most difficult 
concept for all three groups. 
These results are in broad agreement with those 
reported for standard concept formation tasks utilising 
sequentially presented stimuli and where concepts are 
ranked for difficulty using mean (or median) trials to 
criterion. The only difference is that, for the few 
studies which have investigated the identification of 
biconditional concepts, these are usually reported as 
being more difficult than conditionals (Bourne, 1970; 
Bourne, 1974; Neisser and Weene, 1962). 
Neisser and Weene's (1962) assignment of concepts to 
levels of difficulty predicts the ranking obtained for 
all concepts except the conditional. The hierarchy is 
based on the expression of each concept in terms of the 
'primitive' connectives conjunction and disjunction 
together with the unary operation of negation. The 
conditional, expressed as is v q, was assigned to level 
II along with conjunction and disjunction. The results 
of experiment 1 suggest that a more appropriate 
expression would be the disjunctive normal form (pAq)v 
(TA q) v (TA which would correctly predict that the 
conditional would be more difficult than the level III 
concepts - the biconditional ((p A q) v (TA 4)) and 
exclusive disjunction ((pA q) v (p A q)). 	 Also, to 
explain the greater difficulty of conjunction over 
disjunction, we would have to propose that the former 
is in some sense 'more primitive' than the latter. 
Bourne's (1974) inference model for conceptual rule 
learning (outlined in chapter 4) also predicts greater 
difficulty of the biconditional over the conditional 
for standard rule learning tasks where (as in 
experiment 1) stimulus elements are equally divided 
between truth table categories. Also, contrary to the 
findings of this study, it predicts that exclusive 
disjunction should be more difficult than the 
conditional. 
	 However, the model describes concept 
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learning when the S is given informative feedback to 
responses to sequentially presented stimuli and may fit 
less well to the design of experiment 1. 	 Bourne's 
model also predicts, for each concept, the truth table 
categories whose assignment will cause particular 
problems. These are: for the biconditional: TF, FT, 
FF; the conditional: TF, FF; inclusive disjunction: 
TF, FT; exclusive disjunction: TT, TF, FT. These show 
a fair degree of agreement with the errors of 
assignment of the test strings for Ss who used a 
correct description of the concept. However, FF errors 
far outnumbered those in the other categories for the 
conditional and biconditional and, although less 
common, were not absent for either form of disjunction. 
Times to task completion 
The rankings of times to task completion were also much 
the same within each language group, with the 
conditional having a significantly greater mean than 
each of the other four concepts. For all groups, the 
mean times for conjunction and exclusive disjunction 
were each less than the mean times for the 
biconditional and inclusive disjunction, and these 
differences were significant for the English and Arabic 
groups. In an experiment where a S is required to 
persevere until he achieves success at a task, mean 
times to task completion can be used as an indicator of 
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the difficulty of the task. However, in experiment 1 
this was not the case. The ranking of concepts by mean 
times to complete the task corresponds roughly to the 
number of test strings exemplifying the concept. It 
seems likely that inclusive disjunction took longer 
than the more difficult concepts exclusive disjunction 
and the biconditional because there were more strings 
to scan. Presumably the conditional took significantly 
longer than any other concept for the same reason and 
also because it was inherently more difficult. 
Relative performance of language groups 
Whilst the relative difficulty of concepts appears to 
be much the same for all three language groups, it is 
when we compare the results across language groups that 
we observe consistent and striking differences in 
performance. 	 For every concept, the proportion of 
Japanese Ss who successfully identified it was greatest 
and the proportion of Arabic speakers the least. 
Furthermore, the differences in the proportions of 
successful Japanese speakers and successful Arabic 
speakers were significant for each of the five 
concepts. 
Descriptions of concepts 
If we examine the descriptions of each concept used by 
those Ss who were successful in identifying it, we 
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again find some surprising language group differences. 
For all concepts, the mean length of the description 
(measured by the mean number of elementary 
propositions) was least for the Japanese speakers, 
although equalled by the English speakers for 
conjunction. The mean length of descriptions used by 
Arabic speakers was greatest for all concepts except 
the biconditional. 	 Furthermore, the differences 
between the means for the Arabic and Japanese groups 
were significant for all concepts except the 
biconditional (where the disjunctive normal form was 
overwhelmingly favoured by all language groups) and 
conjunction (where nearly all Ss used the description 
corresponding to 'p and q'). Also, for these three 
concepts (the conditional and both forms of 
disjunction), Japanese Ss who identified the concept 
were more likely than Arabic -speakers to describe it 
using the most succinct form with just a single 
elementary proposition. 
Within language groups too, the order of difficulty of 
the concepts (measured by the number of Ss in set C) is 
very much the same as their ordering by the mean length 
of correct descriptions used by Ss in set C. The only 
noteworthy exception is the biconditional for the 
Arabic speakers which was exceeded in difficulty only 
by the conditional but had a mean description length 
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which was exceeded by both forms of disjunction in 
addition to the conditional. This does suggest some 
association between the proportion of successful Ss and 
the length of the description of the concept used by 
those Ss. For each concept, the highest success rate 
was associated with the least mean description length. 
In fact, examination of figure 7.5 reveals a high 
degree of inverse linear correlation between these two 
variables for all concepts other than conjunction 
(which exhibits a 'ceiling effect') and the 
biconditional. 	 This lends support to Lenneberg's 
(1962) observation that 'in most instances of 
experimental concept formation, there is a correlation 
between ease of naming a concept and ease of attaining 
it'. 
In addition to offering shorter descriptions, the 
Japanese as a group used fewer different descriptions 
than either of the other two groups for every concept. 
The nature of the more 'popular' descriptions was also 
rather different for this group particularly when 
compared with the Arabic speakers. 	 For the 
biconditional the disjunctive normal form was favoured 
by all language groups. However, amongst the Japanese 
speakers only one S who attained the test string 
criterion offered a description other than that 
corresponding to the disjunctive normal form. 
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Japanese descriptions of the conditional also tended to 
refer to the disjunctive normal form when they did not 
correspond to one of the single elementary propositions 
pH>q or pA 4. English and Arabic speakers used a wide 
variety of descriptions of the conditional but did not 
show a particular preference for the disjunctive normal 
form. For both varieties of disjunction however, the 
Arabic speakers showed a stronger tendency to use this 
form than either of the other two groups, each of which 
favoured a description of the form 'p or q' with or 
without 'or both' or 'but not both' to make clear the 
sense of 'or'. 
The results seem to indicate that a succinct coding of 
each concept was in some way more readily available to 
the Japanese speakers, particularly when compared with 
the Arabic group which they outperformed in the 
identification of every concept. Furthermore, when a 
succinct expression for the concept was not used, the 
Japanese tended to resort to the disjunctive normal 
form. This seems a sensible strategy since it singles 
out each of the disjoint categories of strings and 
defines them in terms of the presence/absence of the 
salient shapes. Also, the only logical connectives 
used in the disjunctive normal form are conjunction and 
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disjunction which the results of experiment 2 suggest 
are well coded in all three languages. 
For a concept coded in its disjunctive normal form, 
when classifying test strings as examples/ non-examples 
it is presumably necessary to test each string against 
each of the conjunctive categories. 	 Since the 
disjunctive normal form for the conditional and 
inclusive disjunction involves more elementary 
propositions than any other of the concepts, it might 
well be more difficult to remember and therefore more 
likely to lead to errors than a more succinct coding. 
However, the results of experiments 1 and 2 seem to 
suggest that Ss may find difficulty in coding a 
conditional concept with a single elementary 
proposition and therefore resort to a lengthier, more 
error-prone, coding. 
Although the disjunctive normal form for inclusive 
disjunction also involves three elementary 
propositions, Japanese and English speakers were able 
to find a more succinct coding corresponding to one of 
pvq or (pvq) v (pAq). For some reason the Arabic 
speakers tended to code this concept using the 
lengthier disjunctive normal form which had a high 
error rate when it came to distinguishing examples from 
non-examples. Of the 16 Arabic speakers who offered 
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the disjunctive normal form as a description of 
inclusive disjunction, 3 (approximately 19%) failed the 
test string criterion. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
It will be recalled that the purpose of this project 
was to ascertain whether there were differences amongst 
language groups in the construal of the linguistic 
expressions of logical connectives. 	 The aim of 
experiment 2 was to identify any such differences. The 
purpose of experiment 1 was to establish whether 
differential understanding of linguistic connectives 
was associated with differing performance on concept 
identification tasks. Given that experiment 2 revealed 
no major differences in the understanding of those 
linguistic connectives, we are now faced with finding 
an alternative explanation for the consistent 
differences revealed by experiment 1. 
A potential explanation for the relatively superior 
performance of the Japanese group over the Arabic 
speakers would be that the latter group did not spend 
sufficient time on the tasks. However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that this was the case. As figure 
7.6 shows, the only concept for which the mean time to 
task completion for Arabic speakers was significantly 
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less than that for the Japanese was for the conditional 
and, in this case, it was the English language group 
which had the greatest mean time. Otherwise the 
differences in the mean times for Japanese and Arabic 
groups were not significant. 	 In any case, for 
conjunction and exclusive disjunction, it was the 
English group rather than the Arabic speakers who had 
the shortest mean time. Only for conjunction did the 
Japanese have the greatest mean and this was not 
significantly different from that of either of the 
other two groups. 
Another possible explanation for differential 
performance in the concept identification tasks is 
prior training in logic. However, only two Japanese 
claimed that they were familiar with elementary logic 
and the subject does not seem to be included in the 
Japanese national curriculum in Mathematics (Howson, 
1991). On the other hand, 39 of the Arabic speakers 
claimed that they had studied some logic. Were this 
information to be verifiable, we would be obliged to 
entertain the notion that prior training in logic is 
detrimental to performance on concept identification 
tasks. In the event, it was not possible to ascertain 
the extent of any familiarity with formal logic. 
Furthermore, the results of experiment 2 gave no 
indication that the Arabic speakers were any more 
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familiar with the logical concepts tested than either 
of the other groups. We can only conclude that any 
prior knowledge of logic which might be expected to 
have enhanced performance in either of the experimental 
tasks had either not been acquired or had been 
forgotten. 
The higher success rate of the Japanese Ss could stem 
from superior performance at either or both of two 
stages. The possibilities are: 
(a) as a group the Japanese were better at identifying 
the common characteristics of the strings exemplifying 
each concept; 
(b) for the Japanese group, the coding in memory of 
the common characteristics of the strings was more 
likely to lead to successful classification of the 16 
test strings. 
Of these two alternatives, the second seems less 
likely, if we assume that the verbal description 
offered by a S in some way reflects his internal 
representation of the concept. Of those descriptions 
which should have been associated with successful 
discrimination of exemplars from non-exemplars, those 
248 
offered by the Japanese were no more effective for any 
concept (see table 7.6). 
We are faced with explaining why it should be that the 
Japanese Ss were consistently more successful at 
abstracting the logical concepts from the strings and 
why their coding of these concepts was more succinct 
and less variable. There is no particular reason to 
suppose that the Japanese sample of Ss was any less 
representative of the underlying population than either 
of the other two samples and there is little in the 
research literature which might suggest the reasons for 
their consistently superior performance on the concept 
identification tasks. 
In international studies of mathematics attainment, a 
consistent finding is that Japanese children are 
superior to certain others of the same age (Husen, 
1967; Robitaille and Garden, 1989). 	 Unfortunately 
these studies did not consider nations where the 
indigenous language is Arabic. However, in no study 
has a sample of US students outperformed a comparable 
sample of Japanese students and the difference is 
reported as existing at all grade levels (Mayer et al, 
1991). In a comparative study of 15 - 17 year olds, 
the average Japanese score was better than 98% of the 
Americans (Harnisch et al, 1985). 	 However US and 
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Japanese students do not differ in scores on tests of 
basic cognitive ability (Mayer et al, 1991) and their 
superiority in mathematics does not extend to other 
subjects (Lynn, 1989). 	 It is suggested that the 
comparatively low level of mathematics achievement in 
American children is attributable to the fact that the 
quantity of classroom instruction which they receive is 
less than that of the Japanese and that less homework 
is required of them (Stevenson et al, 1986). 	 The 
general opinion is that it is exposure to mathematics 
rather than differential innate ability which leads to 
the superior performance of the Japanese children. 
The English speaking Ss used in this study were nearly 
all from the US and virtually all the Japanese Ss had 
been educated in Japan and, as a group, had almost 
certainly been exposed to more mathematics teaching in 
their secondary schools than either of the other two 
groups. Whilst logic is not included as a specified 
item in the national curriculum in Japan, it is 
possible that the logical concepts inherent in 
mathematics are simply more familiar to the Japanese 
because they have been exposed to them more frequently. 
On the other hand, if logical concepts are more 
familiar to the Japanese because of some other aspect 
of their language or culture, then this may be a 
contributory factor in their superior performance in 
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mathematics. There is a problem here as to which is 
cause and which is effect. 
Another possible contributory factor to the greater 
success of the Japanese in the task used in experiment 
1 is that they have a greater facility with abstracting 
meaning from visually presented symbolic material due 
to the nature of their character-based writing system. 
Japanese newspapers and magazines generally utilise 
around 2000 ideographic characters (kanji), 900 of 
which are learned by children during the first 6 years 
of their elementary education (Miller, 1967). 	 Kanji 
vary in their visual complexity which is measured by 
the number of strokes of which they are constituted. 
More complicated kanji may contain as many as 26 
strokes (Paradis et al, 1985). Visual symbols are much 
more a feature of the Japanese cultural experience and 
it may be that this would facilitate performance in a 
task of the type used. Of interest would be whether 
the speakers of other ideographic languages (for 
example, Chinese) would also excel at such a task. 
Some support for this explanation of language group 
differences is offered by the evidence that there may 
be cognitive differences in the speakers of languages 
with ideographic, as opposed to phonetic, writing 
systems at least with regard to the processing of 
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written material. 	 Zepp (1988) reports that an 
experiment performed in China revealed that damage to 
the temporal bone could result in destruction of the 
capacity to write in Caucasians but had no effect at 
all on the writing capacity of the Chinese. Damage to 
the parietal bone, on the other hand, did not affect 
the reading and writing ability of Caucasians whereas 
Chinese who suffered such an injury completely lost 
their ability to cope with written language. As Zepp 
points out '... educators should at least be aware of 
the possibility that students who speak character-based 
languages may attack problem solving and other 
theoretical concepts using strategies quite different 
from those used by students using phonetic languages.' 
The disparity in the performance of the Japanese and 
Arabic groups in the concept identification tasks does 
seem to indicate some difference in the cognitive 
functioning of the two groups. The greater success 
rate of the Japanese and the way in which they referred 
to the concepts suggest that either the concepts as 
presented were more familiar or that, as a group, the 
Japanese were more effective at identifying the 
defining characteristics and coding them. 
	 If the 
former is the case, prior training in logic does not 
seem a likely explanation although greater exposure to 
mathematics could account for greater familiarity with 
If the latter explains the superior 
the Japanese, then this could be 
writing system which facilitates the 
of concepts from visually presented 
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logical concepts. 
performance of 
attributed to a 
abstraction 
material. 
The underlying reasons are far from clear but the 
consistency with which the Japanese outperformed the 
English and Arabic speakers argues for further research 
to establish which factors - linguistic, educational or 
cultural - are implicated. 
Chapter 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
Experimental studies such as those reviewed in chapter 
4 have repeatedly demonstrated that the concepts 
underlying certain logical connectives are not 
adequately conveyed by the English language items with 
which they are normally associated. However, it is not 
entirely clear whether this mismatch between linguistic 
and logical forms is a general feature of a wide range 
of languages or whether it is restricted to certain 
specific language groups. 
This study constituted an exploratory investigation to 
determine to what extent the results reported for 
English linguistic connectives were generalisable to 
Japanese and Arabic, two languages unrelated to English 
and to each other. 	 A comparison of conjunctions, 
disjunctions, conditionals and biconditionals in these 
languages (chapter 5) revealed sufficient structural 
differences to suggest that there might be differences 
in the comprehension of these linguistic forms. 
Understanding of the linguistic coding of logical 
connectives in Japanese, Arabic and English was 
investigated in experiment 2 using a task which 
elicited the truth table associated with the natural 
language expression of each of the logical concepts. 
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Ss were native speakers of English, Japanese or Arabic 
and were tested in their mother tongue. Whilst the 
primary aim was to compare results across language 
groups, the task was such that the results could be 
compared with those of other studies (reviewed in 
chapter 4) which have used similar tasks to investigate 
the comprehension of linguistic connectives in English. 
Inherent in cross-cultural studies is the problem of 
obtaining comparable samples. Random assignment of Ss 
to experimental groups is not possible because the 
nature of the comparisons to be made determines that 
the groups be composed of Ss with a specified 
characteristic - in this case, that they be a native 
speaker of one of the languages investigated. In this 
study, an attempt was made to obtain comparable samples 
by using, as far as possible, students at a liberal 
arts college (Richmond College) which makes every 
effort to apply constant admissions standards (in terms 
of academic achievement) to students from diverse 
geographical regions. 	 Whilst all the English and 
Arabic speaking Ss satisfied this criterion, 
unfortunately it was necessary to supplement the 
Japanese group with students at other London colleges. 
However, there is no particular reason to suppose that 
these had characteristics which rendered the Japanese 
sample different from one composed solely of students 
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drawn from Richmond College. Furthermore, there were 
no indications that the Japanese Ss who were not 
Richmond College students performed any differently 
from those who were. 
An additional difficulty in comparing the results of 
the three samples is that, because of the requirement 
that Ss be tested in their native language, three 
different experimenters were necessary - one for each 
language group. 	 In anticipation of the possibility 
that this might result in dissimilar treatment of 
language groups, the Japanese and Arabic experimenters 
underwent considerable training prior to the testing of 
Ss. This included several trial runs testing English 
speaking Ss (not used in the main study) in English 
under observation. Both were well acquainted with the 
-purpose of the study and each was sufficiently fluent 
in English to understand exactly what was required of 
them. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the 
observed differences in language group performance can 
be attributed to the behaviour of the experimenters. 
Whilst it would have been preferable to use Ss whose 
only language was their native one, this constraint 
would have rendered the study impractical. In the 
event all the Arabic and Japanese speaking Ss had some 
familiarity with English, although even the few whose 
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English was fluent maintained that it was not their 
first language. 	 It is recognised that, in a study 
which seeks to attribute observed differences in 
performance to language factors, contributory effects 
due to second language interference are possible. 
However, the likely nature of such effects is far from 
clear. By using only the S's native language 
throughout the testing process, it was hoped that any 
such influence would be minimised. 
In addition to performing a task designed to 
investigate their understanding of linguistic 
connectives, Ss also performed a series of concept 
identification tasks where the concepts to be 
identified were conjunction, inclusive and exclusive 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional. This 
constituted experiment 1. 	 Studies using such tasks 
(reviewed in chapter 4) have typically used geometrical 
figures varying on a number of dimensions such as size, 
colour and shape. A concept is then defined by the 
presence/absence of one value on each of two 
dimensions. For example, if the relevant attributes 
are 'red' and 'large', conjunction would be defined by 
all figures which are both red and large and inclusive 
disjunction by figures which have one or both of these 
two characteristics. Less frequently, concept 
identification studies have utilised strings of letters 
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or shapes. In this case a concept is defined by the 
presence/absence of either of two relevant shapes. The 
latter paradigm was selected for this study because 
there is some evidence that attributes such as colour, 
shape and size may not have the same perceptual 
salience (Ketchum and Bourne, 1980). 	 On the other 
hand, there seemed no reason to suppose that, of the 
shapes used in this study (circle, square, star and 
triangle), any one was more salient perceptually than 
any other. 
The concept identification tasks used fall into the 
category of 'rule learning'. The relevant shapes were 
known to the S who therefore had to identify the 
concept only in terms of how those shapes defined the 
characteristics shared by its exemplars. 	 Each task 
differed somewhat from 'standard' rule learning tasks 
in that the concept was to be abstracted from a 
complete set of exemplars rather than from a sequence 
of individual examples and non-examples. 	 This 
eliminated the memory burden associated with the 
necessity to consolidate information obtained by 
previously presented instances. 
The results obtained from experiment 2 suggest that, 
for the languages investigated, if there are any 
differences in the understanding of linguistic 
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connectives, these are very minor. English speakers 
were slightly more likely to interpret an 'or' 
statement as exclusive disjunction than the other two 
groups and the Japanese had a greater tendency to 
interpret 'if ... then' statements as biconditionals. 
The necessity of expressing a biconditional in Japanese 
as the conjunction of two conditionals is proposed as 
explaining the greater proportion of readings 
equivalent to the logical biconditional found for this 
group. 
When we consider the results for individual 
connectives, we find that 'and' statements are almost 
universally understood as logical conjunctions and that 
this finding is independent of language group. 'Or' 
statements are slightly less successful in eliciting 
either of the two possible disjunctive interpretations 
but, when they do, the inclusive interpretation is 
overwhelmingly favoured. This, too, is independent of 
language group. 	 It was also found that, for all 
groups, linguistic conditionals and biconditionals were 
only rarely interpreted 'logically' and appeared to 
have an underlying truth table corresponding to that of 
logical conjunction. 
This hierarchy of understanding of linguistic 
connectives is the same as that reported by a number of 
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studies which have compared the comprehension of 
English language connectives (for instance: Airasian, 
1975; Damarin, 1977a, 1977b; Bart, 1974). However, 
the tendency to construe linguistic disjunctions 
inclusively is at odds with the results of a number of 
studies which have reported a preference for an 
exclusive reading of 'or' statements in English 
(Sternberg, 1979; Newstead et al, 1984; Braine and 
Rumain, 1981). 	 To explain the discrepancy between 
these results, it is proposed that the interpretation 
of an 'or' statement may well depend on the nature of 
the disjuncts. When they are actions, the preferred 
interpretation is likely to be exclusive and where they 
are properties, an inclusive interpretation will be 
favoured. 
We propose that the apparent interpretation of 
conditionals and biconditionals as conjunctions is due 
to the nature of the response categories used in this 
study. The results for conditionals can be explained 
by the 'defective truth table' (Wason, 1966) whereby it 
is proposed that Ss view the truth table categories 
where the antecedent is false to be irrelevant to the 
truth value of a conditional statement. When faced 
with the alternatives of responding 'consistent' or 
'inconsistent' to these categories (as in this study), 
Ss default to 'inconsistent' - but not because they 
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believe that these render the conditional statement 
false. They simply consider them irrelevant and 
consider 'inconsistent' to be the more appropriate of 
the two alternative responses. 
The three language groups performed similarly in their 
interpretation of the linguistic connectives tested 
despite the difference in the construction of these 
items in Arabic, Japanese and English. However, there 
were striking and consistent differences in performance 
in the concept identification tasks. The Japanese as a 
group outperformed the other two groups on every 
concept and the differences between the proportions of 
successful Japanese speakers and successful Arabic 
speakers was significant for all five concepts. 
The hierarchy of difficulty -of the concepts amongst 
themselves was similar for all language groups, 
however. 	 Every group was more successful at 
identifying conjunction than inclusive disjunction and 
both of these concepts were easier than exclusive 
disjunction, the conditional and biconditional. The 
conditional was the most difficult concept for all 
groups. These findings are in broad agreement with 
other studies which have investigated relative 
difficulty of concepts in similar (although not 
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identical) tasks (for example: 	 Neisser and Weene, 
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1962; 	 Haygood and Bourne, 1965; 	 Bourne, 1970). 
However, these have reported the biconditional to be 
more difficult than the conditional. 
Why the Japanese were so much more successful in the 
concept identification tasks and why their descriptions 
of these concepts were consistently less varied and 
shorter remains to be explained. Had differences been 
found in the comprehension of the linguistic coding of 
logical connectives, we could have attempted to explain 
dissimilar familiarity with the logical concepts by the 
differing provision within each language for conveying 
those concepts. However, this study revealed no such 
differences and it therefore constitutes yet another 
investigation which has failed to find Whorfian effects 
amongst the speakers of dissimilar languages. However, 
it cannot be concluded that such differences do not 
exist. 	 There is no obvious explanation for the 
consistently superior performance of the Japanese 
group, particularly over the Arabic speakers, in 
identifying all five of the concepts tested. Whilst it 
does not appear to be attributable to Whorfian 
differences in the understanding of the appropriate 
linguistic forms, language factors which might explain 
greater facility with these tasks cannot be ruled out. 
The fact that shorter and less variable descriptions 
were used by the Japanese suggests that there are 
certainly related language factors, although these may 
not be causative. 	 Furthermore, although their 
representation was visual, the nature of the concepts 
themselves is abstract, a realm where language has been 
proposed as exerting a greater influence (Bloom, 1984; 
Lemon, 1981). For some reason, the schemata associated 
with the logical concepts seem more 'accessible' to the 
Japanese Ss. This seems to lend some support to Brown 
and Lenneberg's (1954) proposal that more familiar 
concepts are tagged with shorter labels so that '... 
more nameable concepts are nearer the top of the 
cognitive deck'. However the results of this study 
suggest no obvious reason why the 'cognitive deck' of 
the Japanese should be organised differently with 
regard to logical concepts. 
Implications for learning mathematics 
A cognitive factor which has been found to be 
positively correlated with mathematical ability is 
'speed of closure' (Pullman, 1979). This is defined as 
'the ability to unify an apparently disparate 
perceptual field into a single percept'. 
	 Whilst 
experiment 1 did not set out to assess this factor, the 
nature of the tasks used is such that success would 
seem to be associated with the general skills subsumed 
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under 'speed of closure'. 	 It may well be that the 
superior performance of the Japanese in experiment I is 
indicative of a cognitive structure which favours speed 
of closure. 	 If so, this would go some way towards 
explaining the greater success in mathematics reported 
for the Japanese (Husen, 1967; Robitaille and Garden, 
1989). However, we are still faced with explaining why 
the Japanese should be more generously endowed with 
this cognitive factor. 
We could also explain the superior performance of the 
Japanese on the tasks used in experiment 1 by proposing 
that, for some reason, they are more familiar with the 
underlying logical concepts. This could result from 
greater exposure to mathematics and hence to the 
logical concepts inherent in the subject. On the other 
hand, if it stems from some other source, it could 
explain superior mathematical performance. 
It is clear that linguistic connectives used to convey 
logical concepts frequently fail to do so. Furthermore 
this problem is not peculiar to the English language, 
but seems to be a feature of a range of languages with 
distinct linguistic origins. What then are the 
implications for the teaching and learning of 
mathematics? 
If, as has been suggested, codability is a measure of 
how readily available a concept is (Brown and 
Lenneberg, 1954; Zipf, 1935), then we must conclude 
that conditional and biconditional concepts are not 
part of the cognitive 'stock-in-trade' of logically 
naive individuals. 	 Yet, these connectives play a 
fundamental role in mathematical reasoning. 	 It 
therefore seems surprising that the teaching of logical 
concepts is a neglected area of the mathematics 
curriculum in a wide variety of national settings 
(Travers and Westbury, 1989; Howson, 1991). Why this 
should be so is not clear but it seems likely that 
there is a tacit assumption that, because linguistic 
items such as 'if ... then' are so widely used in 
natural language, they need no further clarification. 
However, although they may be familiar terms, the 
concepts which they label are not necessarily the 
logical concepts so fundamental to mathematical 
inference. 
There are many mathematical concepts which are labelled 
with linguistic items which have very different 
meanings when they are used in everyday conversation. 
Examples are 'factor', 'group', 'differentiate' and 
'function'. When teaching these concepts, we take 
considerable pains to ensure that the terms are defined 
adequately. Yet there is little evidence to suggest 
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that we do the same for linguistic connectives despite 
the evidence that they suffer from a similar lack of 
congruity between their 'mathematical meaning' and 
their 'everyday meaning'. 
The situation may well be exacerbated by the fact that, 
in mathematics itself, we are often careless about the 
way in which we use conditionals. 	 Mathematical 
definitions are almost always expressed as conditionals 
when the intended interpretation is that of a 
biconditional. For instance, having equipped students 
with the definition 'If a triangle has three equal 
sides, then it is called an equilateral triangle', we 
will take it that all future references to equilateral 
triangles will be understood as confined to triangles 
having three equal sides. We simply assume that the 
invited inference will be made, that the conditional 
will be 'perfected to a biconditional' and interpreted 
as we intended. 
	 On the other hand, if the same 
students were to succumb to the invited inference 
associated with 'If a function is differentiable then 
it is continuous', we would undoubtedly accuse them of 
having made a fundamental reasoning error and exhort 
them to be careful to avoid it in the future. 
It is interesting to note that the direct method of 
proving a conditional statement in mathematics is 
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parallel to Braine and O'Brien's (1991) inference 
schema for a natural language conditional: 'To derive 
or evaluate If p then ... first suppose p; for any 
proposition q that follows from the supposition of p 
taken together with other information assumed, one may 
assert If p then q'. 	 The difference in proving a 
mathematical conditional is that the 'other information 
assumed' must consist of axioms and proved theorems and 
'follows from' must be justified using a sequence of 
steps sanctioned by the laws of logic. 
It is not surprising that logical errors are routinely 
committed when the burden of conveying logical 
relationships rests on linguistic forms known to invite 
a variety of interpretations. Drawing valid inferences 
is fundamental to successful mathematical activity and 
yet logical concepts as such are rarely taught formally 
to other than specialist mathematicians and the nature 
of a deductive proof receives little attention in 
secondary school texts. Furthermore, as mathematics 
teachers and writers of textbooks, we ourselves are 
often guilty of making logical statements which do not 
mean what we intend them to mean and which do not 
justify the inferences which we condone. 
Whilst this study has added little to the 'Whorfian 
debate', it does offer some contribution to the 
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discussion of how linguistic connectives are 
interpreted in a variety of languages and the 
implications for the teacher and learner of 
mathematics. It suggests that, in teaching 
mathematics, we should be aware of the potential 
ambiguity in the interpretation of logical 
relationships conveyed through natural language. 	 It 
also points to the need to include some instruction in 
formal logic and deductive proof in secondary school 
curricula. 
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Appendices 
Appendix la: Test 2 (English) 
Appendix lb: Test 2 (Arabic) 
Appendix lc: Test 2 (Japanese) 
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Appendix la 
A 	 C 	 D 
You are gi N.en below 16 numbered statements. Above are 4 diagrams labelled 
A, B, C and D each showing a square. Two of the squares are large and two are 
small. Two of the squares ore black and two are white. 
For each statement, look at the diagrams A, B, C and D and decide, for each one, 
whether it is consistent with that statement or not. Tick (3) the appropriate boxes 
for the diagrams which you think are consistent with the statement and place a cross 
(X) in the appropriate boxes for those which are not consistent with the statement. 
A B C 
1.  The square is black and it is large. 
2.  If the square is large then it is white. 
3.  The square is white or it is small.. 
4.  The square is small ii and only if it is black. 
5.  The square is large or it is black 
6.  If the square is block then it is small. 
7.  The square is white if and only if it is large. 
8.  The square is small and it is white. 
9.  The square is krge if and only if it is black. 
10.  If the squc:e is white then it is small. 
. - 
11.  The square is black or it is 	 small. 
12.  The square is lorce and it is white. 
13.  The square is white if and only if it is small. 
iz. The square 
	 is 	 lerce or 	 it 	 is 	 -.vhite. 
15.  The square is block and it is small. 
16.  If the square is large then it is black. 
Appendix lb 
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Appendix lc 
A 	 B 	 C 	 D 
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